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Good morning, everyone. Welcome to the third quarter earnings call, the first 9 months of the '25, '26 period at BrasilAgro. Thank you for waiting. We started a little bit late today, and we have Andre and Gustavo to present our earnings. If you're in English, this presentation is also available on the chat.

And before we begin the call, I want to start off by saying, first of all, that BrasilAgro is completing anniversary. We're completing 20 years of history, and we're really happy with this milestone. No one imagined 20 years ago that a PowerPoint would become such a big company that's so significant in the sector and the industry. You'll also see we have a new visual identity to celebrate this anniversary, and we're really happy to share our anniversary. So now I'm going to pass the floor to Andre to start the call.

Can you hear me now? Great. Sorry about that. We had some technical issues here. Ana, thank you for the introduction. Thank you all for being with us 20 years, as mentioned by Ana Paula, a lot of resilience and a lot of lessons learned, a lot of achievements and mistakes, of course, but that's what makes the company mature and really have results. And no doubt, the points right were a lot greater than the wrong points. And so that really helps us to become a better company. So that -- we also enabled the growth of many people and the development of many regions. So when we left behind, and this is a reason of a lot of happiness for us, how many people were able to achieve support for their families, how many regions were transformed and thousands of kilometers of growth and electrical networks were implemented.

So now, these 20 years, we're going to get into a little bit of what this history of 20 years is all about and how we built this. And we definitely did this with people's work and your trust. There's no work without trust and there's also not only trust, right? So the combination of trust in the company's investors and analysts in these 20 years and the work on our behalf really made us reach the point we're in and work in this direction, right? So that's what makes everyone really happy as they are part of the company today. So we're going to talk about our results, and it's a really complex year due to the interest rate and other factors. But let's look at what we have under our own control, which is technology, plantations, productivity, and we know agri business has its cyclical nature.

And today, we're experiencing a low cycle moment. And we're going to talk about this and the good things and the bad things, and that's why we're really going to be available to respond to this, right? So let's talk about the numbers for the first 9 months, BRL 637 million of net revenue. It's really important to -- when we look at the first 9 months last year, there were sales that were also accounted for, and we have an adjusted EBITDA of BRL 42.8 million and an interest rate. And with all of this, we reached those 9 months with BRL 76 million of net losses.

So this is really influenced by the financial expenses and sugarcane in the second half of last year. And thankfully, sugarcane is doing really well this year, but we've had very positive perspectives here, and we actually were able to close some harvest that we'll be able to demonstrate here when it comes to soy. So on the next slide, please. Here, we can see once again, the resilience of the company to continue to sell land in Paraguay. It's a small sale, but it's really important to demonstrate that we have liquidity and that it is a project that, in the last few years, suffered a lot with climate issues, but this year is doing really well.

So when you have a good productive year, you attract liquidity, right? And we were able to complete a sale in Paraguay, not very big, but very significant when it comes to internal return rates. We're talking about 23% in reais within our historical averages and 14% of the internal return rate in dollars, right? So no doubt, Paraguay, this year, we have very positive production and we'll have a lot of success from a productive and real estate perspective as well. Next, please. Here's a little bit of the scenario and here's what we have to share here, which is this line over here at the end of H1 where we began the -- where we had the beginning of the war in Iran. And then what we see is soy is kind of moving sideways ever since the conflict began. Corn as well is really connected to this. And the only commodity where there was a significant recovery after this was cotton. And we know why, because of the connection that cotton has and the synthetic fibers have with oil subproducts really made cotton pull this -- the prices.

And we have cattle raising following a very positive cycle, and we have a restricted of -- supply in Australia and in the U.S. and in Brazil with an increase of the rate due to the [indiscernible]. And so we have more meat -- more food to -- the cows still take 9 months for pregnancy, right? And so this is going to take a while. But ethanol was another commodity we expected would react positively as occurred in cotton due to the umbilical cord kind of connection and the price of gasoline, but we know that political years are always difficult. And we see the quality of the exports -- sorry, the imports that is not really preserved. We saw petroleum go from 65 and reach 130 or 90. And we haven't seen a recovery in the price of gasoline. And so we do expect this to happen in the end of the second half if the conflict really perpetuate all the way there. But the sugarcane has been following a short and historical series. And -- however, we're going to talk about the climate. We're going to talk about perspective.

We're going to see the El Nino coming along really strongly and that really increases the intensity of this discussion on sugar production in India and Thailand. And so we're not optimistic that the prices are going to get back to 18, but we think that the bottom of the well is kind of locked in there, and it should be an upside for gasoline and for the production of sugarcane as well. And then whenever you have a geopolitical conflict or discussion, you have the cost matrix and the revenue metrics. And unfortunately, till now, the only thing that was really impacted was the cost metrics. As we've shown you in the commodities, the only caution was -- where we had an alteration in the matrix -- just 1 minute. So, here. Just 1 second. All right. Can you see? Yes. Good. So thankfully, we're not ITS specialist, and we don't work with this, right? Farmers -- were just the farmers and the agronomists.

But anyways, as I was saying, we have this cost situation that was impacted by the war, especially for phosphate fertilizers, and they went from prices at $600 reaching almost $800. Chloride as well went up a lot and urea also as -- and those inputs that are really -- [ can ] you see natural gas went up a lot. So potassium chloride, we had already, basically, bought about 70% at the beginning of the harvest. With fertilizers, we already had a pretty big position. And when you look at the 43, that represents the first harvest, right? Sorry, it represents the total amount of fertilizers, not only the first harvest. And so in the first harvest, the fertilizers are going to have -- that we're going to need in the month of September, October, November. We have a much greater percentage of growth because we estimate and expect that the conflict should be cooling down a bit in the next month.

So in the first harvest, we already have most of it, of the phosphate inputs, bought. But when you look at the off-season harvest, plantation of sugarcane in the first half of next year, the phosphate -- the products are not purchased, but we also see an exchange ratio that's kind of skyrocketing. So the conflict generated only an increment in the cost matrix, but it still has not led to an increment in the revenue matrix. If the conflict finishes today, no doubt, we will have a significant impact in the costs, and we won't necessarily have a revenue benefit. So we must all hope that this cools down as quick as possible. So then, here about the planted area. So the harvest of '25, we closed at 168,000 hectares. And it's important to highlight here that the company, in the last few years, has been a seller. And basically, we've been able to continue to keep a significant production area.

For soy, we're basically keeping about 94% harvested. We lack very little. And what's missing is Paraguay, especially. All the rest has already been harvested and Paraguay is doing really well. But this year, we have Paraguay bringing in positive surprises. And we've already started to harvest -- and we're starting the beginning of the harvest for corn in summer. And generally, Central Brazil has a rain distribution that's really positive. And for sugarcane, we already started harvesting 2 units, especially in the Serra Branca and Itacuri. And we started off with the first harvest with a lot of adherence. It's an El Nino year. And a bit of what I started saying is the biggest concern we have is that the Northeast region tends to suffer a bit more and it's a year with a lot of caution when it comes to the next harvest, right?

The harvest is going to be planted around October, November, where we have to critically look at this and be careful when it comes to how we're going to allocate capital and especially when we start seeing the risks are very low. And we've been working on this carefully in the company to really exclude some areas that, historically, lead to some production issues, right, because we're seeing a significant El Nino year up ahead. Great. So now just a bit about the hedge position in the company. And we're sharing, basically, this harvest that -- the soy we already mentioned, we harvested. It's a year of a lot of volatility, but I think the company was able to position itself positively, and we'll see the numbers now, right?

So it's worth mentioning that when we were still defining the budget last year, we were talking about soy, at about BRL 1,060, BRL 1,070, and we had a currency rate at about BRL 6. So that was the company's budget. And ever since we have been locking in some operations. We had a currency rate that was almost at about BRL 4.90. So what is important to consider here is, basically, what we have as a hedge locked in. We have a currency that's 65% locked in. at about BRL 5.90 almost, BRL 5.89, and that's what we have locked in at. As a currency, Chicago is at $10.85. But of course, what we need to lock in still is being locked in at about $12. then that's going to lead to a really interesting combination because even with the currency dropping, we should be able to have average currency of about BRL 565, BRL 570, and the Chicago will also be able to recover, right?

So cotton is a crop where the currency is a lot better, actually, due to an area reduction when we saw a major concern with the cost of capital this year with the crop that we can put capital at risk. We had already performed some sales back then, and we have about 60% of the cotton sold at a title currency of about BRL 665 spectacular dollar, and we've also seen about 76% of the commodities sold. And then for ethanol, we've been working on volume in ethanol. We've already -- we see corn is about 54% sold and farm receivables, which is also very significant, the company has over BRL 600 million in this line here in the company. It's a super significant account and we're working on it in the P&L. And there's a currency that's really adherence to the harvest, which is BRL 586 million and in Chicago about BRL 1,079. Next, please. So then, Gustavo. Now, that was the intro, but we can get into the numbers now. I'm just going to close my camera real fast here and pass on the mic.

Thank you, Andre. And well, thank you all for your presence and during this presentation of the results and this exercise starts off in the beginning of July, and then it goes up until 30th of July. And we consider about BRL 76 million within the highlights. And last year in the same period, we had presented a positive result of BRL 76 million with total revenue about 27%. And I want to remind you that we already had mentioned on the 31st of December with the impact -- and will -- that impacted the revenue and the results. And we also saw that we also had a sale in the farm performed previously in this year. We, at the moment, just accounted for this transaction, the one that I was mentioning in the beginning of our presentation. And the adjusted EBITDA in this period was BRL 42 million, BRL 42.8 million and prior to this is BRL 195 million.

And on the graph, we presented this with the main movements in these 2 periods that we have, one part that's on the right side here at the center, and we see soy and corn. But it's important to highlight also that everything we have here up until the 31st of March was, basically, stocks and corrections that were performed in 2025. With everything that would be like the new harvest, Andre mentioned, the 240,000 tons of soy. And we only sold about 55,000 tons in this quarter. So the decision of carrying on this a little more up ahead due to the fact that in the beginning of the war, we had this expectation of a short-term solution that we saw freight started to pressure a bit.

