Global Ship Lease Aktie

Good morning, and welcome to the Global Ship Lease First Quarter 2026 Earnings Conference Call. My name is Franz, and I'll be the operator assisting the call today. [Operator Instructions]

I would now like to turn the call over to Tom Lister, Chief Executive Officer of Global Ship Lease. Please go ahead.

Thank you very much. Hello, everyone, and welcome to the Global Ship Lease First Quarter 2026 Earnings Conference Call. You can find the slides as usual that accompany today's call on our website at www.globalshiplease.com.

As usual, Slides 2 and 3 remind you that today's call may include forward-looking statements that are based on current expectations and assumptions and are, by their nature, inherently uncertain and outside of the company's control. Actual results may differ materially from these forward-looking statements due to many factors, including those described in the safe harbor section of the slide presentation.

We would also like to direct your attention to the Risk Factors section of our most recent annual report on our 2025 Form 20-F, which was filed in March 2026. You can find the form on our website or on the SEC's. All of our statements are qualified by these and other disclosures in our reports filed with the SEC. We do not undertake any duty to update forward-looking statements. The reconciliations of the non-GAAP financial measures to which we will refer during this call to the most directly comparable measures calculated and presented in accordance with GAAP usually refer to the earnings release that we issued this morning, which is also available on our website.

I'm joined as usual today by our Executive Chairman, George Youroukos; and our Chief Financial Officer, Tassos Psaropoulos. George will begin the call with high-level commentary on GSL and our industry. And then Tassos and I will take you through our recent activity, quarterly results and financials and the current market environment. After that, we will be very pleased to answer your questions.

So turning now to Slide 4. I'll pass the call over to George.

Thank you, Tom, and good morning, afternoon or evening to all of you joining today. The opening months of 2026 have been a continuation and, in fact, an escalation of the themes of geopolitical uncertainty and volatility that we saw in 2025. From the continued disruption of tariffs and the Red Sea to the unprecedented disruption in the Strait of Hormuz, which has resulted in the humanitarian crisis of around 20,000 seafarers being trapped in the Persian Gulf.

The world has become more dangerous, extraordinarily unpredictable and complex. And this has ramifications throughout the supply chain. Trade routes have shifted, fragmented and decentralized, ultimately becoming more inefficient, requiring even more containership capacity and more flexible ships to transport a given volume of containers.

In these conditions, we continue to see strong demand for our midsized and smaller container ships, which provide valuable flexibility and reliability for our liner company customers. In this environment, we have worked hard to keep adding charters so that our contracted revenues now stand at $2.1 billion over 2.6 years. Our charter coverage is 100% for 2026 and 86% for 2027. We continue to deleverage and optimize our fortress balance sheet all while paying an annualized dividend of $2.5 per share, which is a dividend yield of around 6% on the basis of our stock price at the close yesterday.

As always, we're keeping an eye on opportunities for disciplined, prudent fleet renewal that will allow us to continue generating strong cash flow through the medium and long term as our existing cash cows age out. Fundamentally, we maintain a focus on resilience and optionality, which has continued to serve us and our shareholders well and provides a start of the foundation in a world of uncertainty from which to act decisively on completing opportunities as they arise -- compelling, excuse me, opportunities as they arise. With that, I will turn the call over to Tom.

Thanks, George. Hello again, everyone. Please turn now to Slide 5, where you will see our diversified charter portfolio. As of March 31, we have over $2 billion in forward contracted revenues with 2.6 years of contract cover from a well-diversified and top-notch set of charterers. We have 100% of our revenue days covered for 2026 and 86% covered for 2027.

On Slide 6, we go over our dynamic capital allocation policy. A steady stream of significant geopolitical events over the past several years has added further volatility into the already cyclical nature of our industry, creating an environment where resilience, flexibility and dynamism are critically important. Maximizing long-term shareholder value is at the core of what we do and our combination of paying an attractive dividend, building equity value through deleveraging and highly selective fleet renewal, which also includes the opportunistic monetization of older noncore assets are all in the service of that goal.

Slide 7 shows the cyclicality of our industry as well as our prudent and long-term thinking when it comes to managing it. You can see our history of ship purchases and how they have been clustered during market downturns or have otherwise been structured to minimize downside risk while maximizing upside potential. While not shown on this chart, it's worth noting that the flip side of choosing the right circumstances under which to buy ships is identifying the right opportunities to sell ships. All of this sounds simple enough to do in theory, but it is less straightforward in practice. And hopefully, you will agree from our track record that we have managed to strike the right balance.

With that, I'll pass the call to Tassos to discuss our financials. Tassos?

Thank you, Tom. Slide 8 shows our financial highlights in the first quarter of 2026. I would like to emphasize a few key takeaways. Our financial performance and cash flow have remained very strong. Our cash position is $655 million, which on paper brings us almost to net zero debt, although $156 million of this cash is restricted. The remainder ensures that we can fully cover our covenants, working capital needs and manage the potential financial implications of geopolitical disruptions and other macro events in an increasingly unpredictable world. It also provides dry powder both for CapEx to optimize the commercial value of our existing fleet and for disciplined investment in fleet renewal when the right opportunities present themselves.

Indeed, as Tom has referenced, we were pleased to agree the forward sales of 3 of our older ships, which will all be 25 years old or older by the time they are delivered to buyers for an aggregate price of $52 million, which we expect will unlock a book gain of around $25 million. Added to which, we will hand on to the cash flows to be generated by their existing charters until they are delivered between fourth quarter of 2026 and fourth quarter of 2027. And we achieved all this while also consistently paying a healthy and recently upsized dividend.

Slide 9 shows our ongoing efforts to build resilience and equity value while delevering our balance sheet. Our outstanding debt is shown on the left graph, which stood at $950 million at the end of 2022, now sits at under $700 million and is on track to be well below $600 million by year-end. The right graph highlights a similar result for financial leverage, but to an even greater extent, which we have reduced from 8.4x in 2018 to 0.3x today.

Slide 10 lays the progress out further. As seen in the left-hand graph, we have been able to maintain a highly competitive cost of debt even as base rates have meaningfully increased. Our breakeven rates have seen a similar trajectory as our progress in reducing interest expense has enabled us to absorb inflationary increases in vessel OpEx over time, primarily related to rising crewing costs.

With that, I will turn the call back over to Tom to discuss the market and our fleet.

Thanks, Tassos. On Slide 11, we reemphasize our focus on container ships between 2,000 TEU and approximately 10,000 TEU. These ship sizes provide the backbone for containerized trade with around 3/4 of global containerized trade volumes flowing in the "non-mainlane" trades, which tend to require ships offering more flexibility and adaptability than the very big container ships, by which I mean the jumbos and A380s of the container shipping industry that attract more media attention. These very big ships tend to be limited to the big East-West mainlane arterial trades requiring specialized port infrastructure, deepwater and huge cargo volumes.

Meanwhile, midsized and smaller container ships like those in our fleet can go almost anywhere and are not reliant on any one region or trade. And as geopolitical uncertainty has increasingly become a fact of life in recent times, liner companies have prioritized operational flexibility and reliability. In addition, trade routes have fragmented and decentralized, leading to a larger percentage of trade occurring intra region, further increasing the demand for these midsized and smaller container ships that GSL provides.

On Slide 12, we go over the developing situations in the Middle East. While we're not geopolitical experts by any means and cannot predict how these situations will unfold, we can provide some context about what we are seeing now and what we have seen in the past. Let's take the Red Sea first. Prior to the disruption, about 20% of containerized trade volumes moved through the Red Sea and Suez Canal. Since the disruption, ships have been forced to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope, a far longer voyage and one that has absorbed about 10% of effective shipping capacity in the process. After a brief period of optimism that saw a limited return of ships to the area, the security situation in the region sharply deteriorated once again. While, of course, we can't know for sure, it certainly appears, for the time being, that liner companies are unlikely to return to transiting at scale in the near term.

Now on to the more recent conflict in the Strait of Hormuz where shipping traffic has been and continues to be seriously constrained since the beginning of the Iran conflict. Most of the press coverage has focused on the significance of closing Hormuz to the energy sector and the growing risk of a global energy and fertilizer crisis.

However, there is also an impact on container shipping as prior to the conflict around 3% to 4% of global containerized trade volumes passed through the Strait. Now major ports and shipping hubs in the area are seeing only a fraction of normal volumes with limited transshipments or overland freight options available to replace the lost trade volumes and cutting across all of this is the awful fact that around 20,000 seafarers are currently estimated to be trapped in the Persian Gulf.

The longer-term implications of these disruptions remain unclear. For the time being, both situations remain highly dynamic and offer yet another set of complex challenges for the shipping world to navigate while keeping seafarer safety at the forefront of any decision-making.

Slide 13 shows supply side and scrapping trends. The situation there remains largely the same as it has been for some time. Idle capacity and scrapping activity both remain negligible. And with capacity constrained and trade routes in continual flux, the global fleet is consistently finding employment and often doing so at very strong rates that are keeping older ships on the water, making money instead of being scrapped.

We highlight the order book on Slide 14. In recent years, the order book has grown meaningfully, although the segments that GSL operates in have seen far less growth. The overall order book-to-fleet ratio stands at 37%, but this is dragged upwards by the 60% ratio for vessels over 10,000 TEU. For ships below 10,000 TEU, in other words, the segments in which GSL primarily competes, the order book-to-fleet ratio stands at a somewhat more digestible 20%. Also, the sub-10,000 TEU size segments are aging. If we were to assume that all ships 25 years and older were scrapped through 2030 and netted out that capacity against new capacity delivering from the order book, then the sub-10,000 TEU fleet would actually shrink by 3.4%.

In the current market, which has minimal slack, GSL is happy to lock in charter coverage at highly supportive rates. And if the market were to experience a downward normalization, we would expect scrapping activity to pick up meaningfully, offsetting the arrival of new vessels in part or in whole or even more.

Slide 15 shows the charter market. When looking at the market rates on the right side, I would like to reemphasize that our average daily breakeven rates are just above $9,800 per ship and the operating leverage in our business means that essentially everything over that point falls straight to the bottom line. In this environment, we have added charter coverage so that we are now -- we now have more than $2 billion of contracted revenues spread over 2.6 years, offering us the comfort of forward visibility in an otherwise highly uncertain world.