Considering the excellent harvest results in, as well as due to this increment and this increase we have at the logistics level. So we decided to hold this a bit more and see if we could find opportunities that were better for logistics because the products are already practically all sold, about 60% compromised already. But we're just searching for the best moment, right, for all of this. But until the 31st of March, we had already sold only the stocks, and then we had BRL 11 million sold in soy and BRL 22 million in corn. And then sugarcane which is different, BRL 56 million, that we have presented in the 31st of December when we talked about the ice period and the frost we had in the region of Sao Paulo and issues also with burns in the northern region and the prices also that started pulling it -- this downwards.

Cotton had -- we had a harvest in some areas with losses, and that led to reducing the amount of hectares that were planted during this new harvest and the farm, so does the other administrative and costs and then, especially -- when you can see this in sugarcane and the farm, and that explains the main differences between the adjusted EBITDA, right? So when we see the results of this exercise in the top part of the graph, you can see BRL 76 million positive and negative. And then you see the price of sugarcane and cotton, and that represented a variation of about BRL 36 million negative. The lower volume of sugarcane as well, which added to this BRL 19 million, and there was a reduction in the cost as well with some soy, corn crops that we should have some kind of a savings because of the productivity in the past.

But we can see the fair value when you can see the performance of everything we've been marking to market at fair value and the impact of the prices as well presented for ethanol and sugar that really impacted this, generating an impact with a lower results and the sale of farms and also an impact that was positive for this period of BRL 37 million of financial results, which we can only see at the bottom part last year during these 9 months, 2025 with BRL 93 million. And this year, this impact represents BRL 56 million. And I always want to remind you that the first line of financial investments, we have the minimum cash and then we see our interest on liabilities as well, which is the cost of debt that the company has. And so we see approximately BRL 55 million. And in the last year, this effect of minus BRL 59 million was smaller because of the lower interest rate at a percentage level. And then after we saw that for these 9 months, especially for mark-to-market, which are the updates to fair value and the other variations as well practically at a null effect.

But to complete this, we are presenting the BRL 76 million that are negative. And you can see this performance that we've had in sugarcane as well. So next, here, you can see the gross results once again, mentioning that everything that was commercialized here with the exception of soy, which is 55,000 tonnes, all the rest are the sale of stock of the prior harvest and soy, as you can see, there's an improvement in the gross earnings and results as a consequence of better cost per tonne. And for corn as well, we also see the price and cost leveraging the results of the products and looking at the unit results considering reais per ton, and that would be the potential.

So with the increase in volume, not only for the soy, but also corn, we had an increment in the volume. When we look at sugarcane, which is to the right side on the left here, to the right, you can see how this performance was of 1,341,000 tonnes for 2025. And for '25, '26, we have 971,000 tonnes, and that really brought in this difference that's so significant about BRL 36 million. We also see the unit price, not only because of the price of the ATR, but also considering the concentration of the kilogram of sugar that we considered in the provision, and that led to our margins, which are normally stabilized at 3,500 hectares, which keep a lower margin as a consequence of this impact on productivity.

So when we see cotton as well, we had -- as we mentioned, part of this cotton was we performed sales and commercialization, which are produced in irrigation areas that were very positive. And we had other areas that did not have irrigation, that would have very negative impacts. But besides having productivity is very low, we also had an issue with quality, which made the unit price be a lot lower than what we normally had achieved through a hedge that had led to these results of BRL 9.9 million, but the discount made the price be a lot lower, right? So this was the main engine, let's say, that made us decide to reduce the service for this harvest that we're working with now. And then we can also see the net debt for the company, a total of BRL 1 billion and the cash level of BRL 887 million.

And then this debt is at 93.2% CDI with the maturities considering this period. We have the receivables at the farm, BRL 678 million that we still have to receive. And here, what's important to mention is we are at a moment where all costs were already incurred. And from now on, we're going to be commercializing and transporting and receiving all of the receivables for production. So then here, when we consider soy, for example, we have to receive over BRL 280 million. And as we had mentioned in the beginning of this exercise, from now on we'll begin reducing the level of leverage, especially considering the understanding that the reduction of interest would happen throughout this year and the next year.

But after the beginning of the war and as you saw the Central Bank was reducing their pace, we will make a decision to search for a reduction in our level of investments and try to be more efficient as well in how we place in the production. But we are, at this moment, confirming the El Nino for the climate conditions in the next harvest. So I think with that, we wrap up our presentation, and now we'll get into Q&A.

Well, I just wanted to get back to one discussion on the cost of fertilizers that Andre had already mentioned in the beginning of the conversation, but this has been a central point here for discussion, and I think it's worth reinforcing, right? So we had a comment from management on the news today that maybe a real is more appreciated, it could compensate this and maybe amortize a headwind and maybe bring in an inflation year-over-year that could be lower than what the market feared, right? But I wanted to understand what are the assumptions behind this?

And what are the prices of product inputs, nitrogen-related inputs that you could maybe be more inclined to accelerate purchases for? And what would be the timing for this since you have the logistics and the flow required to reach the farms? And I imagine this is probably smaller for smaller farmers, but I would imagine that would maybe considered a stabilized level that would already encourage this kind of movement, right? So then to bring in this discussion on the cancellation there of the farm that we saw last month with a worse scenario from the counterparty. And how are you considering the risk for the receivable portfolio? Are there any other possibilities of cancellations that are concerning you? And just if you could give us a little more visibility on this, it would be interesting for the market.

Well, for fertilizers, you know it's an area I love, and I've been working in this sector -- I worked in the sector for 12 years, but I want to share a little bit of the expectations here. So what are we working on from a time line perspective? The sugarcane harvest started off in April in some areas, and it's going to go until the month of November. There is a period in sugarcane where you're harvesting it, especially the sugarcane we're harvesting in these months where you still have humidity in the soil, and that's still like the remaining from the rain period. And also when you talk about Sao Paulo, you should have some humidity in the month of May or so. And when you get into a region like Mato Grosso, things are a little more complicated, right, you get rain and then you get back to having rain in September.

And so the fertilizers and nitrogen-based products that we have the need to work on, we're going to be buying considering this, and we're going to be harvesting -- we're going to be fertilizing these sugarcane plantations, right? So the discussion we've been working on to try to balance out this impact is if we should have the full dose of fertilizers. When you put this fertilizer in the sugarcane, you have an absorption curve. And this happens in the month of January, February, and March, where you have most of the dry material accumulated. So when you're fertilizing sugarcane right now, while not fertilizing this is bad because it won't have the availability of the nutrition that it needs, but it's growing about 100% as we do every year for an operational matter, you're going to kind of fertilize about 100% in the sugarcane.

And due to this significant movement with the prices, sugarcane is going to be harvested now that has humidity the soil or protected through rain in the next month, we're going to treat -- how are we going to treat this? Well, it depends on this year. We would already kind of like a full dose or maybe installments. That when we have a full dose applied, normally older sugarcane where you don't want to have such a small installment or part, right? In the younger sugarcane, we're going to drill this down to try to bring this a little bit before the sugar season -- sorry, before the rain season for the sugarcane. So the sugarcane we treat and harvest -- the sugarcane you're harvesting now, you should treat. But what you're going to harvest in August or the end of July and September, that fertilizer you put in the soil is just to help you operationally because the sugarcane won't absorb that. They're only going to absorb the fertilizer -- or any crop, it only absorbs this when you have water.

So you're going to fertilize sugarcane in August, you have no rain or humidity, the fertilizer is going to be stabilized on the surface and it won't absorb it. So we would do this every year when we had another stable price situation, right? When you have price volatility, then you throw this up ahead of it. So when you look at the time line of the sugarcane, that's going to be it. And as I mentioned, the phosphate products, we already have good positioning for, and it's important to see this impact when you get into the discussion on the conflict, the biggest damage is for the nitrogen-based products, right?

And 35% of this goes through the Strait, right? So -- the Hormuz Strait. So when you look at phosphate-related products, then you could have an increase in the cost matrix, right, with natural gas prices going up, et cetera, but it's less than 15% of the phosphated fertilizer that goes through the Strait of Hormuz. So we would -- it wouldn't be -- and yes, we're going to have a cost issue considering the increment of the cost of natural gas, which is the basis of everything.

So for fertilizers, I try to answer this a bit. And I can add on as well a bit. What we are looking at here is that last year, for hectare of soy, we were talking about BRL 4,100 of direct cost, right, per hectare. But all of this confirmation of cost was considering a dollar of almost BRL 6. So what has happened during this period, we're in this process of starting up a new budget. And we see that the appreciation of the dollar has really pulled the cost downwards, especially for expenses. And since we've already purchased part of the chloride, almost 70%, and everything with the phosphated products and everything for soy and corn. And we still -- although we have some prices pushed upwards, let's say, in any of these cases such as the urea for the off-season harvest, we can see that this impact and the appreciation of the real has made costs be very, very similar from one year to another.

So then the big challenge here when we see this in reais and sacks per hectare with the costs here that are normally BRL 30, BRL 35. Historically, we see that it's kind of at the ceiling, the BRL 35. And the big challenge up ahead is how we are going to position ourselves, right? At a moment where we bought the chloride, we already sold a bit of soy, and that would give us a stack of soy approximately with like 4% or 5% better than the previous year, right? So when we saw this through the margins, it was actually a little bit better. But of course, from now on, we have to see what's going to happen and if this will impact the services, especially.

But when we consider the first version of the budget we had seen before, between March and April, just as presented here and the impact, the prices for the fertilizers and -- we're kind of stabilizing there. And from then on, we saw a possibility to begin the negotiation, right? So when you have scale to buy, you can have some sort of discount, right? But also the doses, we're talking about 130, 140, 150 per hectare. And when you see the impact of all of this, of the price in the fertilizers, there's not much of an incidence, right? So that's the vision we have. And we can see this impact in the fertilizers.

Great. And so I'll just answer Bruno, the second part of the question here on financial risks. And I think that we were very quick in solving this. And so there's 2 ways to -- and we will be able to sell this, right? So I like looking at the half full cup, right? We were buying an area. And so yes, this transaction, we had a reduction. This asset will get back to our shareholder base and -- sorry, our asset base, and it is within our space, and we're going to be searching for ways to do good business with it, right? We're not going to get into details here, but I'd say that this asset that came back was one of the assets we had of a buyer. Maybe -- I don't think we had a detailed credit analysis, but it's a buyer that has a leverage rate that's a lot higher than the others in our portfolio.

So generally, our portfolio, we always sell farms-to-farmers that already have a big portfolio. And this farmer that we canceled this business, they didn't have such a big portfolio. And so the liquidity capacity was smaller, but that's not what happens in our portfolio with other creditors. So we're really keeping our eyes open to this. And it's always worth mentioning that the transactions we have protect the risk for this to happen, and that's something we just demonstrated, right? So if you have a huge challenge and you can see our horizon here where there's no possibility of time frames.

In the sense, we have an asset registered in the company, and it's a lot easier for us to -- it's a sale where you can sell this asset, and this is what we consider a -- you deliver the title, but deliver the property but not the title, and that's where we can guarantee the solvency of our transactions. So it was a creditor where we already had a relationship of leased properties that was one of the worst in our portfolio. And I'd say that our portfolio, we're very confident about the receivables as well.

Thank you, Bruno. Now we're going to open up Thiago Duarte from BTG Pactual.

Pleasure to speak with you always. As always, I wanted to take advantage of this topic on the fertilizers and also hear a little bit of guys' opinion as well as Andre's about a more market-based issue. And this graph on the exchange that you present in the presentation from 2 years from now, basically, if we were to extend this decade later, that would be maybe not as favorable for commodity. We had the war in Ukraine, and then in 2027, 2028. And my question here -- my answer -- my question here to you, Andre is how you understand that this ratio will get back to the historical average?

Do you understand that it will be a retraction in the demand for fertilizers and a bit of what you guys chose as how you're going to work with them eventually and maybe bring this downwards? Or will it be for the recovery of prices and commodities as you've already presented is happening. But the truth is that this happened very little when you look at the grain specifically. And so my question to you is, first, do you understand that this should get back to the average? Or do you think the sector will have to handle these very unfavorable exchange ratios for a while? So that would be my question to you.

Thiago always has intelligent and difficult questions here. He wants to take advantage of my past experience in the industry for fertilizers. But just to understand here, what I'm going to explain a bit about production just so we can understand how this will accommodate this. So nitrogen fertilizer industry is one of the most beautiful things. The air we're breathing here has more nitrogen than oxygen.

So what the fertilizer industry is all about is they need energy, and that's why you have the natural gas history, and we capture nitrogen from the atmosphere. And through this process, that is external, adding energy into the molecule so they can shock. We produce gas, which is called ammonia, NH3, and this gas is where you start all of the production of the fertilizer industry. So when you look at the ammonia and you -- NH3 and you react with SO4, this is sulfate and when you say -- when you react to NO3, you have just ammonium nitrate. And when you get ammonia and you react against another molecule, you have CO2 and NH2, which is the molecule of urea.

And it's really important to understand, right, to understand the fertilizer production and that starts off with the production and you need to have this fundamental element, which is natural gas. And this natural gas is going to be where everything starts. So what's the phosphate [Foreign Language]

Because even if the area has no coverage in the case of sugarcane, as what I talked about, we would have fertilization. So since there is a time where the rain will take longer. It shall gives us more favorable time for the fertilization of nitrogen for sugarcane. So we are working on this for next year. Okay. To complement the costs that were mentioned. All of this previous budget that we inaugurated has a cost for all of the crops, very similar to what we had last year. And because of the appreciation of the real, defensives are cheaper and fertilizers are costing $180. Now it's $80 with more chloride.

So we are anticipating some changes because of that. The concern that we have for the future is the CCT. The CCT may have some kind of impact, some material impact if we maintain the diesel price over BRL 160. This is the only crop that we are more concerned with. But there are still a lot of things that can happen. We still have contracts with service providers to make, and it will be the beginning of a harvest where we need to be very attentive and be able to control the costs that are still going to close.

Thank you for those answers. Thank you, everyone, for your questions and for your time with us this morning. We will be closing this call. So if anyone has any questions, please contact us through our Investor Relations team and see you next quarter.

[Statements in English on this transcript were

spoken by an interpreter present on the live call.]

Good morning, everyone. We are here once again in our earnings call at BrasilAgro. Today, we're going to be presenting our earnings for the second quarter of the harvest of '25, '26. For those of you who are watching in English, the presentation is available on the chat.

Now I'll pass the floor on to Andre Guillaumon, our CEO, to begin.

Thank you so much, Ana Paula. Thank you, everyone. Once again, it's a great pleasure to be with you here. And I think this call has been disrupted, right? This call is done directly from a farm. We had agenda challenges here at Chaparral, and I hope the internet has no issues. We have everyone hoping for the best here. Let's hope the provider is good, but I am sure it's going to work well. And we're connected with telemetrics, and we hope things work well. And if this works well, I'm going to do all of my calls from the farm because then I won't be stuck in Sao Paulo, just be straight from our operations. But, once again, thank you for being with us today. We're going to be disclosing our earnings for the semester.

Before we talk about the semester, we saw that we had included the slides up ahead of the climate conditions, but I'm going to give you a quick overview. I believe that overall, you've seen this, and it was a year with a bit more of regular rain conditions, but we -- our replanting needs were very low, and we had good efficiency in choosing when to plant the right crops. And we've been working on development ever since then. That's been very positive in Mato Grosso with rains that are good and not getting in the way so much as what happened in the last harvest last year. And the last harvest was really difficult. But now so far, we're doing really well. We have a lot of units as well, doing well, Mato Grosso and Bahia, in here, and it's always a huge challenge. The plantations are doing really well, spectacular. We have the last rain 5 days ago in the farm. We're expecting another rain period this week. So this is an overall panorama.

Sugarcane has been recovering a lot as well. I came from the Sao Jose Farm yesterday. I was in many different sugarcane areas there, and the sugarcane is doing really well. They're expanding well with replantation rates that's very good. We accelerated the plantation of sugarcane. We planted a bit more sugarcane now during summer even to give us a bit more time as well. And we're doing really well overall in all of the crops. The big challenge is, and I think it's worth mentioning was the implementation of telemetrics in all of our operational units in the company. We've implemented this in Parana. We're just waiting on Bolivia to have the full telemetrics. All of our units in Brazil are 100% covered by telemetric monitoring, and we have a lot of efficiency when we add these technologies, and we can improve systems a lot. So the application of defensives are all connected as well in all of our 16 units we operate.

So we're really happy with this challenge we overcome, and the team is able to deliver, and now we want to improve more and more of the accuracy in telemetrics. So we also opened up COE in Palmas, that's doing really well. And there, we've also been monitoring all of the operations in the company. So we talk about the first 6 months in the company, we had a revenue of BRL 470 million and adjusted EBITDA of BRL 71.3 million. And this loss of BRL 61.8 million, we're going to get more details into this soon, but six months are going to be pretty tough because you don't have the classification of some of the assets yet. You have all of the incurred expenses into the cost base. So it's a huge challenge this semester, but we're going to get into more details in a bit. And the company will also show us how they're working and what they've been doing.

So one more slide, please. Well, this has been the biggest challenge for the entire agricultural sector. The supply of soy has been a surplus in the supply. We see the stocks a lot higher than they were a few years ago. We reached stocks that are over 50 million tons. And Brazil is, once again, heading to a super harvest. A few houses was talking about 179 million to 182 million tons. And as things are moving, that's really the reality. Soy here and in Maranhao & Piaui, have been going around -- the soy plantations are really spectacular. A lot of the soy have been above 65, 70 sacks. So this number that was an uncertainty in the market in the past two weeks, really has been demonstrating more signs of confirmation, and this has impacted prices, but also the premium perspectives. Then corn has a very regional specificity. The ethanol plants are changing all of this logistical network. It was a cereal that used to have a big significance in the logistics when it's a low added value product, logistics makes a huge difference. So the distribution of the ethanol plants. We'll see that we're being able to sell corn with a premium in some markets, and this has been very interesting. We've also seen when we look at our historical relationship and the process of soy and corn, which is 2.3, but it's a lot more favorable compared with the corn and the positive ratio is a lot better for corn.

So when we see cotton, it's moving sideways around 66, 67, even 68. And then cattle is a recovery that took place in the beginning of last year with a perspective that's been very positive. This week, we've had news all over of Trump advisors saying they're going to pressure to lower cost of beef in the U.S. But the biggest issue is we had scarce supply of beef. And so we're really optimistic of the prices in this sector. And for ethanol, in the end of last harvest was very positive, went up significantly, and that helped offset the bottom graph, which was sugarcane. And we left those prices that were -- those high prices, $0.22, $0.23. We started the harvest with $0.17, and we wrapped up with almost $0.15 a pound. And a lot of the plants have the capacity to modify the mix at a certain proportion. No one can modify the mix entirely, right? But this is a photograph or panorama of the commodities. It's very important to always look at this and see that the company besides being an agricultural production company, it's a company that's involved in the development and commercialization of properties. So there are some things that are really bad of production, but it could generate opportunities for the company. So we always keep our eyes open to all of these movements in pricing, and we're going to provide more details about how the strategy has been commercially in the company.