And with that, I will turn it back to George on Slide 16.

Thank you, Tom. To summarize, we are focused on maintaining optionality, resilience and operational integrity in a complex and uncertain world. As supply chains fragment and shift from 1 day to the next, flexibility is key, and that is precisely what the GSL fleet provides to our liner company customers. We have extensive multiyear charter cover over $2 billion of contracted revenues spread over the next 2.6 years, in fact. We have built a fortress balance sheet and have highly competitive breakeven rates such that we are in a strong position for any circumstances. And we will continue to follow our mantra of staying patient, disciplined and nimble regarding value-accretive fleet renewals while also prioritizing the return of capital to shareholders via our $2.5 per share annualized dividend.

Now with that, we will be very pleased to take your questions.

[Operator Instructions] As of now, your first question comes from the line of Liam Burke from B. Riley Securities.

If I look at your open charters for '27, have there been -- can you gauge charters' interest in forward fixing those vessels? And any kind of appetite for where the rates are going?

Yes. The market right now, Liam, is as healthy as it has been. There is demand. There's not enough ships. So whatever we see in the market right now is a result of unavailability of tonnage, not a lack of demand. So the market is right now healthy for ships opening in 2026, and obviously for ships that are large enough in 2027. When I say large enough, like I said, always the ships that are in demand forward more than anything else are ships that are in excess of 4,000 TEU or 3,500 to 4,000 maybe.

Great. You got great prices on the 3 2,000 TEU vessels you sold, forward sold, and you've had some great prices on the purchases of the 3 8,500s in the fourth quarter. But looking at the pricing that you got on the older vessels, are you seeing any opportunity to add assets here?

Well, Liam, as you know, having listened to our earnings call now for a number of years, I guess. We always keep our eyes open. But we stick to the mantra that George described at the tail end of his remarks. In other words, we're patient, we're disciplined and we're nimble. So we always keep our eyes open, we're always running numbers, we're always looking at opportunities, but we only move on the right opportunities.

So we're continuing to see interesting things, but none that have met our fairly stringent investment criteria and meet the right mix of risk and returns. So as a result, we have not acquired anything. Instead, we've monetized these older assets. And I know Tassos mentioned that on the call, we get not only the gain on book that we're estimating at roughly $25 million when they're eventually delivered to buyers, but we also get to hang on to the contracted cash flows between now and the time of delivery and the vessels are being delivered between depending on the ship between the fourth quarter of this year and the fourth quarter of 2027. So we're pleased with the deal.

Great. That's fair. And I just have a real quick one for Tassos. On the SG&A for the quarter, I know you have seasonal expenses that don't repeat the balance of the year. But even on a year-over-year basis, they were higher. Is there anything in there unusual?

Nothing unusual. It has to do with the accounting method of the incentive plan that we have mentioned in the 20-F. It has to do with how this is being calculated and of course, comparing to the share price versus the previous time that it was in 2021.

And your next question comes from Stephanie Moore from Jefferies.

I guess given your commentary, the charter market remains firm for now, but forward visibility is certainly limited and sentiment might be somewhat cautious. But how are your customers approaching duration today? Are they still kind of looking to lock in multiyear charters? Are they increasingly favoring shorter tenures, just given the geopolitical uncertainty? I would love to get your thoughts on that.

Sure, Stephanie. This is Tom. Thanks for posing the question. I'll kick it off and no doubt, George and possibly Tassos will add to it. Charter negotiations, it's a 2-way discussion. So you're absolutely right. I would say that in the context of heightened uncertainty, the charterers would probably prefer to go short rather than to go long. But given that there's such limited liquidity and availability in the charter market, if they want the tonnage, they have to move much closer to the terms that are being offered by owners like us, which means that there's always a compromise found between us, between both rate and duration. And going back to George's earlier comments, if -- for the right ships, duration of several years is still possible and at very firm rates.

George, do you want to add anything to that?

No. I'll just echo what you said. It's really a compromise between a negotiation between the charterers and the owners. The owners want the certainty of long employment. The charterers want a good deal. So longer employment gets a better charter rate, obviously, than short employment. So you might have an immediate ship opening, let's say, in the next 6 months might get double what she would get or she might get double for a 6-month period than what she would get for a 3-year period. So it's just a matter of negotiation.

Understood. And then I guess, you continue to talk about being selective and disciplined regarding fleet renewal. Can you maybe just highlight what your ideal replacement profile looks like, the ship size, age, ECO, specification and the likes? And then maybe timing or preferences that relates to vessel renewal in terms of your broader kind of capital allocation priorities?

Sure. I'll kick this off. And again, no doubt, George will weigh in. So let's back into this. We're very comfortable with the size segments upon which we're focused, which we think provide the right combination of operational flexibility and an attractive risk return mix, by which I mean we're going to stay focused upon the roughly 2,000 to roughly 10,000 TEU size segments when it comes to renewal. If you were to offer us the perfect choice, it would probably skew towards the mid and upper end of that, so call it somewhere between 6,000 and 10,000 TEU or so.

In terms of age of asset, we're not dogmatic. We look at every project or every prospect on its own merits. So as you've seen, we're willing to look at ships with charters attached. We're willing to look at ships on a speculative basis as long as the pricing is very much towards the bottom of the cycle and downside risk is minimal, and we're also willing to contemplate new builds. So there's no dogma on that. We'll look at every deal on its merits, but we will continue to focus upon the same size range as is our current focus.

Your next question comes from Omar Nokta from Clarksons Securities.

George, Tom and Tassos, I do have a couple of questions. And maybe just first kind of back on to the -- those 3 ship sales. Tom, you highlighted $52 million combined price looks fairly decent, but then also you get to generate what looks like perhaps maybe $20 million or so of EBITDA until you sell them. So I think just looking at that, it suggests that ship values are quite a bit firmer than certainly than what the share price implies. Just wanted to get a sense from kind of your angle. Is this something broad-based across all container ships? Or is this perhaps an arb that you're able to capture just given that these vessels are maybe later in life? Yes, I just wanted to get a sense in terms of where you see values from here. Is it very firm on the back end versus what we kind of think?

Yes. I mean that's a sort of multimillion or multibillion dollar question, Omar. I don't have a sort of a clear and crisp answer for you. But what I can tell you is, obviously, from an owning perspective, the option value on an asset reduces as that asset ages.

So typically, our view is that it's possible to make much more money from holding and continuing to operate a vessel in the charter market, and you'll see from the chart in the pack, which contrasts the way in which charter rates, asset values and newbuilding values fluctuate through the cycle, and there's always much more upside volatility in charter rates than there is even in secondhand values. So it generally makes sense to hold on to the ships, keep chartering them and keep locking in additional revenues. However, when you get to ships, which are -- well, these are going to be between 25 and 27 years old by the time they're sold, that option value comes down somewhat.

So we like the economics that you've just laid out of retaining the contracted EBITDA until they're delivered and then divesting them at that price. Whether you can draw anything broader from that on where asset values are today or are likely to remain, very, very difficult to say. I think we're in a world where making bets on what will happen in the future or even tomorrow, it would take a brave man, probably a braver man than me.

But George, do you want to add to that?

No, I mean the golden rule for shipping is the entry point. So if you're buying an asset at the right price, then it's only upside potential that you have to worry about rather than downside. So the way we look at transactions is protecting the downside first and foremost. And then the upside will come if we have bought the asset at the right price. This is, in general, our theory, which I think is the golden rule of shipping.

Yes, the GSL way. Well, it certainly seems that the exit point here is quite a bit appealing. And then just a follow-up, second question. You're now officially in a net cash position, and that looks to widen now as we move ahead here over the next several quarters with no real major commitments. Does buying back stock here make any sense? Do you prefer to kind of go in that direction? Or do you think it's best to maybe stay conservative, build a bit of cash and continue to focus on maybe repaying debt?

We think the latter of those 2 positions, Omar, makes most sense. I mean it's not only a question of delevering, but it's also building dry powder for opportunistic acquisitions when the right opportunities arise. We do keep eye on share buybacks from an opportunistic perspective. And I think the average price at which we've bought back shares has been roughly $18.50, so $18.50 or thereabouts through the cycle where we felt that there was a structural disconnect between where the business was being valued and the intrinsic value in the business. So we pounced on it. But at the moment, we think delevering and building dry powder is the right strategy for where the market is in terms of both risk and opportunity at the moment.

[Operator Instructions] And your next question comes from Climent Molins from Value Investor's Edge.

I wanted to follow up on Liam's question regarding fleet renewal. A couple of the vessels are on the smaller sizes. And you have a few more vessels also on the older end on that side of the fleet. Would you be comfortable downsizing the feeder side further if you don't come across interesting acquisition opportunities? Or is there, let's say, minimum size you'd like to maintain there?

Climent, thanks for the question. I mean we sort of tried to address that at least in part in our answer to Stephanie a little earlier. So while we like the 2,000 to 10,000 TEU segment, broadly speaking. If given our choice, we would wait our fleet renewal towards probably the upper half, let's call it, the 6,000 to 10,000 TEU range. We're not dogmatic about a particular size category. So once again, we will either invest or divest assets where we think the returns are likely to be most favorable for the company and for shareholders.

That's helpful. And I also wanted to ask a bit about the effect that the Middle East situation is having on the market. Could you talk a bit about whether you've seen a sizable increase in congestion in regional ports outside the Strait? And are you seeing any other ripple effects?

Yes. I mean it's hugely disruptive. We're seeing ripple effects throughout liner companies networks. And one of the most recent ones we became aware of is congestion in the Panama Canal of all places as lines look to redirect vessels and optimize their network.

So yes, you're absolutely right. There is disruption in terms of congestion, both at choke points like canals and also in ports. And there are also disruption associated with challenges for the liner operators getting fuel into the right places. And not only the challenge of getting fuel into the right places, but also the cost of fuel. And as bunker costs rise, the ship -- the lines try to reduce fuel burn to reduce costs. And the only way to reduce fuel burn is to flow ships down. So we're seeing networks slowing down, which means you need more ships to carry the same volume of cargo. And we're also seeing, to your point, congestion, both in ports and transit locations. So yes, big ripple effects.