Next, well, now when things are tough, prices are tough, and you can't do much, you have to work in-house, right? So my friend Gustavo has been around for 20 years, and said "Costs are just like nails. We have to cut them every week," right? And trying to find the best way to allocate our resources, right? And so on this graph here, we show you basically the moment where we had -- we're talking about the current harvest that's currently underway, and the moment we took on the position of the purchases of these inputs. So the first graph shows MAP, where you can see, where we were at this moment, and how we were buying MAP at $640 a ton. There was a peak, and then it went back, and now, once again, starting to go up a bit more. Then, chloride, we also had a very effective purchase at about $308, and there's a lot of volatility as well, right? So we've always been monitoring this currency situation. And when we had the budget, we had a projection and a budgeted amount of $6 and for inputs of $5.90, and we've been monitoring this. With the reduction, we were able to lock this in a bit more and get the right higher prices. And now at this low bottom level, we've been able to lock it in the opposite, right? Prepay a lot of what we had in dollars as inputs to get lower prices. And this has been leading to significant savings in defensives and some inputs, about 7% or 8%, which is a lot if you talk about commodities.

On the right side, we can basically see the position taken with everything. And what's missing is basically just something related to sugarcane, let's say. And then we show the exchange ratio that's already been worse. It got better then, and now it gets back to showing some signs of a peak, but not such a significant peak. And as you have -- I always tell the team when we have a lot of turbulence between the price of sale, dollar and other variations, we're always looking at the exchange ratio to try to find the best moment to lock in agrochemicals, fertilizers and this is where we can see this graph. And I think it's worth mentioning the decision-making process of the company at the right moment.

Sorry, one more. In cattle raising, we've had significant reduction in the volume of production, which is normally due to the sale of the Preferencia farm. And I'm really humble in saying that when at the company, we think we should have a basket of products, we're really focusing on reducing volatility operationally, productive volatility and the volatility, especially of prices in this basket of products. But we were keeping our eyes open that much to having different crops that could maybe generate better liquidity to the sale of land. Of course, we knew land with cotton is worth more. We always try to add value. But here is a classic example of this when we saw -- we were selling always the grain farm, but when we saw that there was a recovery in the prices of cattle and beef, that started heating up the market and was in Preferencia. It was in our portfolio for 15 years, but we were able to complete a sale that was very significant for the company in the middle of last year. This brought in important results in a unit, where we had very limited expectations to implement grains and other crops. So it was really a cattle-raising area.

So we can show you here the harvest and a bit of the reflex here. As I mentioned, we talked about the harvest that started in a bit of a turbulent scenario when it comes to rain distribution, right? And that brought in two factors. Pastures were delayed in growth and sprouting, and that also -- this delay in the pastures growing, which generally led to volumes of rain that were also very low in these areas, where we have cattle-raising activities. So -- but then after -- from 15th of January, it kind of got stabilized, but this reflects the overall scenario of the quarter. So that's why the photograph in cattle raising is limited. Of course, we were still quite optimistic. We're talking about 470 grams of daily weight gains. And we're looking at a photograph of the drought period, right? But we're looking at the scenario of July, which is already the drought season, limited offering of pastures. And then in December, you have this delay in the beginning of the rains in October. So in the quarter, already kind of compromises this a bit, but nothing is too concerning. We're going to reach the numbers because of the -- what happens and helps a lot is the production of small calves that are getting weight. And so that's advancing really well.

Now we're going to move on to a photograph here that we say we have to show good news and bad news. This is a photograph of the sugarcane year-over-year. And I think this is a huge challenge. Last year, we had two significant events take place, especially the ice period in the southeast of the state of Sao Paulo, which affected some of our sugarcane plantations with this frost and ice. And also, we had a situation of fire in Sao Jose, where we had a big plantation of sugarcane that burnt. When it burns, you have to harvest it beforehand. So some sugarcane has a later average cycle, you have to cut that down. You don't lose all of your sugarcane, but it won't complete its full cycle. And this leads to two impacts. First, the maturity, right, the level of ATR, and there's a lower impact in TCH, but the biggest impact is in the maturity level. You have to harvest sugarcane that hasn't reached 70% of dry material. And so it's almost like the fruit is not riped enough, right? It hasn't concentrated all of its sugar yet to simplify things here. But this led to an effect in productivity. But as I mentioned, we've been keeping up a good productivity in the sugarcane plantations this year. It's a lot better than last.

Next, here, we can see a photograph that we like sharing a lot, which is the company's capacity to work in the real estate pillar and operational pillar in a very effective way, right? So on the left side pizza, you can see that we've been keeping up our productive area in the company despite the fact that in the last few years, we had to take advantage of commodity prices that were very positive, but [ the company ] that sold lot of area and land, and had a significant amount of sales in the last 4 or 5 years, taking advantage of the cycle. And I'd say we must be a cyclical company that captures moments of opportunity of the commodity prices, and that's been affecting the land prices as well. So one thing it's very different as well for the company. When you look at this graph for quite a while in our presentations, you can see that there's a real high concentration of sugarcane and soy. And the company in this important strategy for diversification and mitigation of the risks searching for better results. The pizza graph has been improving more and more, and it's just becoming more significant with other crops.

On the right side, you have the two other graphs that also indicate and was showing a bit of the breakdown of our properties, which are our own land and also lease land. And here, there's no magic number. We've always mentioned that the leasing needs to bring operational results and stabilize the results, and our own land should be efficient to allocate capital. So our own land allows us to have a cost of capital that's cheaper. And so this combination between leased and properties -- and our own properties is something we closely watch so that we can always be around 50% or 55% or 52% because that's where we understand is our main formula to have cheap cost of capital and really consider the results of the operational stability and especially where you have a lot of volatility in these open areas in the company. So when you consider leasing in more premium areas, especially in Mato Grosso, where we had a lot of leases there. And there's still some work to be done as well, nothing is ready yet, but we understand that this company will be stabilized in a very productive manner.

So next, here, I've already gone over this a bit. But here, you can show a summary of what we've been talking about. Harvest plantations complete and in good conditions. And considers good conditions. We started the year with a trend that was a weak La Ni�a, and we also see climate scientists mentioning this heading to more of a neutrality. And we always say it's fundamental, right? Our experience in these boarding zones, right? And so when you have this, of course, La Ni�a is strong, you're going to have an important significant when it's not, you also have -- when you have El Nina or the neutrality, or El Ni�a that's closer to a lower intensity, have better rain distribution, and that's the condition that's setting this harvest in Brazil.

Next, well, here, we bring in a bit of detail on what the company is searching for ways to do in a more efficient way through the treasury team led by Ana and Gustavo. And we've been searching for ways to find efficiency, right? So setting up an increase of 2% or 3% productivity is difficult year-over-year, but losing 2% or 3% in the commercial formula is really easy, right? So we're going to show you some of the derivatives, and that's been led by Ana and Gustavo and commodity. And so soy is about 65%, closed at $10.80. Everyone saw this soy reached $10.20, $10.50, but -- and so we've been considering this. And we have a currency that's sold at about 55%. And it's very different than spot, right? So as I was mentioning in other calls, it's a very volatile year, a lot of geopolitical insecurity, and it's a year where we have to bring volatility to our favor. And so we've already sold this soy, this currency. And part of this is already kind of closed off. And part of this soy will most likely be left to be commercialized in the second semester as we've done. Cotton is 6% locked in already, and it's a crop where we're a little more stuck because we had a perspective for daily plantations, we reduced this and at that moment where we already had sold about a piece that had represented 30%, 40%, there was a peak of the dollar. And when you look at cotton, it's different than looking at soy. When we look at soy, we're considering -- and here, we're considering this for December, right? So we already have a lower percentage because you have a longer period, right? But two things happened here, right? The longer period was about December '26, and the reduction of this area is quite beneficial because you had a better sold dollar, right? And so that's been sold at $6.65, right? And then below you have ethanol for the '25 harvest and that's at BRL 2,670. And then after this, we decided to -- we saw the prices were recovering. And so this is really important to reach the prices we needed at that moment where ethanol was reaching BRL 200 to BRL 300. And with corn, we have a little bit less sold due to the off season harvest kind of what we mentioned now, which was the issue of better premium captures in the different locations. So this also has made things a lot easier. We can capture better prices, and this is what kind of justifies a little bit less corn locked in, right? And just a minute.

And receivables from farm sales is an important line in our balance sheet. As you all know, there is a significant volume of over 5.5 million sacks, and we have over approximately $120 million in this line receivables. And all of the receivables of the current harvest come into the P&L. And then it's kind of like a photograph of what we have of receivables from farms this year. So soy sold at $1,078, 67% at this level and currency at $6.16. And so when you look at the position of the dollar, we look at the global position, but we also consider the allocation because the receivables in farms are in certain units that maybe we don't even operate anymore. So we have a segregation, it's very significant, and we like demonstrating this separately.

Next, please. Gustavo, it's all yours, and we'll get back to your -- to the questions with the rest of the team here.

Thank you, Andre. Good morning, everyone, and I want to thank you all for your presence. The first 6 months, 2025, 2026. As Andre mentioned, normally, it's just when you have a weaker quarter, you generally have the sale of all of the stocks that we had harvested in the harvest for '24, '25. And we'll then see that this decision of being -- of carrying this product is really positive, right? But also on the other hand, you have this impact that what Andre mentioned of sugarcane. And for the first time in a long period, we had achieved productivity that was very low. And so we had almost 200,000 tons and another 200,000 we lost due to burning and some other operational issues we had as well in Maranhao. So we started off with losses of BRL 61.7 million. And in the same period of the previous year, we had already reached BRL 77 million. And on the right side, we can see the results of this period. The first graph on the top, BRL 77 million at BRL 71 million negative. And then you have the main variation that we'll see volumes of prices, which is mainly in sugarcane. And in some products, especially with soy and corn, we had the savings and fertilizers are a little cheaper, but that was not enough to offset or compensate the impact in sugarcane. And then we also had the sale of Taquari, BRL 207 million, and commercial expenses. And the impact of the financial results this year were better performance in previous year, and this is something we can see in the financial results as well. And in derivatives, we did not have such volatility, was kind of at normal levels with the sale of soy and corn. But at that moment, the currency had reached BRL 6.10, BRL 6.20, and that had impacted the results that we had mentioned. And so it was kind of mark-to-market, but that had been very relevant, right, in that period. And so I think these periods, they behaved -- the derivatives behaved pretty well, especially with currency bringing in more positive results. But of course, results that are not going to have an actual cash effect. We see the cash effect, the revenue from financial investments always above CDI. And then also the impact of the interest 15% that we can see interest -- passive interest rate. And so we have a net impact.

Last year, in this period, we had lower interest and also maybe not that different, but the impact was about BRL 11 million positive and BRL 38 million negative because of the interest we were considering about BRL 20 million. And this was something we already discussed. These lines are the ones that have the actual cash effect. All the rest is the mark-to-market or updates of fair values, the values which are receivables as well from farms. As mentioned, we have 5.9 million, almost 6 million sacks of soy. And the mark-to-market for all the months and quarters is generating a variation. And last year had been positive. This year, it's a negative, especially because of the drop of the dollar prices.

So from a financial earnings perspective, it was not that relevant in the results, and it didn't impact that much. But if we consider the last year, we had BRL 107 million, and now we're talking about BRL 71 million. And we can say that there was about BRL 90 million. And actually, the adjusted operational results, right? And you can see on the graph, at the center, you can see the main variations, right? So as mentioned, like soy was BRL 3.7 million, corn was BRL 20 million and cotton was BRL 9.9 million. And so other crops, we diversified our basket and the impact of all of the sales of stocks were very positive. And what really hindered us during the semester was sugarcane with BRL 54 million, BRL 58 million.

And then a bit more of the details of what happened to these products, right? And so we're talking about -- this is a stock decision trying to capture the best premiums in the semester. And then we had margins of 28%, 29%, very similar, of course. Although, prices were a little bit lower during the semester, we're talking about BRL 2,037 million. Last year it was BRL 148 million, and the costs have been a little bit smaller, especially for fertilizers. And that generated BRL 52 million. And so that was against BRL 48.8 million, right? So then you can see that explanation.

Then for corn, this was last year, we had mentioned the company really reduced the off-season harvest because at that time, we had a very low expectation for prices and a lot of stock. And so for fertilizer prices, we normally all of the technical pack as well. And we understood that it was a great moment to reduce this and reach a better decision, right? So with this, we would be able to also reduce the losses we had. And so we always mentioned that the farm needed this rotation. You plant this, and sometimes we understand this is better to provide the sustainability, right? So last year, this product generated a loss of BRL 5.3 million. And this year was a period with the arrival of a lot of industries in regions, where you have different locations of the farm, this generated the possibility to have better prices because this also -- they also pay like some premiums and to ensure the stocks for the production in the plant. But even so, what we understand is that the logistical impact upon the price and is what really generates this differential that's very significant. And it generated BRL 15 million of results that were -- gross results that were a lot better, and the expectation that this should be kept for this next harvest as well.

Beans, we always say that they're more for the sales in the external market. The margins are not always so positive, but we understand it's very important to keep this market with a bit more diversification and sugarcane. We also once again are talking about 1.3 million in tons, and that was the previous year, and it also showed above 80 tons per hectare, and that was kind of the average in the company, even a little more, right, 83 million tons, 84 million tons. And this year, of course, we had these issues. We mentioned we had 970,000 tons during the semester. And the price, although Consecana was always very positive, besides the losses in productivity. We also had problems with ATR. We lost sugar, right? Last year, we had an average of 140 kilograms per ton. This year, we reached 131, 132 kilograms per ton. It also impacts the price and the cost when we consider this increment because we see the absolute values for the same amount of hectares, we have BRL 131 million. And last year, we had BRL 147 million. But the main point here, the main issue here is that the costs are pretty fixed, right? After we harvest, we need to add fertilizers and then treat the land and soil and use all the fungicides and all of the inputs required for our process to keep the sugarcane plantation that generated a reduction in the tons, which makes the cost per ton a lot higher. And then the results from last year, BRL 78 million, this year BRL 20 million. And this is where we really feel the impact operationally in the company's results. And all the other products like cotton and especially pluma cotton, which is a crop we still have, but we can see that the margins are still very low like 8% or 6%. But it's a crop that we were betting on in areas that have irrigation, and we're going to search for the right moment also to work with these feather cottons and then reach the levels of hectares we had, right? But what we understand is today, the capital costs don't make it unfeasible, but make the returns very low and especially when you have a lack of security, right, in these areas that were planted and that makes the company still be a little more careful about this. And then for cattle raising, as we mentioned, the main effect of the purchase in Seoyon here, I want to remind you that we have a fair value part that's not included. But when you consider this normally the cattle heads in the market, this generates results also. And we can exclude this also to analyze our EBITDA.

On the next part here, we can show you the debt and the position financially of the company. So we have a debt of BRL 886 million, which is similar. It was similar to what we had on the 30th of June in 2025, with an equivalent cash position of BRL 73 million, net cash of BRL 802 million. And normally, this is a moment where we have the lowest level of cash and the highest level of debt because it's the moment where, as Andre mentioned, we have all of the fertilizers, inputs. And most of what we use operationally was already acquired and kind of already have paid off expenses, right? And that generates these differences. So -- but anyways, what I always say and I think it's important to remember is that from the BRL 686 million at present value of receivables sales in the farm, which is pretty big stock that we have to be received. The cost of debt is pretty low, and it allows us to keep a bit more comfort about 94%. And here, we can see on the right graph, it's lower than 1 year, which is the working capital to plant this harvest of BRL 360 million. And 2 to 5 years, BRL 500 million, which is basically the issuances we performed to implement some investments and irrigation and transformation of the areas and investments that mostly were already complete, and we are expecting the return of this cash flow to be able to also advance, right? But at the bottom, we can also see the indicators that we always monitor closely with our financial committee. And we believe that the company's position is not concerning. But of course, what we expect is a reduction of this interest rate, right, because we believe it's very significant, the impact that this would have with the levels of interest rates within the company as well as in the whole market, right? So it's difficult to work with such high level rates of interest as we still face and operate in.

Then I think we reached the end here, and we'll get into our Q&A session. Thank you so much, everyone.

Thank you, Andre. Thank you, Gustavo. Well, we have three people here waiting in the queue to ask questions. And first, we'll have Guilherme Guttilla from BTG.

And we have two questions on our side here, please. The first one is if you could give us a bit more info on what's behind this shift in productivity for the cotton guidance, right? Just so we can understand more about what changed in this process, right? And then the second question is about sugarcane. In our last conference call, we actually talked about this, and you guys mentioned this a bit more than the market, right, in regards to this last harvest of sugarcane. And now you guys are expecting some strong recovery, right, for this next one. And so what we wanted to understand is how you're looking at the scenario in the market overall, and how you're considering if there's going to be a recovery, and what this next harvest for sugarcane should be like?

Just about cotton, I just wanted to -- if you could just give us a bit more context on the question. You want to know why the company reduced the cotton plantation, or what our vision is for cotton, if you could just review this?

A bit of both, but more related to productivity.

All right. In regards to the change in the guidance. Okay. Guilherme, thanks for the question. As always, very great questions coming from you guys. But first about cotton, right? What we noticed is we were really relying on cotton in Bahia, and that's the first BrasilAgro photograph, right? And then we know Bahia is a place with a lot of volatility with a production cost that's very high. So what we started to design and structure, and the company has been working on this stability more and more, right, with the cotton production. So we're in the final deployment phase of the irrigation project in the Arrojadhinho farm, and we also have some other pivots as well. And we've been focusing a lot on all of our efforts for cotton production, right, on irrigated agriculture. And so a view the company had -- and so we look at the profitability. And so when you look at soy with a contribution margin at about 29% to 30%, we see cotton with the cost of production, and there's results in reals per hectare. We see a lot of capital under risk, a lot of cash working at a moment where you have such high capital cost, so the company readjusted. We see the cotton of Sequeira. We took all of the cotton from the off-season harvest, right, in the Xingu region, where you have challenges to altitude, et cetera. And you can see days that are maybe not that cold, right? So it's really important to dosage the consumption of energy through this. And when at night, it's colder, the plant can breathe ease -- with greater ease, right? So in that region, we reduced 100% of the cotton there, and we're focusing on cotton in this irrigated area in Bahia. And this is going to be cotton that's high productivity. We closed levels of productivity of our Projeto Genio, that's about 370, 380 per hectare. And everything is kind of moving towards having a year that is very -- at this moment, we're reducing this a lot, is the cotton of Sequeira, right? There's another region for this, is that part of the Chapparral Farm, we have a lot of this cotton. We sold those 8,000 hectares, which is a very interesting deal for the company, right? But the profile of areas that are mature kind of changes a bit. And you have mature areas, but you also have the weight of the new areas that's greater. We have to operate and have a turnaround of this other crop transition, right? So there is a big challenge also with sanitary conditions also between 33 and 34 applications to control an insect that's really a big problem. And so it's a crop where you can't make any mistakes. And you also can't put shareholders' capital at risk. And so we're directing cotton to irrigated areas here in Bahia. And together with this, we're also increasing irrigation projects. So the company will continue to produce cotton in a more efficient way. And so for sugarcane, what we did was the following. First, this year, we'll have -- we had significant work done to kind of change the nutrition a bit and place more fertilizers. We had significant work to also reduce issues in the sugarcane plantation. Ever since the pandemic, there was discussions on this. So that's kind of like a sector market perspective, right? There are moments where the production plants didn't even know when they were going to stop processing that because they didn't have space to stock up alcohol, right? So at that moment, everyone kind of moved away from the renewal areas, and you carry this for 2 or 3 years for the cycle of the crop, which is 5 years. So overall, us and the sector had aging of the sugarcane plantations. The sector still has a big challenge, which is the cost of capital, and that's pretty high. And with this, you pressure the renewal of the plantations. So in our case, I would say that we ended up kind of accelerating what we needed to do because we had to produce more in the unit there in Maranhao. We have potential. We have a water and a good partner there, and we're accelerating this. So this is also a factor that makes us ready to have a bit more sugarcane in the next harvest. So we accelerated the plantation of sugarcane in this harvest compared to others, which is the sugarcane is going to be harvested now. And this is also -- we're going to get back to planting this around 2,000, 2,600 hectares in this unit. So the company, overall, what we're understanding in the improvement of the sugarcane is the issues of management and a bit more fertilizer. We had another challenge also, I think, which was every year, you have a different challenge, right, that you have plagues, diseases and other issues. But in sugarcane, we had more efficiency to find and control what they call the camalote grass, which is a big challenge, but now this is really well controlled, and the areas are very clean. So all of the detracting factors for productivity, we've been able to work on and interacting in a very precise manner with telemetrics. And we've been working on improving this productivity.