Congratulations for the quarter.

There are no further questions at this time. I would now like to turn the call back over to Thomas Lister for the closing remarks. Please go ahead.

Well, thank you very much, everyone, for joining our 1Q call. We wish you a very good summer and look forward to talking to you again on the event of our second quarter call. Thank you again. Bye-bye.

Ladies and gentlemen, thank you all for joining, and that concludes today's conference call. All participants may now disconnect. Thank you.

Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for standing by. My name is Desiree, and I will be your conference operator today. At this time, I would like to welcome everyone to the Global Ship Lease Fourth Quarter 2025 Earnings Conference Call. [Operator Instructions]. I would now like to turn the conference over to Tom Lister, Chief Executive Officer. You may begin.

Thank you very much. Hello, everyone, and welcome to the Global Ship Lease fourth quarter 2025 earnings conference call. You can find the slides that accompany today's presentation on our website at www.globalshiplease.com.

As usual, Slides 2 and 3 remind you that today's call may include forward-looking statements that are based on current expectations and assumptions and are by their nature inherently uncertain and outside of the company's control. Actual results may differ materially from these forward-looking statements due to many factors, including those described in the safe harbor section of the slide presentation. We would also like to direct your attention to the Risk Factors section of our most recent annual report on our 2024 Form 20-F, which was filed in March 2025. You can find the form on our website or on the SEC's. All of our statements are qualified by these and other disclosures in our reports filed with the SEC. We do not undertake any duty to update forward-looking statements.

The reconciliations of the non-GAAP financial measures to which we will refer, during this call to the most directly comparable measures calculated and presented in accordance with GAAP, usually refer to the earnings release that we issued this morning, which is also available on our website.

I'm joined as usual today by our Executive Chairman, George Youroukos, and our Chief Financial Officer, Tassos Psaropoulos. George will begin the call with high-level commentary on GSL and our industry, and then Tassos and I will take you through our recent activity, quarterly results and financials and the current market environment. After that, we'll be pleased to answer your questions. So turning now to Slide 4. I'll pass the call over to George.

Thank you, Tom, and good morning, afternoon or evening to all of you joining us today. Both the supportive supply and demand trends and heightened geopolitical uncertainty that we have previously highlighted, remained firmly in place throughout 2025, and then in recent days have clearly ratchet up even more. Tariffs, the prospect of new port fees in the U.S. and elsewhere, security concerns in and around the Red Sea and now the situation in Iran, shifting from tense to violent conflict, the list goes on. These and other factors have all combined to increase unpredictability and volatility, fundamentally alter and fragment trade patterns and make supply chains more inefficient as a consequence.

At the same time and perhaps surprisingly, given the noise, aggregate global containerized trade increased in 2025 by 5%, with input volumes to the U.S. also growing year-on-year. In this environment, demand for midsize and smaller containerships has remained remarkably strong. As a result, we have continued to lock-in charter coverage at attractive rates, with $2.24 billion in contracted revenue over the next 2.7 years, with 99% contract coverage for 2026 and 81% in 2027.

Maximizing optionality remains a key focus to us, in order to both mitigate risk and save value-accretive opportunities. With this in mind, we have transformed our balance sheet, reduce debt and increase liquidity, also serving to bolster our resilience and agility in the process. This progress has been reflected by the affirmation of our strong credit ratings by leading rating agencies and has also supported payment of our quarterly dividend, which raised again with a dividend paid in December 2025. On an annualized basis, we now paid $2.5 per common share.

Another thing at the front of our minds is strategic, but highly selective, fleet renewal. We were pleased to announce a transaction in December for 3 vessels that make our fleet younger and larger and replace some of our aging cash cows, which we have previously monetized at cyclically attractive prices. Tom will discuss this more in a few minutes. But we see this as great ships that are in the post-panel sweet spot acquired at a fantastic price, de-risked right out of the gate and with compelling upside potential. In short, just a short of deal for which we keep our powder dry. Taken together, this progress and these successes are possible because we have worked diligently to maximize optionality in order to manage risks and seize opportunities in the cyclical industry and a turbulent world.

On Slide 5, we thought that it would be helpful for new investors and a new refresher and nice fresher for our friends who have stuck with us and made money with us over time, to put our current status in some historical context. Over the past 5 years, we have transformed the business and dramatically increased all of our key earnings and cash flow metrics while simultaneously de-risking our balance sheet. And we have returned capital to shareholders, both by way of opportunistic share buybacks and by introducing a dividend, which we have repeatedly upsized as we made progress on de-levering and building our contract cash flow. And our share price has responded accordingly tripling over the period. The profound improvements that you can see here are a testament to our dynamic capital allocation policy, the discipline and patience to stick with it through the cycle, and the ability and confidence to seize opportunities as they arise.

We fully intend to continue building on this track record, generating shareholder value by making Global Ship Lease even more competitive, robust and resilient for the long term. With that, I will turn the call over to Tom.

Thank you, George. Hello, again, everyone, and please now turn to Slide 6, where you will see our diversified charter portfolio. As of December 31, we have over $2.2 billion in forward contracted revenues with 2.7 years of remaining contract cover. Throughout 2025 and the first 2 months of this year, we added 52 charters, including options exercised for $1.26 billion in additional contracted revenues. So it's been a pretty good year.

Turning to Slide 7. We take a look at our dynamic capital allocation policy through which we are able to mitigate the risks and capitalize on the opportunities inherent in the natural cyclicality of our industry, not to mention the so-called black Black Swan events industry seems now to be confronting on a regular basis. We have de-levered our balance sheet to reduce risk and build equity value. Our increased cash position has made us more resilient and capable of handling whatever may arise from upheaval in the Middle East to tariffs to an evolving regulatory landscape and, of course, to opportunities as they appear. And as always, a top priority is returning capital to shareholders. And in late 2025, we upsized our dividend yet again to reach $2.50 per share on an annualized basis. We aim to provide investors with a liquid and stable platform from which they can participate in the shipping cycle, maximizing access to upside opportunities while minimizing exposure to downside risks.

Slide 8 shows our patient and disciplined approach regarding investments. As you can see from the chart, we have a strong track record of buying ships during market downturns when asset values are low and then contracting them on super lucrative charters to lock-in the good times of the up cycles. It's easy to say buy low, but it's much more difficult to do, especially as access to capital also tends to be constrained during downturns. That being said, I would underline the following points.

First, our capital allocation policy is dynamic and has us well paired to pounce on value-accretive opportunities when they arise. Second, our relationships throughout the industry give us insight into nascent deal opportunities often before they're known in the broader market. And third, our combination of long-term focus and balance sheet strength put us in a position to take a holistic and through-the-cycle view of risk, returns and option value, which brings us to Slide 9.

On December 1 of last year, we announced the purchase of 3 high specification fuel-efficient 8,600 TEU container ships that were built in 2010 and '11 and had already being fitted with valuable ECO upgrades by their previous owners. This deal was executed on short notice with cash on hand, is de-risked from the get-go and offers high upside potential in the years to come. Moreover, as these are sister ships to high demand, high earnings ships already in the GSL fleet, we have the added advantage of extensive first-hand knowledge of their operating and commercial profiles. By purchasing the ships with below-market charters attached, we were able to achieve an aggregate purchase price of $90 million, which isn't far off what a single ship would cost, charter-free, meaning this is essentially a 3 for the price of 1 deal. Added to which their aggregate scrap value alone is around $40 million and long-term historic average charter rates for ships like these are over $40,000 a day. So we're looking at just the sort of low risk, high upside potential deal we like very much. And there's a nice symmetry in that we funded this fleet renewal almost to the dollar with proceeds from the sale of much older smaller ships that we had monetized at cyclically high values during the course of 2025.

With that, I'll pass the call to Tassos to discuss our financials.

Thank you, Tom. Slide 10 shows our financial highlights in 2025. I would like to emphasize a few key takeaways. Full year earnings and cash flow were up compared to 2024. Our cash position is $637 million, of which $164 million is restricted. The remainder ensures that we can fully cover our covenants, working capital needs and manage the potential financial implications of geopolitical issues, which seems to be rising with increasing frequency and intensity. It also provides dry power from a position of almost net zero debt, both for CapEx to keep our existing fleet commercially relevant and for disciplined investments in fleet renewal when the right opportunities emerge. And all of this without compromising our ability to reliably pay healthy and recently enlarged dividend.

The latest $85 million refinancing has pushed our average debt maturity to 4.5 years and our blended cost of debt down to 4.49%. We also realized a $46.2 million gain from the sale of 4 older ships, and we have strong credit ratings from the leading rating agencies.

Slide 11 highlights our progress in de-levering our balance sheet and building equity value. The graph on the left shows our lower outstanding debt, which stood at $950 million at the end of 2022, was under $700 million at the end of 2025 and is on track to be well below $600 million by the end of 2026. The graph on the right tells a similar story but with stark context. We have worked diligently to reduce our leverage from 8.4x in 2018 to 0.5x today. This comprehensive efforts are shown further on Slide 12, where we have lowered our borrowing costs from a blended 7.56% in 2018, down to 4.49% in 2025. We have also maintained low breakeven rates through multiple years of inflation by aggressively reducing our interest expense. This keeps us both competitive and resilient in any market environment.

With that, I will turn the call back over to Tom to discuss the market and [indiscernible].

Thanks, Tassos. On Slide 13, we put our fleet in context, restating our focus on midsize and smaller container ships between 2,000 TEU and 10,000 TEU. In contrast to the really big ships, which require specialized port infrastructure and tend to be constrained to the big east-west "mainland trade" midsize and smaller container ships are highly flexible and can be employed worldwide without being reliant on, or captive to, any industry or country. As such, they provide the [indiscernible] companies, our customers with valuable optionality at a time when trade patterns are in flux. And by the way, it's often overlooked that roughly 3/4 of containerized trade by volume already takes place in the non-mainland north-south and intra-regional trades, like intra-Asia, and we'll discuss this further over the coming slides.