So when you look at the sector, what are you seeing in the sector?

Well, the overall sector is really concerned with the price of sugarcane. And so we've seen this in the last few years. There's been an acceleration in the plants that only had ethanol, and they had the mix of sugar and then everyone was more geared to sugarcane. And the overall scenario now is going to be a harvest that's more alcohol-based, right? But in these 2 or 3 years of changes, we went from ethanol -- sugarcane ethanol that was 3 million or 4 million tons to almost 10 -- sorry, 3 million or 4 million liters of sugarcane to corn ethanol. That was very different, also pressure ethanol. But there's still an interesting parity.

And the big question mark is going to be, well, I can't see a sector that, and you guys have seen this better than I can, where you've seen this movement that's very significant in the sector.

And so yes, there's going to be some recovery and some production plants that are sold, whoever buys wants to place their face in the business, right, and search for what's best. And so yes, I think there's going to be some kind of a recovery in the sector. We're not optimistic about the price of ethanol and sugarcane in the next year, but we're optimistic for sugarcane and ethanol prices in the next cycle.

And why is that?

Well, because we know the stability of productivity in India always, and we -- the cost of capital in the last few years held the renewal of sugarcane plantations a lot, right? And so we really believe that this will leads to some limitation of productivity. We want to be really well positioned to have productive sugarcane and working in the opposite direction, working towards a reduction of the average age range of the plantations, right? So this is our strategic view as a company, and our view of what the year will be like. I don't think it's going to be favorable pricing, but it does not seem that we're going to have years of super good pricing. And so we're actually starting to visualize a possible recovery in the next 2 or 3 campaigns.

Now we're going to open up for Bruno Tomazetto, Itau BBA.

Two questions on my side. If we could just start getting a follow-up on the discussion on sugarcane. That was an important detractor as well and considering all the dynamics you mentioned, the icing and frosting and all of the plaques, et cetera. But when you look at the future with this, you have harvest in 2026, is this already -- are you already considering some impacts that we saw in 2025 that can be carried over to '26? And how are you going to measure this marginal move in the last few months, right? So we're just trying to understand what's left as a space once you have this initial comment, right? And so then, Andrea, more of a long-term question here. In Brazil, we have -- we're not used to seeing this reduction of planted areas, right? And so we also are used to seeing 3 or 4 harvests of high interest rates and all these other instability -- geopolitical instability. And there's a lot of things happening at the same time that weighs in profitability of farmers, and there's probably going to be a limit to this, right? So our question is what we want to provoke you all about is, do you believe that there's going to be, at some moment, an adjustment for the reduction of this planted area in Brazil? And if so, what would we have to see to see this scenario take place, right? So this is a farmer where we're going to have a big volume of grains, right? This should be a positive variable, right, especially at this moment with worse profitability, right? So what's the limit of this disruption? And what's missing for this to happen?

That's a million-dollar question, right? And then we'll talk about where this -- where we believe this is headed, right? We've been using a series of different factors to be more precise ever since raising data with drones to identify and generate the overall productivity maps and aspects in the sugarcane and then also show the telemetrics for this location. At this moment, what we're seeing, and why we're a lot more optimistic is because we see that this year, what we call how sugarcane is going to grow, and that's where we measure this spacing, right? And so we can see this distribution, that's a lot better. And we're in February. We still have like four months basically for the growth of sugarcane, but we already see this distribution of internodes that's better. Last year, we -- despite having rain in the formation of the greens, we had a summer that was really hot and plants above this certain temperature, they stop and they say, "Look, that's too much. I'm going to start losing a lot of water here," right? And so that also showed that we had a shortening of the width of the sugarcane that we're not seeing this year. And we did have peaks in temperature, but there weren't that many sequential days as it was last year in December, January. So these two factors for us are extremely decisive for productivity. And now that what's starting to happen from March on is that we start have biometrics and then people start coming into those points that were raised and start performing the biometrical analysis to understand how things are doing. But visually, considering the extension of the internodes and also the width, the sugarcane is very different, right? And these are the main tools. But the second question is the reduction of the margin. And you always need to -- and I've been talking about this a while, right? You have to have many years so you can actually understand the effect of this reduction, right? But what I think changes in this scenario, and what changed in the last few years, and you were very precise in your comment, you said like the area was being expanded, but we included a factor which is very important. The decision to open up areas for farmers in the Cerrado region was always based on a contribution margin criteria and profitability. Civil society, as a whole, understood other criterias of sustainability and started adding restrictions to the conversion of new areas, even if they had been authorized adequately by the authorities, and that generated this external factor into this sector, right? So the farmers opened up a huge amount of land and the profitability and contribution margin factor was not decisive anymore, right? So the farmers said, "Look, if I don't open up my farm until 2025, the trading thing, they're not going to buy grains." The other trading saying, they're going to do that only in 2030. So what happened again, which is kind of what eliminates a bit of this factor, right? I'm not saying you have to deforest an area, but adding an exogenous or external factor that was pressuring something and the rational started to be a little box next to it and maybe not as important as the rational factor, which is the external factor and the opening of the areas due to the limitation of the trades in not buying grains from areas that are deforested or areas that were open after '25 and '26. So in our understanding and with everything you've seen in the last few months, we're starting to deactivate this huge bomb of external factors, right? And then we're going to have something similar more rational, then we'll see the cycle of the soy. And if you guys like looking at numbers, you're going to really like this data. If you look at the historical series in about 100 years of soy prices, you'll see -- and I had the opportunity actually to watch this study closely. But you'll see that at every -- we have like a cycle, right, of soy every 6 or 7 years. And that's what we see in the data when you look at this historical series of many years. And you can see if this is deflated or not.

But why is that?

Well, prices that are attractive. Farmers have a contribution margin, there is a carryover, they have to harvest, perform this and then they start expanding, right? And then when they expand the area, the prices have a retraction. And then we have the expansion of the area in this historical series. And when you see this, on the other hand, you have to consider the demand, right? So what's going to happen is you're going to have restrained prices and then the demand of soy is a little watch, right, like 1.5%, 2%. So you spend like 3 or 4 years and that generates like a hole of 6%, 7%, 8% of the demand. And then once you go back to increased prices, incorporating new areas in the system, et cetera. So -- but we're talking about something that's infinite, right?

And so you would incorporate a lot of areas that are easier and more productive and incorporate more areas with greater difficulty and less productivity, right? So this curve of recovery and responses becomes...

And so now we're going into more areas but less productive areas, right? So the other factor that I think was fundamental to incorporate the areas in Brazil in the last few years, which is mostly like 60%, 65% is most of them did not come from areas are opening up in Cerrado. They came from incorporating pasture areas. And that would make real sense if we have these investment and incentive programs from the government. And so this area when it's incorporated with high productivity kidnaps more carbon, right?

And so the second factor that kind of tightened this a bit was the price of cattle, right? So you had high soy, and then you would say, well, it's better to lease -- to plant the soy than to have a stress of my cows here, right? But when you see the recovery today, this is also a factor that eliminates a bit of this pressure. So anyways, the opening of areas and incorporating new areas and systems is always connected to the contribution margin and profitability. And so in the last few years, we had external factors. And we also had this big valley, right, which was also a significant movement, right? So look, I'm going to make 160 kilos of beef per year, or I'm going to lease this farm in this average period. In our understanding, we are estimating this, and we eliminate this pressure conversion. So that area, that's not the area that's completely degraded, right? But this is going to be recovered in the contribution margin. And so my understanding and when you look at this in the last year, you see soy was already bad and Brazil incorporated about 800,000-some hectares of soy. So this year, everyone is saying, look, we're not going to incorporate 800,000, we're going to incorporate maybe in our understanding like 400,000, 500,000 hectares of soy. So in the next year, then we're going to get back to incorporating what's a basal, right? So maybe 200,000, 250,000 hectares of soy per year. And then that becomes a number that's going to be adjusting that supply and demand ratio. So you're always going to have farms that are going to be open, people that are expanding. But in the last years, these two factors were accelerators for this process.

Now we're going to open up Leonardo from XP.

Great, so the connection is excellent. And so Ana Paula owns my agenda here. Anyways, okay. Actually, I had a bit of a follow-up about this point here. You had a lot of relevant information transmitted here. And also you have like a land donor, right? But of course, you still have a big potential conversion, but maybe it reduces a bit of the short-term pressure, right? But if we get into more details, just to see if I understood your reading, we had the trading factor with the soy. But when you consider this end of the moratorium, do you think this would be feasible in the short or midterm? And then if you think about this dynamic of price of land, and so do you think this is an opportunity? Well, maybe a risk and groups that kind of move in this direction. These are some of the aspects, right, trying to get more clarity on this point here. Just to make it easier to understand. The second point would be even more of a short-term vision, which is why we've been discussing this dynamic for a few years. And I remember one of your phrases on how soy has to drop 3 or 5 years to really start being priced in the market, right? And we've already seen this in '23, '24, '25 and '26. So it's kind of in this window and this entire scenario, profitability of the farmers and the financial health of the farmers has been very concerning. It would be kind of favoring the scenario, right? So that's really what we consider from the soy farmer perspective, right, where we can add financial health and also with this, you also have even a bigger supply, right? And you have a new dynamic also where a lot of land going to the hands of funds and banks are being auctioned and searching for operators, right? So you have this factor on the moratorium, but then do you also consider more liquidity maybe in the market for land and real estate and maybe even more attractive pricing, et cetera, that are focused on this as this appears to be an opportunity.

And Leo, that's a great question. Just trying to split this into some phases here. First of all, the incorporation of new areas and the big groups that are the ones that have the biggest concern with ESG and all of this. They certainly create a basis, but that's not where you move your supply-demand ratio, right? For agriculture, I always mentioned the beauty of agriculture is how it's fragmented, right? So if you add up all the groups in the states, et cetera, the areas incorporated in the last few years will probably represent 3% or 4%. So 97%, 96% come from farmers to farmers, right? So I would say that the pressure of the trade for industry and the industry will -- well, the qualified company will pressure this development. And I don't think so, but if they do, I don't think it's going to change the equation of productivity. What changes this equation of the farmer when they have this limitation, and that's where you kind of shift the equation, right? But I don't think there's going to be pressure, huge pressure. I think it's going to -- I don't know if you got the opportunity, but once they called me to have an integrated global and I said, "Look, as a society, we're pressuring the environmental system wrongly. We need to consider how we pressure this." The way we did it, it distorted everything, right? So the equation and profitability was left sideways. So I don't think the exit or the solution of the moratorium will generate this impact of like, "Oh, now it's a huge crazy race or a lot of openings now." No. But now we're going to get back to a rationalist perspective. The rationale is opening up areas now are really difficult. You're going to open up an area that's [indiscernible], then first you're going to lose money. So now we go back to more of a rational equation, right? Now what could happen is in a new cycle of soy. If we have a scenario like this, then yes, you could have an increase in the expansion, but that would be due to a recovery in the contribution margins, right? So I can't view that we've reduced all the pressure, and now things are going to move, right? But when it comes to prices of land, this is dropping already. And we always receive information about this. But fortunately or unfortunately, some people think it's good, but we think it's bad. The process of the judicial recovery is not as it was in the past. In the past, like a farmer would tighten up and had five or six farms, he would sell one, and life would move on, and things will keep on. But now people don't want to sell land. They want to start a judicial recovery process and keep up in their activity. And that made a lower cycle of land. And so this is happening a lot at a lower level, right? So when you look at the bank's recovering land, the average property of 600, 700, 800 is always coming into the market and that comes due to this tightening of the contribution margin. So yes, I think that the prices did drop. We've seen a bit of this reduction. It's very like one-off, but the big land extension, what you still see is you have groups that generate liquidity. And on the other hand, you have persons offering that extension with this instrument of judicial recovery, right? And so it's complex, but I do see a reduction in prices. And as I mentioned, 2 or 3 years. We're in the third year, we already start seeing this. So like farms that would arrive at 600 sacks of soy, now you can buy 450. But when you consider the 450 and the cost of capital that Gabriel -- Gustavo mentioned, you still have a non-attractive return rate. And so even with this reduction, we're being penalized a lot, right, with the cost of carrying. So to accelerate this a lot, it's a bit of the logic of the actual assets, right, with low interest rates. So if we have a reduction in the moratorium and lower interest rate and a scenario of -- you have three factors that are important for this. So you have high interest rates, a positive scenario and then we have this issue which kind of affect buyers. We're definitely going to be more buyer than sellers.

Well, I think we've reached the end of our call. Thank you all for your questions. Thank you, Andre, Gustavo. If anyone has any questions or unanswered points, our IR team is available to clarify. And have a great weekend, and we'll see you in our next quarter.

Hello. Good morning. We are here to talk about our earnings in the first quarter of '25, '26 harvest at BrasilAgro. I'm here with André Guillaumon, our CEO; and Gustavo Lopez, CFO of BrasilAgro. If you're watching us, the presentation any chance, I would like to say good morning, everyone, and pass the floor to Andre.

Thank you very much, Ana Paula. Thank you all for being with us once again. Thank you for being with us and presenting our results. This is a quarter that historically has not too much revenue. So we're at this moment with the end of the sugarcane harvest and then we also have our harvest being planted. So theoretically, it's a period where you have results that may be a bit weaker, but we'll bring in some points about these results and also providing more details on sugarcane, et cetera.

But anyways, in the net revenue of our first quarter, we reached BRL 286.6 million and adjusted EBITDA of BRL 64 million and a net loss of BRL 64.3 million. So basically, the first quarter, and then we'll get into a bit more details where this is coming from. Basically, a lot of what we're going to see in this quarter is a mark-to-market and IFRS mark-to-market of sugarcane, mark-to-market soy receivables. And so our receivables account is pretty big. And you know that.

Next slide, please. So now we can see an overview of how the year has been behaving with a lot of volatility, and I'm going to quickly look at -- talk about the operations and the numbers. We had the strategy of bringing soy to the second semester, and this strategy seems to be very good due to all of the commercial discussion between China and the U.S. and we had Chicago back there that was basically intending to improve prices and basis. And then we have this decision of taking soy to the second semester. We're going to show you this later. Basically, this price is very much influenced by basis. And just more recently by this turnaround with the agreement with the U.S. and China, you have Chicago go up and basis weakens a bit. But we basically sold all of it a little before this agreement.

So corn is also a market that's been pretty stable in the last few months, mainly due to the ethanol industry. Cotton is also a commodity that's been in a curve that's dropping. We had a 14% less in price. For cattle raising, there's some recovery. Since back then, it's been recovering. There was an expectation of even being a little better due to the tariffs and export restrictions of beef to the U.S., but this analysis is pretty limited. Ethanol as well. And as you all know, what affects us and other players in the market, right. Sugar, due to all of the expectation of production all around the world, there's been a lot of loss in prices.

So this is an overall photograph. We're going to talk about what we have ahead in the next slide, but we're imagining a soy harvest in Brazil is pretty good. Some of the best offices are considering 178 million, 180 million tons. There's also a pretty significant concern. Although Mato Grosso is advancing a lot with plantation, we're going to see some examples soon of some other locations and some states in Brazil.

I always mention that besides being an open-air industry, you're also a cost taker and not a price maker, let's say. And we always bring this here to show a bit of our decision-making moments and how we got this right, right? So the first graph, we show the map curve and the purchases of these little balls which are, at the moment, the company understood that, once again, what's most important for us is the contribution margin.

So when we block costs, we're also blocking the sale of certain products, and we were very assertive with this purchase. This year, when we look at the curve and we consider the decision-making moment, that was a really good decision. When we look at the last harvest, we have practically 4% or 5% more price.

Phosphate is a product that, in some way, has stabilized prices a lot due to all of the demand that exists for phosphoric acid and battery production. And it's a market that is pretty firm.

Chloride is the sector. We've been also getting this right. There was a moment where we understood it really made sense to come in with this. So we were able to buy chloride this year at levels of prices that were better than last year, not much of a difference, about 3%, but really demonstrating the assertiveness of the company.

So back then, we were able to close this really well on nitrogen products, which are really connected to petroleum, but that's like the seesaw of prices. Of course, the more we had the best purchase. And then on the right graph, you can see the percentage of what's already closed. We already advanced with chloride, phosphate and NPK and other fertilizing. We still have some things to be closed for defenses and nitrogen-based products, mainly due to the second harvest with corn.

The bottom graph shows the exchange ratio. When we see this year, you can already have a view of how the next harvest is expecting to be designed and the performance of the costs as well. So I'd say this is very close to the cost of the previous harvest. Some are a little bit more expensive than phosphate. Defenses were a little cheaper. In considering this in dollar, not only the currency the last year. Seeds kind of moved sideways, not much of a modification, but you see the harvest about BRL 4,000, BRL 4,200 per hectare.

And next, please. Well, now we already get into a little bit of the sugarcane topic and the assets for the harvest. And as you can see what's estimated in the actuals, 1,558 tons. This is for 30th of September in the company, the harvested area, the estimates also [ 26,000. ] And the biggest surprise, let's say, contributing to this a bit is TCH, a company that has historically been delivering good results, and we had 2 events that really marked the TCH for some units.

Mato Grosso, not that much. But when we take a look at the block in the state of Sao Paulo, considering the icing events in Sao Paulo and San Jose due to more rigorous winter, we had a reduction of TCH in the company. And in [ Brazos ], we had to harvest sugarcane after the -- so you're going to have to harvest the sugarcane that were affected by the snowing or the icing that took place and then you have to produce the alcohol. If not, you have fermentation in the actual -- inside the actual sugarcane. So we had to accelerate this process. And that brought in a reduction in productivity, especially in the region of Brazos.

Well, I think here in the next quarters, you'll see a reduction in the amount of numbers and the number of pads. And this is a bit of the reflex. I showed you the slide on the commodities. And when you see this company, it's diversified. It's diversified. And this is very good for our operational results. But you can see that there was significant recovery, and we were able to, in the end of this period, complete the sale of the [indiscernible] farm. As you mentioned, this is a very significant sale. It's a property that didn't have that much liquidity. But when you see here in other commodities, that makes sense because when cattle raising improves, you can generate more liquidity. So diversification in the productive aspect, but also in the has really made a big effect in the company. So the amount of cattle heads were pretty stable.

And then in the first 3 months, what's estimated for the year is -- not what's for the first 3 months, for the full year because these 3 months actually initially are the full drought period. So July, August and September, we have the low GMVs and about 180 grams basically, right, per day at the drought period. So when I start the rain period and the GMV starts going up, you have 500, 700, and then you have 470 grams per kilo. But here, you can see a photograph of the company. And in the last few years, we've been taking advantage of commodities. It's a company that has been historically, in the last 5 years, we sold over BRL 350 million per year of farm assets. And it's a company that even with the significant demobilization of assets which make total sense for the company, shareholders has been really keeping up with the plantation area very closely, right?