On Slide 14, we turn to the situation in the Middle East, a subject that is, of course, top of mind for us, as it is for many across the shipping industry and beyond. We will not pretend to be geopolitical analysts or forecasters here, but we can provide some facts and contact fundamentally two key Middle East shipping choke points, the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz are now more or less closed at the moment.

First, the Red Sea and Suez Canal, with around 20% of containerized trade volumes would normally transit. Here, the initial green shoots of cautious optimism have been decisively cut back with the [indiscernible] calling for renewed vessel attacks in the Southern Red Sea. Even before this setback, a large majority of transit continue to go the long way around, around the Cape of Good Hope, which sucks up around about 10% of global effective fleet supply in the process. And recent update suggests that this is likely to remain the case for the time being.

The new choke point to address is the Strait of Hormuz, which allows the shipping traffic sorry, let me start that again. The new choke point to address is the Strait of Hormuz through which shipping traffic has pretty much ceased since the outbreak of hostilities with multiple major regional ports suspending operations in-part or in full. While it is more famously a gateway for global energy flows, a normal year would also see between 3% and 4% of global container volumes move through the Strait of Hormuz, serving ports such as [ Jebel Ali ] in Dubai, which is the ninth busiest port in the world as well as Doha, Abu Dhabi and Damam in Saudi. While the overall volumes themselves are not huge, the knock-on effects are much bigger given, among other things, the importance of [ Jebel Ali ] as a transshipment hub and the challenges of serving golf destinations by alternative roots.

So this is a big deal. Container supply chains, which were already complex, now have additional challenges and inefficiencies to confront. We will see how the [indiscernible] of companies adapt, but we are, of course, in the very early days of all this.

In summary, the situation is highly dynamic, and the longer-term implications are unclear. However, the paramount concern for the industry amid the turmoil is and must continue to be seafarers safety.

Turning to another source of disruption on Slide 15. We look at tariffs. While the stance keep shifting on this issue, looking back to 2019's tariffs under the first Trump Administration could be at least directionally instructive in how they develop moving ahead. As expected, the tariffs in 2019 did indeed result in a reduction in direct trade between the U.S. and China. Perhaps unexpectedly, however, there was an increase in demand for midsized and smaller container ships during this period as supply chains shifted and decentralized intra-regional trade, particularly intra-Asia containerized trade volumes rose. Trade networks grew more complex and more inefficient, and those conditions tend to be supportive of earnings for providers of shipping capacity, like GSL.

Slide 16 is where we cover some of the other geopolitical and regulatory trends affecting the shipping world. This slide is backward looking as who knows what other surprises 2026 has in store. USTR port fees were introduced by the U.S. in October 2025. And while they caused some disruption, the industry was able to adapt to the new circumstances given the lead time, with which they announced. However, China's port fees did not offer the same lead time and were much more disruptive as a result. Fortunately, the port fees from both countries were suspended until the fourth quarter of 2026. While these policies and their implications have been deferred for now, the situation was a reminder of how fast things can change and how optionality is more valuable than ever within the current global framework, both for us and for our customers.

Notably, the White House's recently unveiled Maritime Action Plan points to the possibility of future such port fees. Along with the rest of our industry, we will certainly closely monitor future developments there, on this front. The IMO's Net Zero framework faced similar delay to the fourth quarter of 2026. This decision is expected to provide a boost existing conventionally fueled vessels, such as those in the GSL fleet. Amidst this heightened regulatory and geopolitical uncertainty, we will stay prudent disciplined and agile, doing our best to maintain and to leverage the optionality at our disposal.

On Slide 17, we highlight supply-side dynamics and scrapping trends where little has changed from last quarter. Both idle capacity and scrapping activity have remained near zero. With minimal slack in the system due to fragmented and inefficient supply chains, the charter market [indiscernible] environment has remained strong and charterers have proven willing to pay attractive rates even for late in life ships. Unsurprisingly, owners have responded by keeping those ships on the water and profitably in service for absolutely as long as possible.

Slide 18 shows the order book, which has grown meaningfully in recent years, but importantly, mostly in the larger vessel segments where GSL does not participate. For ships, over 10,000 TEU, in other words, they're really big ships, the order book-to-fleet ratio stands at 55.5%, which drives the overall order book-to-fleet ratio to almost 35%. However, for the size of segments below 10,000 TEU, which are the ones relevant to GSL, that number halved to 16.9%, with deliveries spread over the next 5 years or so. In addition to the smaller order book, if we were to assume all ships, 25 years or older with scrapped through 2030, the sub-10,000 TEU fleet would actually shrink more than 6%. If supply remains low and rates remain high, we will be happy to continue locking-in coverage at attractive rates. If on the other hand, the market were to experience a normalization or even a downturn, we would expect the arrival of new ships to be offset in large part at the very least by a sharp rise in scrapping activity. Similarly, we would expect such a scenario to yield interesting investment opportunities for a patient and well-capitalized owner such as GSL.

We take a look at the charter market on Slide 19, and it is important here to remember that our daily breakeven rate is just over $9,800 per vessel per day, which is well below market rates. In these supportive conditions, we've been hard at work, locking in as much charter coverage as possible to the tune of $2.24 billion over the next 2.7 years or so, providing good forward visibility and insulation against any downside turbulence. And on that note, I will turn the call back to George on Slide 20.

Thank you, Tom. To summarize, we have continued building our forward visibility on cash flows now with $2.24 billion in contracted revenues over 2.7 years with 99% coverage for 2026 and 81% for 2027. Optionality remains a core focus, even with the deferral for the time being of U.S. and China port fees and of the IMO Net Zero framework, as geopolitical and regulatory environments remain volatile. And we are constantly at work to make GSL more resilient, robust and able to capture opportunities. .

The current situation in the Middle East and around the Strait of Hormuz, of course, adds more complexity to a situation that was already highly complex and dynamic. The supply chains has become fragmented. Decentralized and increasingly inefficient, which drives further demand for midsize and smaller containerships. We have successfully delivered, pushed down our cost of debt extended our average debt maturities and lowered our daily breakeven rates to well below market rates. Our fortress balance sheet, which brings us close to being net debt neutral position us well for the opportunities and challenges of the market. We increasingly look to renew our fleet in a disciplined, prudent manner to support earnings now and into the future. And we always look to return capital to shareholders.

To this end, we increased our quarterly dividend to 2025, now up to $2.50 per share on an annualized basis. Finally, looking back on the last 5 years, it is gratifying to see credit ratings agencies acknowledge the progress we've made. Much more gratifying still, is to see the stock price triple over the same period and we will do our best to ensure that positive momentum continues. Now with that, we'll be very pleased to take your questions.

[Operator Instructions] Our first question comes from the line of Liam Burke with B. Riley Securities.

George, Tom, Tassos. There's still -- I mean the timing of this question is probably bad, understand the geopolitical situation, both in the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz but the gap between charter and freight rates is staying wide, all things being equal, is there anything that you'd anticipate to have those -- that movement converge in terms of freight and charter rates converging?

Good question, Liam. I'll have a crack at it, and no doubt, George will add to it. It's very, very difficult to comment on the freight market side to that equation, which is obviously much more responsive to day-to-day events given the contract cover is much more limited in terms of duration. However, I can comment on the charter side of things that what we're seeing is that appetite from charters remains to lock in charters at attractive rates. So at least for the time being, and it's very difficult to predict anything really in today's slightly crazy world.

But for the time being, we're seeing customers looking to continue to lock in charters at high rates for meaningful durations. Of course, it's worth highlighting at this stage that 99% of our positions for 2026 are already contracted and over 80% for 2027 are already contracted. Broadly speaking, there is still charter market appetite.

Great. Your leverage ratios are low. You pay a very healthy dividend through the cycle. What about the cash? And how do you see allocating it this year or next year?

Sure. So in this cyclical industry, the way to make genuinely attractive returns for our shareholders is making sure that we have cash to move on opportunities Ideally, at the bottom of the cycle when no one else has capital. That's when you make most money for shareholders within shipping. So holding that cash on our balance sheet, we see as super valuable in that respect. And in fact, the 3 ships that we mentioned during the course of the call, these 8,600 TEU ships that we acquired at the tail end of last year a perfect representation of that. We went from zero to completion within about 30 days or so on that deal, and you can only do that if you have capital at your disposal, which happily we did.

Great. And I apologize for asking such a specific question, but Tasso's SG&A jumped considerably. Is that -- is there a one-timer in there? Or is that just another level to anticipate?

No, no. It has to do with the valuation of the incentive plan that we have calculated and the others have calculated. It's a noncash item. And you will see much more details in our upcoming 20-F.

[Operator Instructions] Our next question comes from the line of Omar Nokta with Clarkson Securities.

Thank you for the update. You obviously touched on this, Tom. I think, I think you talked about this and maybe touched on it also in response to Liam's question, but just kind of about what's going on in the Middle East and the turmoil and whatnot. There's been clearly a lot of focus on the impact on energy and exports out of the region. But sort of in terms of, say, the containers and presumably, it's a lot more of an import market than export, I would think. But just in general, what's been sort of the impact, seen a spike in different commodity prices and we've seen energy shipping rates go through the roof. What have you seen here over the past few days with respect to your business? Have you seen any shift in the freight market dynamics or time charters?

I would say not in time charters. Their appetite remains, as I mentioned to Liam, from charters at attractive rates and for attractive durations. I think in the freight markets, the industry is just struggling to adjust to this massive curve ball. Now although only 2% to 3% or whatever it is, 3% to 4% of containers actually flow into or out of the Persian Gulf, there's a tremendous volume that's actually particularly in [ Jebel Ali ]. So although the overall numbers are comparatively modest in sort of percentage terms as far as global trade are concerned, the ramifications through the liner company networks are considerable.

I think one analyst calculated that roughly 10% of the global fleet actually under normal circumstances calls at ports within the Persian Gulf. So although the volumes in terms of import and export are not huge. The implications for liner companies networks are much bigger than that, and that confusion and complexity breeds disruption in the networks, which breeds inefficiency which breeds the necessity for more ships. That's what we're seeing so far, but it's very, very early days. I don't know, George, do you want to add to that?

Yes. What I would add is that we see clearly the statement of [indiscernible] that they will resume their attacks in Red Sea. So let's say, it's out of the question right now. There was a process where liners were returning slowly to the Red Sea. This is not the case.

And then the second thing we should see this is very similar to the COVID. There is going to be a big reason that is not going to be serviced by ships for until this conflict is over or at least this conflict is to a point where people can cross the Hormuz, and there's going to be a big starvation of cargoes in the region. Now as you can imagine, this is going to create the disruption, and I think it will lead in raising the freight rates at the point when passing through the Hormuz is possible, but not clean cut as it was before the war, I think the freights are going to go up for the ships that are going to go through.

And once the Hormuz is open completely, there's going to be a lot of cargoes that need to go that haven't been going for a while and hence back up in the ports, they're going to be waiting and all of that. Similar many situation of the regional [indiscernible] of COVID i would imagine. So if you ask me, I think the earnings of [indiscernible] should increase for a period of time. And the fleet is going to tighten further for a period of time again.

That's quite helpful. And thanks, Tom, you answer the second question in there for me. And then maybe just one final quick follow-up just on the balance sheet. I noticed a big jump in the long-term restricted cash flowing from $23 million to $113 million quarter-over-quarter. Is that actual restricted cash due to financing? Or is that just sort of a long-term bank deposit?

It's actually Omar revenue received in advance like the previous time that we have in our account. We have again received a revenue received in advance which has been restricted and it will be released following the service of the charter.

Okay. And is that, how long is the duration of that?

If I remember correctly, it's 3 years.

Omar, I think just to correct, I think it's actually 5 years.

There are no further questions at this time. I would like to turn the call back over to Tom Lister for closing remarks.

Thank you very much, operator, and thank you, everyone, for joining today's call. We look forward to regrouping for our 1Q earnings once they are ready. So stay safe. Thanks for joining. Bye-bye.

Ladies and gentlemen, that concludes today's call. Thank you all for joining us. You may now disconnect.

Thank you for standing by. My name is Tina, and I will be your conference operator today. At this time, I would like to welcome everyone to the Global Ship Lease Third Quarter 2025 Earnings Conference Call. [Operator Instructions]

It is now my pleasure to turn today's call over to Thomas Lister, CEO of Global Ship Lease. Sir, the floor is yours.

Thank you very much. Hello, everyone, and welcome to the Global Ship Lease Third Quarter 2025 Earnings Conference Call. You can find the slides that accompany today's presentation on our website at www.globalshiplease.com.

As usual, Slides 2 and 3 remind you that today's call may include forward-looking statements that are based on current expectations and assumptions and are, by their nature, inherently uncertain and outside of the company's control. Actual results may differ materially from these forward-looking statements due to many factors, including those described in the safe harbor section of the slide presentation.

We would also like to direct your attention to the Risk Factors section of our most recent annual report on our 2024 Form 20-F, which was filed in March 2025. You can find the form on our website or on the SEC. All of our statements are qualified by these and other disclosures in our reports filed with the SEC. We do not undertake any duty to update forward-looking statements. The reconciliations of the non-GAAP financial measures to which we will refer during this call to the most directly comparable measures calculated and presented in accordance with GAAP, usually refer to the earnings release that we issued this morning, which is also available on our website.

I'm joined as usual today by our Executive Chairman, Georgios Youroukos; and our Chief Financial Officer, Tassos Psaropoulos. George will begin the call with high-level commentary on GSL and our industry, and then Tassos and I will take you through our recent activity, quarterly results and financials and the current market environment. After that, we'll be pleased to answer your questions.

So turning now to Slide 4. I'll pass the call over to George.

Thank you, Tom, and good morning, afternoon or evening to all of you joining us today. Global Ship Lease's focus continues to be on optionality as geopolitical and trade policy uncertainty continue to be a major factor throughout the third quarter. As we have seen in recent weeks with the IMO Net Zero framework, USTR and China port fees, all of which were deferred at 11 hour or later, even policies that are proposed without even fully coming into effect are having far-reaching real-world implications.

All of these real and potential factors are contributing to 2 major effects, both on which play to our advantage. Number one, making supply chains less efficient, which means that more ships are needed to transport a given quantity of cargo; and number two, increasing the value of flexible, midsized and smaller container ships such as those in our fleet.

Now on the IMO deferment, this accrues particularly to the benefit of older, conventionally fueled vessels that are now likely to have a longer economic life. Taken together with aggregate growth in global containerized trade, these factors are contributing to a situation where there's essentially 0 idle capacity for the vessel size segments in which we operate. Thus, we continue to see strong interest in chartering our vessels, typically on a multiyear basis.

Through the first 9 months of 2025, we added $778 million in contracted revenues with full contract coverage for the remaining of 2025, 96% coverage for 2026 and 74% coverage for 2027. This offer us stability and certainty at a time where both are generally in short supply. Our progress in securing additional charter coverage, adding to our revenue backlog and fortifying our balance sheet has enabled us to achieve strong credit ratings across the board, including an investment-grade rating on our U.S. private placement notes.

These same factors, notably including a clutch of recent agreed long-term charters have put us in a position to once again increase our supplemental dividend, bringing our overall dividend to $2.50 per share on an annualized basis. That's a 19% increase being announced today. But if you look at where our dividend was just over a year ago, which was $1.50 annualized, the total increase is 67%, all done on a nonspeculative basis on the back of real contracted revenues and without compromising our ability to establish a fortress balance sheet and position GSL for opportunistic fleet renewal at the right time.

With everything going on in the world, both GSL and our customers are acutely aware that many of our assumptions and understandings may be turned upside down from one second to the next. In this environment, we are simultaneously locking in the high value and forward visibility that comes from time charter contracts with top-tier global liners while also making sure that we have the strategic and financial flexibility to respond to the challenges and the opportunities of a fast-changing world and the cyclical industry. In this way, we are maximizing GSL's optionality and putting ourselves in the position to protect and generate shareholder value no matter what is waiting around the corner.

Now with that, I will turn the call over to Tom.

Thank you, George. Hello again, everyone. And please turn to Slide 5 to see our diversified charter portfolio. As of September 30, we have over $1.9 billion in forward contracted revenues with 2.5 years of remaining contract cover. Through the first 9 months of 2025, we added 38 charters, including extension options exercised for almost $780 million in contracted revenues, of which about $380 million were added in the third quarter.

Slide 6 is where we discuss our dynamic capital allocation policy. With the inherent cyclicality of our industry, we consider it essential to look at the big picture in order to remain on the front foot, manage risk and capitalize on opportunities as they arise. As George mentioned, this has only become more important in the current environment.

Optionality remains key as we navigate this environment and tackle our priorities. Among other things, these include returning capital to our shareholders through our just upsized $2.50 per share annualized dividend and strengthening our balance sheet. To that end, we've continued to delever to grow equity value and to increase our financial resilience and cash reserves to manage the various geopolitical challenges and uncertainties that confront the industry with growing frequency.

And of course, we need cash on hand to cover CapEx requirements and to seize the right investment opportunities as and when they arise, especially as we've observed on various occasions because the best such opportunities tend to crop up when capital is otherwise scarce. We're proud to have made GSL a stable and liquid platform that allows investors to participate in the industry with us managing and mitigating the risks of the down cycle and negative volatility while maximizing obsess -- sorry, while maximizing access to super returns in the up cycle.

Turning to Slide 7. This slide shows the cyclicality of our industry and how we have managed it. We want to emphasize our history of disciplined capital allocation regarding investments, buying ships during downturns where asset prices are depressed or structuring deals such that downsides are limited and upsides are substantial. This also shows that it is at and near the bottom of cycles where the opportunities for outsized value are to be captured.

I'll now pass the call to Tassos to discuss our financials.

Thank you, Tom. Slide 8 shows our financial highlights for the first 9 months of 2025. I would like to emphasize a few key takeaways. Earnings and cash flow are up compared to the first 9 months of 2024. Our cash position is $562 million, of which $72 million is restricted. The remainder ensures that we can fully cover our covenants, working capital needs and manage the potential financial implication of geopolitical issues, which seems to be arising with increasing frequency and sharpness. It also provides dry powder both for CapEx to keep our existing fleet commercially relevant and for disciplined investments in fleet renewal if and when the right opportunities emerge. And of course, importantly, it supports payment of our expanded dividend.

Earlier this year, we completed an $85 million refinancing that pushed our weighted average maturity to 4.7 years and brought our blended cost of debt to 4.34%. We also realized a $28.3 million gain from the sale of 3 older vessels. Our strong credit ratings were affirmed. We have $33 million remaining under our opportunistic share buyback program, and we continue to delever and build equity value.

Slide 9 shows our ongoing process to repeat the resilience, derisk our balance sheet and grow equity value. The graph on the left shows our progress in reducing our outstanding debt. From $950 million at the end of 2022, we are on track to be under $700 million at the end of this year, even as we have acquired ships and put leverage on. The graph on the right is the more telling perspective as our financial leverage has reached to 0.5x. We have come a long way since the days of 8x-plus leverage.

Slide 10. The left graph shows our cost of debt, which we have lowered to a blended 4.34%, down from over 6% in 2020. We have continually reduced our margin even as SOFR has risen materially. And the graph on the right shows our very competitive breakeven rates where interest rate reductions have more or less offset OpEx inflation.

With that, I will turn the call back over to Tom to discuss the market and our fleet.

Thanks, Tassos. Slide 11 reiterates our emphasis on midsized and smaller container ships between 2,000 and 10,000 TEU. These vessels are the backbone of global trade are not dependent upon any one trade or country and are extremely flexible. This stands in contrast to the very big ships that tend to dominate the headlines in the media, but which are more restricted in where they can go due to their size, requiring specialized port infrastructure and deepwater, not to mention huge cargo volumes to fill them. This keeps the very big ships largely confined to the mainlane trades between China and the U.S. or Northern Europe, which, as I'll get to in a minute, have been disrupted in recent quarters.

The flexibility of our fleet offers is a key point that we reiterate because it matters a great deal, particularly in this current environment of heightened uncertainty and shifting trade patterns. Our fleet plays an increasingly vital role as trade routes and supply chains have become fragmented by a wide variety of factors that we'll discuss on the coming slides.

On Slide 12, we break down the impacts we have seen from the ongoing disruption in the Red Sea, prior to which approximately 20% of global containerized trade volumes transited that bottleneck. Since then, about 10% of effective capacity has been absorbed as ships have been forced to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope, which in turn has driven up charter rates. While it is difficult to predict how long these particular conditions will last, we and the industry more broadly are looking to see a sustained period of safety and stability before transiting goods through there again as seafarer safety is key.

If and when the Red Sea does reopen for safe transit, there would be a period of costly and complex rerouting and reshaping of networks for the liner companies. This suggests that there will need to be a reasonably high industry-wide conviction of a long-term normalization of conditions before we would expect to see large-scale rerouting by the Red Sea and Suez, but it's certainly something to keep an eye on.

On Slide 13, we discuss tariffs and how 2019 under the first Trump administration could be instructive in how we might expect things to continue to play out moving forward. Following the 2019 tariffs, there was reduced trade between the U.S. and China, which had a negative impact on larger container ships used for those mainlane trades. While as for midsized and smaller container ships, there was perhaps counterintuitively, an uplift in demand following the tariffs as trade routes shifted and more emphasis was placed on intra-Asian trades where midsized and smaller ships predominate. Regional trade volumes increased, the supply chain diversified and midsized and smaller container ships were the beneficiaries. Put bluntly, if you're providing capacity to the containerized supply chain as we are, increased disruption, complexity and inefficiency in the supply chain tends to be a good thing and supportive of earnings.

Slide 14 is where we discuss the latest developments or non-developments, if you prefer, on the regulatory front, namely USTR fees and the reciprocal China port fees caused quite a lot of agitation, vessel redeployments and uncertainty as the industry sorted out how to adjust. In the case of USTR, that played out with several months of forward notice as the regulations which were announced in February modified in April and implemented in October. Meanwhile, in the China port fee situation, several months' worth of disruption and strategizing were forced into a memorable few days in October with measures announced on a Friday and implemented the following Tuesday. Even with both measures now apparently suspended after only negligible periods of enforcement, the industry was given yet another sharp reminder of the value of maintaining flexibility.

Meanwhile, the long anticipated Net Zero framework at the IMO, which had been due to be adopted in October, was deferred at the 11th hour by 1 year. This deferral will likely extend the lives of older ships and lift the commercial relevance and earnings for conventionally fueled ships such as those in the GSL fleet. Our view has long been that in a period of pronounced regulatory uncertainty, there are clear advantages to investing in mid-life tonnage and being smart followers when it comes to the adoption of new fuels and propulsion technologies.

We cover supply side dynamics and scrapping trends on Slide 15. As ships continue to transit around the Cape of Good Hope and supply chains remain both fragmented and subject to continuous reshuffling, idle capacity and scrapping levels have remained close to 0. In that context, scarcity value is real and the liners continue to show an interest and in fact, a need to charter in scarce tonnage in an uncertain freight environment as the risk of being short on capacity and the value of network optionality override concerns about fleet optimization and the maximization of efficiency.

Slide 16 shows the order book. Here, we want to highlight that although the overall order book is meaningful and has grown over the past few years, the segments in which GSL focused are seeing far less growth. For ships over 10,000 TEU, a segment upon which GSL does not focus or participate, the order book-to-fleet ratio stands at 54% However, this stands in sharp contrast to the 32% ratio for all container ships and even more so for the 15% order book to fleet ratio for the segments GSL does participate in, which are those between 2,000 and 10,000 TEU.

Also, with the current order book, if we were to assume that all vessels over 25 years old were scrapped through 2029, which is how long it would take to deliver the current order book, the sub-10,000 TEU fleet would actually shrink by over 5% in that time frame. While capacity remains tight, we will continue to lock in charter coverage at attractive rates. However, should the market normalize in the coming years, we would expect to see scrapping activity pick up sharply, meaningfully offsetting the impact of new vessels coming into the market in our size segments.

Slide 17 shows the charter market against which I would remind you that our breakeven rate, including operating costs and debt service is just over $9,500 per vessel per day. With the current market conditions, we have been locking in as much charter coverage as possible and now have forward visibility on $1.92 billion of contracted revenues over 2.5 years of coverage. Who knows how macro, geopolitical and industry dynamics will develop going forward, but we're pleased to have built a stable platform in otherwise choppy seas.

On that note, I will turn the call back to George on Slide 18.

Thank you, Tom. To summarize, our cash flows are strong, and we continue to build our charter backlog with almost $2 billion of cover over 2.5 years 2025 fully contracted, marginal open days in 2026 and a significant slice of 2027 already covered.

Even as there is a sigh of relief on the current suspension of USTR and China port fees in some quarters for the deferral of the IMO Net Zero framework, uncertainty remains pronounced. We're maximizing optionality to manage risks and capitalize on opportunities. Less efficient and more fragmented supply chains are increasing demand for our fleet of flexible midsized and smaller containerships.

We have strengthened our balance sheet and continue to amortize debt to build equity value and resilience through delevering. We have lowered our financial leverage and our average breakeven rates stand at just above $9,500 per day per vessel, and our credit ratings are in great shape. As the existing cash flows and cash cows begin to age out, we're focused on the disciplined and opportunistic renewal of our fleet to ensure that we have the right value-generating assets going forward.

And as ever, we're proud of returning capital to shareholders through our dividend, which following the increase announced today stands at an annualized rate of $2.5 per common share, 67% above where it was just 18 months ago.

With that, we would be very pleased to take your questions.

[Operator Instructions] And our first question comes from the line of Liam Burke with B. Riley Securities.

It looks like freight rates have sort of bounced off the bottom from third quarter and are inching up. Are you still seeing a healthy gap between freight rates and charter rates here?

Liam, short answer, yes. Charter rates continue to move sideways at very healthy levels. So historically, I would say, really quite high and attractive levels. So despite the near-term volatility, both up and down in the freight markets, the charter markets are staying steady.

Great. And is there any appetite or how are you balancing rates versus duration when you're looking at either renewals or forward charters?

Look, we're conscious that these are strange and uncertain times. So we continue to be focused on a sort of risk-averse basis on midterm and longer charters, and we're happy to take attractive economic rates on as long charters really as we're able to go at the moment. So for different sizes, that means probably sub-5,000 TEU, you're looking at a couple of years that you can fix for. And from, say, 6,000 or 6,500 TEU up, you're looking at maybe 3 and possibly even 4 years in some instances. And that would be our preference to lean into.

[Operator Instructions] And our next question comes from the line of Omar Nokta.

Obviously, things are coming together quite nicely, pretty solid quarter, added a good amount of backlog despite all the uncertainty in the strange times that you're just referencing, Tom. Just kind of thinking about the fact that you were able to add so much backlog in the third quarter, $380 million, nearly half of what you did for -- or sorry, nearly half -- equal to what you did in the first half. Just wanted to get a sense from you, is this -- is that on the back of a very sort of maybe active fast-paced market on the part of charterers? Or is it something unique to GSL that you were able to accomplish maybe not necessarily representative of the broader market dynamics?

I mean, obviously, we'd take every opportunity to talk up our own book, Omar. But I would say that it's more representative of the market. And if you look at -- look back on 2025 year-to-date, the first quarter was very active, the second quarter was significantly disrupted by Liberation Day. So I would say a lot of chartering activity was effectively put on hold during the second quarter, and that came into the third quarter. So I think it's probably best to look back on the 9 months as a whole as opposed to trying to infer too much from individual quarters.

But what I would say is that in the face of an uncertain environment, and it just seems to get more uncertain every day, the lines see capacity as optionality, particularly midsized and smaller container ships that can be moved around pretty much any trader. And we see, as a result, sustained demand for such tonnage, which is what explains the fact that charter rates in the broader market as well as within our fixtures remain at very attractive levels.

Yes. Especially it looks like for those older vessels, we noticed in your fleet list, several of those ships that are in that 2000, 2001 built age range have now been extended for, say, 3 years. Those ships are going to be, call it, close to 29, maybe 30 years when those ships roll off charter. Do you think -- obviously, it's going to be a different market perhaps in 3 years' time. But as you think about what that market looks like, assuming it's still kind of the same do you think those ships can continue to trade at 29, 30 years old? Or is there an age limit you think for those ships?

Yes. If I may take this, I will tell you. If the market was exactly the same as it was today, these ships will continue to trade. There is one big differentiation between containers and the other types of ships. There is no extra insurance on the cargo depending on the age of the ship. And why is that? Because container ships have the highest and best record of safety versus other types of ships. I mean, ships sinking or breaking into two, et cetera. The construction of the containers, because of the way they are loaded and discharged in a direct way, they have to slide the containers into the cargo hold from the gantry crane. They are super heavy in lightweight, hence, very strong, very well made.

Then the fact that the cargo does not come into contact with the cargo hold, meaning it's just boxes that you stack up in. So you're not putting anything like oil that goes and touches the side of the ship, the cargo hold or bulk cargo, which again gets in contact with the surface of the cargo hold and hence deteriorates over time, make container ships very strong and hence, there's no extra insurance, which means that the ships can trade easily past the 28 or 29 years if the market is there.

And Omar, just to sort of add yet more texture to that. I think the U.S. Jones Act vessels that trade in some instances into the sort of late 30s and occasionally into their 40s are evidence of the fact that technical obsolescence in the containership sector, if you put sort of fuel and propulsion issues to one side for a moment, is not an issue. So that dovetails with what George was just saying. So long story short, if there's economic need, the vessels will "live longer.

Okay. That's very helpful. And then maybe just one final one. Tom, you were talking about the Red Sea. And there's obviously perhaps maybe a growing view that we'll start to see transits pick up again in the near future now that there's a peace deal in Gaza, still obviously a lot of uncertainty there. But just want to get a sense from you. Are you having discussions with your charters at the moment on how that will look? And how does that decision come about? Is that going to be an agreement that you make? Or is it going to be them who force it down? How do you kind of think about the 2 sides of the ship?

Yes. So first of all, no, it's not something which is currently under discussion. Secondly, it's a sort of multilateral decision that has to be taken because also beyond the charterers and the owners, there are also the insurers, not only of the vessels themselves, but of the cargo. So it's a fairly complex web of folks that have to get comfortable with the idea of transiting. And the biggest concern is obviously that of seafarer safety.

But I would say, if we go back to looking at the tonnage that was diverted away from the Red Sea and Suez and around the Cape of Good Hope, it's predominantly the bigger ships, the larger ships because it's those ships that are typically deployed on the Asia to Europe legs. So I would say that the opening or not of the Red Sea is something that will have a proportionately greater impact on bigger ships and less of an impact -- I mean, which is not to say no impact for sure, but less of an impact on midsized and smaller ships, which were not frequent transitors of the Red Sea and Suez in any case even when it was "a normal environment" up until the end of 2023. So we'll have to see. But I think the dynamics remain comparatively supportive.

[Operator Instructions] And with no further questions in queue, I will now hand the call back over to Thomas Lister for closing remarks.

Well, thank you all very much indeed for joining our 3Q call, and we look forward to reconnecting in the new year on the back of our 4Q earnings. Many thanks.

This does conclude today's conference call. You may now disconnect.

Hello, and thank you for standing by. My name is Bella, and I will be your conference operator today. At this time, I would like to welcome everyone to Global Ship Lease Q2 2025 Earnings Conference Call. [Operator Instructions] I would now like to turn the conference over to Mr. Thomas Lister, CEO of Global Ship Lease. You may begin.

Thank you. Hello, everyone, and welcome to the Global Ship Lease Second Quarter 2025 Earnings Conference Call. You can find the slides that accompany today's presentation on our website at www.globalshiplease.com.

As usual, Slides 2 and 3 remind you that today's call may include forward-looking statements that are based on current expectations and assumptions and are, by their nature, inherently uncertain and outside of the company's control. Actual results may differ materially from these forward-looking statements due to many factors, including those described in the safe harbor section of the slide presentation.

We would also like to direct your attention to the Risk Factors section of our most recent annual report on our 2024 Form 20-F, which was filed in March 2025. You can find the form on our website or on the SEC's. All of our statements are qualified by these and other disclosures in our reports filed with the SEC. We do not undertake any duty to update forward-looking statements. The reconciliations of the non-GAAP financial measures to which we will refer during this call to the most directly comparable measures calculated and presented in accordance with GAAP, usually refer to the earnings release that we issued this morning, which is also available on our website.

I'm joined, as usual, today by our Executive Chairman, Georgios Youroukos; and by our Chief Financial Officer, Tassos Psaropoulos. George will begin the call with high-level commentary on GSL and our industry, and then Tassos and I will take you through our recent activity, quarterly results and financials and the current market environment. After that, we will be pleased to take your questions.

So turning now to Slide 4. I'll pass the call over to George.

Thank you, Tom, and good morning, afternoon or evening to all of you joining today. As in the last several quarters, uncertainty and volatility related to tariffs, trade disruptions and geopolitical tensions have continued to materially impact the global container shipping industry. This set of factors is highly diverse. And of course, there have been numerous additions, such measures announced in recent days. But as we will explain today, the through line is that they are all making containerized supply chains, less efficient, which as long as consumer demand holds up, means that more vessels are needed to carry the same volume of cargo.

In this environment, our fleet of flexible midsize and smaller containerships has remained in high demand, and we have secured nearly $400 million of additional charter coverage in the first half of the year, effectively, closing out any 2025 market exposure and bringing 2026 coverage to 80%. Meanwhile, we have selectively and opportunistically sold older ships, crystallizing the cyclically high values and providing us with additional dry powder for freight renewal when the right opportunities arise.

Our strong credit ratings reflect the fortress-like quality of our balance sheet and our extensive contracted revenue backlog. We have also continued to pay dividends to our investors with the recent increase, bringing our annualized dividend payment to $2.10 per common share. We are pleased to provide an attractive total return to our shareholders. So far, this year, we have not only outperformed our peer group, but have also outperformed the S&P 500 by approximately 4x.

In summary, we're maximizing our optionality to manage risks and capitalize on opportunities in an unpredictable market, all of which providing our investors with a combination of stability, total return, upside potential and good trading liquidity in our shares.

With that, I will turn the call over to Tom.

Thanks, George. Hello, everyone, and please turn to Slide 5, where we highlight our well-diversified charter portfolio. As of June 30, we have $1.73 billion in forward contracted revenues with 2.1 years of average remaining contract cover. We added 22 charters in the first half of 2025, including extension options that have been declared for nearly $400 million of contracted revenues.

On Slide 6, we discuss our dynamic capital allocation policy. Being in a cyclical industry that is impacted sometimes positively, other times negatively by any number of global trends and macro factors, we believe it to be fundamentally important to maintain the long view. This means looking through both the cycle and short-term volatility and ensuring that we provide ourselves with the optionality to dynamically allocate capital in the manner that best protects and helps build shareholder value.

Given the extraordinary uncertainty currently prevailing, we believe that maximizing that optionality is the right course of action for us to take while, of course, reinforcing our balance sheet selectively investing in our fleet and continuing to return capital to shareholders. And, indeed, increasing those returns we're prudent as we have recently done by growing our annualized dividend to $2.10 per common share.

Our strong cash flows from multiyear contracts put us in a strong position to confidently advance each of these priorities. And as we've said before, it's easier for investors to buy and sell our shares than it is to buy and sell ships. And we're pleased that GSL can serve as a liquid platform through which investors can fully participate in our business and industry while minimizing downside risk and having the share trading liquidity to upsize or downsize their exposure at their option.

Moving to Slide 7. We continue to take pride in this chart and what it says about our discipline when it comes to acquiring ships. We have consistently bought ships opportunistically and in situations where we believe downside is limited and upside potential is significant.

The primary takeaways for investors are twofold. One, we have a strong track record of avoiding acquisitions during periods when asset prices are elevated or in terms that depend upon an optimistic projection of medium or long-term market conditions. When the all-in proposition makes sense on a long-term per share basis, we execute. If it does not, we do not.

And two, the old maxim applies the best opportunities to build long-term value and unlock outsized returns tend to be at the bottom of the cycle when there's blood in the water and access to fresh capital is limited.

With that, I'll pass the call to Tassos to discuss our financials.

Thank you, Tom. Slide 8 shows our first half 2025 financial highlights. I would like to mention a few key points. Earnings and cash flow have continued to rise, while our gross debt has increased relative to year-end 2024 as we brought an additional 4 vessels into our fleet. Nevertheless, our gross debt figure is down from where it was 1 year ago. Our cash position is $511 million, of which $80 million is restricted.

The remainder ensures that we can fully cover our covenants, working capital needs and any unexpected contingencies in addition to providing dry powder for both opportunistic investments in the existing fleet and investments in fleet renewal if and when the right opportunities emerge. And of course, importantly, it's first continued payment of our sustainable dividend. Of note, we completed an $85 million refinancing to push our weighted average debt maturity to 4.9 years and bring our weighted average cost of debt to 4.18%. We also realized a gain of $28.3 million on the sale of 3 relatively older, smaller vessels, and we have contracted to sell a fourth vessel built 2000 for $35.6 million in Q4.

In addition to the healthy dividend, which has already been discussed, we have a further $33 million under buyback authorization, and we continue to delever to build equity value. We have also recently had a very strong credit ratings of firm, the details of which are on the slide.

Slide 9 shows our ongoing efforts to delever, derisk and grow equity value, which ultimately increase our optionality. The graph on the left shows our progress in lowering our outstanding debt, which was $950 million at the end of 2022 and now sits under $700 million. Perhaps more willingly, the graph on the right shows a reduction in financial leverage with net debt-to-EBITDA now at 0.7x. Whatever challenges or opportunities come next, we are ready.

Slide 10 further highlights our progress in delevering and building resilience. Our cost of debt is shown on the left and blended cost of 4.8%, down from the 6-plus percent in 2020. A similar story is shown on the right, where we have maintained low breakeven rates by cutting our interest expense even as operating expenses have risen in the middle of a period of high inflation.

I will now turn it back over to Tom.

Thanks, Tassos. For the benefit of those of you who may be new to the GSL story and to whom I offer a warm welcome, Slide 11 restates our focus on midsized and smaller container ships between 2,000 and 10,000 TEU, which make up the backbone of global trade are super flexible and are not dependent upon any 1 trade or country. This is quite different from the situation of very large container ships, which are often the focus of media coverage on our industry, not to mention the bulk of capital investment which I will come back to.

Because of the huge capacity physical restrictions in many ports and the need for sophisticated port infrastructure, those very large container ships tend to be limited to the big mainland trades, such as those between China and the U.S. or Northern Europe. We consistently reiterate this aspect of our business because this distinction is not a subtle nuance for purposes of fine-tuning a model, but a major differentiation with real-world implications, both in the current environment and well into the future.

Moving to Slide 12 on the Red Sea, which continues to have a significant impact on our industry as approximately 10% of global containership capacity is absorbed by routing around The Cape of Good Hope instead of transiting Suez. It's impossible to predict how long this will last. However, liner operator service networks are complex and interconnected, meaning that any significant changes in service routing can't simply be dropped in overnight or enacted without incurring substantial costs.

Because of that and more importantly, still the very real implications for seafarers safety, industry consensus is that the line of majors will want to see sustained stability and safety before making any material shift back to the Red Sea transits. Who knows when that will happen, but if or when it does, potentially triggering a meaningful market correction, we're well positioned to take advantage of the opportunities that arise.

Turning to Slide 13. We continue to believe that trade tensions in 2019 may be instructive as we all try to grapple with the implications of volatile U.S. trade dynamics with much of the rest of the world, and most notably, with China. In short, from 2019, a combination of tariffs, tariff arbitrage, non-tariff pressures and the prospect of future escalation led to a deconcentration of supply chains throughout the Asia Pacific region and away from huge, highly efficient industrial clusters, feeding directly into the largest Chinese ports and then outward on the very largest vessels to Northern Europe and the U.S. West Coast.

This shift accrued to the benefit of midsized and smaller vessels like ours, which both directly took market share from the very large containerships that cannot service those smaller trades, and also saw material incremental demand from a more complex and less efficient supply chain that may now involve multiple voyages within the region before going long haul to the end markets.

We've made this point before, but it bears repeating. Increased inefficiency in the supply chain means that more vessels are required to transport a given quantity of cargo. From the containership owners perspective, this is effectively indistinguishable from increased demand, and it is a key theme of many of the major factors currently impacting the world and global trade.

To be clear, those disrupted Chinese supply chains remain very significant to global containerized trade, but the diffusion of both intermediate and finished good manufacturing capacity has proved to be lasting as has the general recognition that excessive reliance on any one source country represents a fundamental supply chain vulnerability.

In the current context, many of these particulars are fluid to put it mildly, but the overall dynamic and impacts for container shipping are looking to be directionally similar to this president. So if not exactly history repeating itself, it does so far appear to rhyme.

On to Slide 14, where we provide our standard check-in on supply-side trends in the space. What at 1 point would have been quite shocking has, in recent times, just become the way things are. Both idle tonnage and scrapping activity are more or less 0, as the system remains stretched. Thin and older vessels continue to command high rates that more than justify keeping them on the water. Just to drive this point home in a global fleet with cellular capacity of around 32 million TEU, a global total of 6,800 TEU of capacity was scrapped in the first half of the year or to put it differently, more or less the equivalent capacity of a single ship in our fleet of midsized and smaller containerships.

Slide 15 covers the order book, which is both meaningful in overall scope and overwhelmingly focused on the very largest size segments, a part of the market in which GSL does not participate. In the segments where we do focus, the order book-to-fleet ratio is 12%, which is spread over a 3- to 4-year worth of deliveries.

Crucially, while the median age for the global fleet above 10,000 TEU is just 7.5 years, the median age under 10,000 TEU, in other words, in the segments we're focused on and are competing in, the median age has risen to 17.5 years, as new additions have been limited and quite old ships have hung around to reap the benefits of the tight market. It's a bit hypothetical, but if we were to look to a scenario where that full sub-10,000 TEU order book is delivered through 2028, and we were to assume that ships over 25 years in the same time frame was scrapped, then the global fleet would in fact be trending towards a net fleet reduction of 6.3% in these sizes. As we've said before, it can't be taken for granted that all of these ships will indeed be promptly scrapped but as an owner of well-maintained and high-specification ships, I can't say that we are particularly worried about a market in which even a generic 28- or 30-year-old ship can be profitably employed in the charter market.

On the flip side, in a scenario in which the wider market turns sharply downward at some stage, pressure on less well-specified vessels and their owners could be meaningfully more widespread with extensive contract coverage, a high specification in-demand fleet and a balance sheet with both resilience and dry powder, we're inclined to see such a situation as an opportunity first and foremost.

On Slide 16, we check in on the charter market itself. As you would expect from our commentary thus far, the charter market remains quite strong on an absolute basis and even more so in the context of GSL's breakeven rates of under $9,400 per day per vessel.

The amount of chartering activity, particularly on a forward or long-term basis, reduced materially during the post deliberation date air pocket when the liners and their own customers were trying to sort out how best to proceed. However, as you can see on the chart, this bout of short-term focus and hesitation to commit did not undermine the very healthy rate environment.

Beyond the discussion of fundamentals that we have provided here, forward visibility on market charter rates is rather limited. For GSL, though, we're insulated by more than $1.7 billion of contract cover over an average of 2.1 years going forward. So our focus is squarely on the opportunities ahead of us.

With that, I'll turn it back to George on Slide 17.

Thank you, Tom. To summarize, we continue to add forward cover and now have essentially no open days in 2025 and are working on closing out next year as well. Macro, geopolitical and regulatory uncertainty is high, and we're maximizing optionality to manage risk and capitalizing opportunities. Financially, GSL is stronger than it has ever been with the fortress balance sheet and annual EBITDA in excess of our net debt. Our average breakeven rates are under $9,400 per vessel per day, which means that we are positioned to continue generating free cash flow even if the markets were much weaker than today's.

As our fleet cash flow -- as fleet's cash cows age, we're opportunistically monetizing certain older vessels and are increasingly focused on disciplined fleet renewal to support forward earnings and returns.

And finally, we are pleased to be returning capital to our shareholders by paying out an annualized dividend of $2.10 per common share. Now with that, we're ready to take your questions.

[Operator Instructions] Your first question comes from the line of Liam Burke with B. Riley Securities.

Tom, as we look into third quarter, freight rates are sort of weakening or softening as we go further. Is there still that positive disconnect between your freight rates and then your charter rates?

Short answer, Liam. Yes. I would say that the charter rates in the market are holding up firmly despite the downward pressure on freight rates, in the transpacific. I would also point out actually that there are more buoyant markets than the transpacific such as Asia, Europe. But main message, charter rates remain very attractive.

And in terms of your liner customers, is there interest in longer durations in terms of the vessels that are up for recharter.

I wouldn't necessarily say longer durations, but there is certainly appetite for midsize and smaller tonnage from the liner operators for the same multiyear charters that we've been seeing for a while. So for the smaller ships, maybe a couple of years is on the cards for the ones at the larger end of the size spectrum in our fleet, you may be looking at 3 plus years?

Your next question comes from the line of Omar Nokta with Jefferies.

Maybe just a follow-up, Tom, on just your last comments about the charter appetite for the midsize and smaller asset classes. You're highlighting in 1 of the slides just how much the order book has been more attuned towards the bigger vessels. I guess maybe recently, there's been some chatter or some orders coming in for some of the smaller end of the fleet. So I guess maybe my question is maybe 2 parts. One, what's behind that or sort of kick-started perhaps that interest in the smaller ships? And then two, do you see opportunities to place orders for smaller ships against long-term contracts?

Thanks, Omar. Okay. I'll get the ball rolling on this, and I'm sure George will also weigh in. I think there is a growing recognition that the midsize and smaller segments are underbuilt and people are beginning to react to that. However, because it's still rather challenging to get significantly long-term charters in the midsize and smaller space from the liner operators that keeps a lid on any speculative orders in that space, which means that despite the fact that, yes, there is more ordering activity than before, it's still not, let's say, worryingly high in nature.

And to the second part of your question, I mean, we're always looking at opportunities in the space, both for existing ships, which has been our bread and butter to date, but also for new buildings. But we don't move on either of those unless we can make the risk and return numbers work. And so far, that hasn't been the case for new buildings, at least for us. But we continue to keep an eye on the market, as you would expect, George, I don't know if you want to add to that.

Yes. The only thing I would add is that, generally speaking, liner company, smaller ships do not consider them as the backbone of their services. Hence, they are not running to charter the ships for long durations more than 3 years, I would say, especially if it's a brand-new ship that will go for 3 years or if it's a bargain, they would even go for longer. I mean, it all depends on the rate. So if you offer a very low rate, then yes, they might get longer than 3 years. But in general, they are not the ships that the liner companies consider as their main ships so they can always pick them up in the market, they feel the charter market.

So I don't think that it is an idea for us to order these ships at today's high newbuild prices, and then speculatively try and fix them at a higher charter rate because I don't think there's higher charters will be available given the appetite of charterers and knowing also the price that somebody has paid. So the charter is not going to want to allow the owner of the ship to make a killing naturally as a charter could order the ships themselves if it's becoming too expensive.

Okay. That's interesting. And maybe just a second question. It seems like you've been perhaps a little bit more transactional on the sales side, maybe not dramatically, but you've monetized another ship an older one. It looks like it had a much firmer price than what you achieved for the sister ship a few months earlier. Is your -- are the sales coming on -- is it being driven by the fact that asset values are continuing to stay firm? And also are you seeing these high prices continue here despite perhaps the air pocket you mentioned in freight rate?

Asset prices remain attractive, going to the second part of your question first. But as a general comment, Omar, whenever we're looking to either deploy an asset or sell it, we run the numbers and try to figure out what's going to generate more capital, more returns, more cash for the business. So it so happens that, yes, we've sold these older assets opportunistically, a total of 4 during the first half of this year, simply because for those specific assets when they were coming available, we felt that, that would be the more value-generative proposition for the company. But that's not to say that we will continue down that track going forward. It's always a dynamic decision, and we figure out what makes the most sense economically, but asset values are remaining quite firm at the moment as our charter rates.

If I may just add something for clarification. The first ship we sold special survey due. The second ship we sold, special survey passed, hence, the difference in price.

[Operator Instructions] Your next question comes from the line of Climent Molins with Value Investor's Edge.

I wanted to start with the modeling question. You mentioned that as of June 30, 2 dry dockings were ongoing and 6 additional were anticipated. Could you confirm whether the 6 additional dry dockings are to be pursued throughout Q3? Or does that include the fourth quarter?

That's a pretty granular question, Climent. Nevertheless, for joining the call. Tassos, I don't know if you happen to know that to respond to it. Otherwise, we can respond to it off-line, Climent.

Yes, yes. Because I don't have it right now.

Perfectly. I'll follow up on back off-line. I also wanted to ask about your B1 asset values. Your last acquisition in December focused on large vessels, especially relative to your fleet and looking ahead, to what extent should we expect you to focus on large vessels, let's say, above 4,000 TEU relative to feeders?

I will answer to that, Climent, generally speaking, let's say, our focus, hence that our fleet is for post-Panamax beam ship. So more than 40 meters, 40 meters plus. This is the majority of our fleet per TEU. Now, we like those ships for various reasons. They take more cargo. They're more flexible and so on and so forth. Now, having said that, that does not exclude us from buying, which we have in the past, smaller ships if the deal makes sense. But if I had -- if I was in a shop then I had to -- I had all the options open to me and I would pick and choose what ships are like, I would go for post-Panamax ships rather than smaller, midsized post-Panamax ships. Ships between 6,000 to 10,000 TEU. That would be my absolute preference, but just preference, not carved in stone.

That concludes our Q&A session. I will now turn the call back over to Mr. Thomas Lister for closing remarks.

Well, thank you, everyone, for joining our earnings call today, and we look forward to reconnecting with you in the fall for our 3Q earnings. Have a great summer.

That concludes the conference call today. Thank you all for joining. You may now disconnect. Everyone, have a great day.