And so this graph shows you what our breakdown is and how we have the split. Soy is really the most significant. Then we have sugarcane with 17%. Then we have corn and the corn harvest and all the other products. And on the right side graph, you can see how things have been designing the beginning of the rain period in Mato Grosso. I'd say it's -- rain arrived early as it arrived in other years, right? But every year in Mato Grosso, we start planting. And this year, we were able to start planting at the end of September, beginning of October. We had this window of 1 week, and it was a drier week where some units we had to stop plantation and then we got back to planting from the second to the third week of the month of October.

So the beginning of the plantation in Mato Grosso, in Mato Grosso, we start planting and we never stop again, but this is like an interval in some of our units. Rains got back now, and then we also had rain coming back in the Northeast of Brazil. And we also already initiated the plantation in the Maranhão í areas and in Bahia as well. So more recently, Bahia, Maranhão, we started off in the end of the month of October, and Bahia began in the month in the end of the weekend, and we started the plantation in Bahia with a good rain regime. So we're in this year with La Nina low intensity and phenomenon in our experience indicate not too much. What indicates is the more -- what's more significant is the intensity. It's [indiscernible] very similar to what we had in the '15, '16 harvest. If you're at the farm and you want to take a look at how this year will be from a current perspective, it's very similar to the '15, '16 harvest.

Next, please. Here, you can see the status of the schedule in the graph. You already know, due to this shutdown in Mato Grosso, and as I mentioned in Maranhão starting a little bit later than usual. We started at the last week of the month of October. And now we have a status of 34% planted in the company. The good news is that everything is very well planted. The replantation index was -- the rework index was very low.

Another pleasant surprise, as you've heard also in our project for our own seeds in the Chaparral unit, this year, we were able to have a pretty good level of our own seeds in the company. And this is actually giving us a real show. Let's say, after the investments we've performed in chambers, that's been demonstrating to be very efficient. So it's another alternative for cost reduction. And we currently have about 34% of the planted area. And in the beginning of November 10, this is scheduled for the beginning of next week, and we'll start planting.

And then when we talk about December, we're talking about corn in summer, especially [indiscernible] and [indiscernible]. In the rest of Brazil, we have corn, but it's a second season harvest, and that's going to be starting to be planted in the beginning of January. This year, I think it's going to be the year where we started off the plantation really early, and we should already start harvesting soy in Mato Grosso. And then we'll have a little bit more energy also for the harvesting. That's a year that we've been starting to work on, and that really favors prices. And as you can see, we're in full volumes. And the premiums are -- we have a lot of soy to harvest there, especially in the end of the beginning of January.

And so now about the crops and commodities, we have a big challenge with a lot of volatility this year. This year, the volatility is coming from the other side, right? At any moment, you could sit down with Trump and have an agreement, and Chicago would go up and the basis would go down. So I think the company and you really took a bet on this, and we bet on this very well. And so we took to the second semester. We knew there was going to be a pressure on this agreement. So when we really believe that this would come along then up ahead as we believe as well. We -- the company sold, and we captured this really well on a basis.

So the story I'm showing you here is for this harvest now. And this harvest already has 56% sold at [ 10,72. ] And it's worth mentioning all these sales were contributing with the margin with the [indiscernible] and the map that I mentioned in the first graph. Also a lot of volatility. And at this moment, we were really deciding to block the contribution margins. We were able to have over 45% of the currency, even knowing that it's a year of a lot of volatility up ahead. But we believe that this currency position was really assertive.

On the right side, we have cotton, 53% closed. And also in cotton, you have a second advantage, right? You have that volatility moment. And since we sell forward in cotton, our dollar per cotton at [ 6 65 ] and 52%. And then we see ethanol as well, 50% sold at [ 2 600. ] Corn is what's most late, let's say, but we saw a recovery in the last few days, and prices were going up in certain markets.

And then on the right side, a very important calculation, which is receivables. The company has over BRL 650 million in receivables of sales in farms and almost 6 million of soy to be received. And this is the P&L we monitor along. So part of the soy we have 50% are sold at 68 with a currency of 6 60, and these are significant values that really help us have a positive contribution of these receivables in the company's balance sheet. These receivables have significant volumes and the sale for '26, but we have receivables that for 4 or 5 years.

And Gustavo will explain this. This is the biggest effect we had on the balance sheet since it's a bigger period, the dollar from the -- we sold here. It's been dropping a lot, and that's really making a difference. But then an exchange in the next quarter, we'll have good news that Chicago is going to go up again. So it's going to be a year of a lot of volatility when it comes to marketing receivables of farm sales.

So then I'll pass the floor to Gustavo now.

Thank you, Andre. Good morning, everyone, and thank you for your presence with us today in the presentation. And Andre already mentioned that we sell most of our stock and that we consider the exercise. And we had this decision of loading of soy, and we have almost 70,000 or 80,000 tons of corn; so [ 5,000 ] we sold.

The biggest issue here in these results are normally sugarcane, right? So this has already anticipated that we have some issues with productivity and that the issue we also had, right? And so with -- from then on, you start also providing more influence in results.

And starting off here with the net operational revenue of BRL 302 million, 7% below what was last year. And this is impacted not because of the ethanol price that was really good during the entire half, but also the ATR level, right? And so historically, the company was reaching indicators that were close to 140. Now 135, 136 kilograms. And so we're going to close this year. It will have an impact that's very significant, right? So -- but even so, this could be offset by some costs reduced and also good productivity, which also helps dilute the [indiscernible] per ton.

And when we see our operational EBITDA at BRL 64 million, we can see that when we compare with the same period BRL 61.4 million, they're very similar. And so if we monitor the adjusted EBITDA, so as you can see this on the right side of the -- and soy and corn. And I believe that was a crop that last year had been hindered a lot by price and productivity in our case in the Mato Grosso region. And this harvest, we were able to have very good productivity that really helped reduce part of the cost as well as fertilizers that had taken on a setback when we compare with the previous harvest.

So when we see sugarcane this BRL 20 million negative lead to an impact in tons of ATR and the costs also increased because of fixed value as well and the expectation with productivity as well. So we have an investment in fertilizing, and this also made the reduction of tons lead to an increase in cost.

When we see our margins, adjusted EBITDA margins, then there's a difference of BRL 169 million compared to BRL 164 million. And that's mainly the farm sales. And in the previous year, we had accounted for this sale. And at this moment, we don't have purchase to account for. But when we see the final results of those BRL 64 million negative, what calls our attention is how an EBITDA that's operational that's very similar to the previous case, we can see the graph in the previous part of the financial results. And Andre mentioned, for example, that we have 2 main effects, right? Updating the fair value of BRL 40 million, basically the effect that we were talking about here within the impact of the financial results. And that represents all of the receivables of bond sales. We have BRL 6 million, as Andre mentioned, [ 36 million tons. ] And every quarter, we have to perform the mark-to-market. And during this quarter, we had volatility and a price in our soy prices that back about 3% to 4%. And the real value and also the basis that had a negative effect.

And all of this impacted the BRL 40 million. And when we see what happened last year, practically we had a quarter without this type of variation or variable taking place. And the second point is the updates on the fair value of leases. All the leases we have to remeasure the period represented and account for this and all the variations that this has. And they should also of all the contracts that are already in the operation that should be remeasured and that also has an impact. So all of this is brought to present value that we understand that there's also interest that don't keep up at the same levels, and this generates movement within this these results.

So basically BRL 54 million. And as we always mentioned, it's not a cash effect, but a purely accounting launch, and this is what most impacted our results and our net losses here that we're considering that. So we see the revenue for financial investments, and we see we have a cash between BRL 250 million, BRL 260 million.

Interest rates are a little higher as well. We had a bit more profitability, and we see the interest. We have a stock of debt of BRL 850 million with interest at 15%. And so we see the cost below CDI and then you have a very positive effect. So as other revenues and expenses that represent currency variations, especially in Paraguay, we have about $8 million debt in Paraguay to perform the terminals in the property and the real also gained value [indiscernible] as well, and that generated a revenue of approximately BRL 4.5 million because part of this debt, we ended up paying off there. And then also currency variations that we were finding at the moment when we were paying for fertilizers. And we had bought this fertilizer in the month of April and March, and we had a bit on the real gaining value. And so we had booked payments in August, September, November now in this month as well.

And this is -- at that moment, we were considering the BRL 5 80 7 90, and we would be able to perform the 5 35 5 38, and that generated a very positive result. So finally, when you consider the over part, you can see how that impacted the difference between BRL 97 million and BRL 74 million as losses in this period. And the main difference is the prices we had mentioned, the volumes we're going to consider in sugarcane and the savings in costs and we'll see the fair value as well. And that can be confusing, right?

We can see the estimates we have the sugarcane expectations as well that kind of distort the analysis a bit. And so -- and the financial results minus BRL 39 million, and that explains this variation, right? So it's a very complicated quarter.

I remember in December, we had to also perform an in-depth explanation about the [indiscernible] impact when the real had reached BRL 6 20. Then we were able to prove on the 30th of June, what was not a cash effect. And we were able to get back to numbers that were a little more reasonable.

On the next page, you can see here that what we were discussing soy, corn, sugarcane and I think those are the most important crops we were considering commercializing. And in soy, we have the total gross earnings of BRL 30 million, a margin of 32%. This margin is getting better because although if you compare the price opportunity, and it's about 3.5% below, it's smaller than the first quarter, and this is mainly due to a reduction of BRL 100 per ton of cost. And so those volume also about 1,400 tons more. So corn is the result up until now because here, we're still waiting for about 60,000 tons. And so we still have about 400,000 tons to sell to the business in the quarter. And the gross is about [ BRL 0.5 million. ] The margin, so far, is about 40%. And the volume commercial is similar to the previous one, 4,000 tons approximately [indiscernible] you can see about [ 50% of 730% ] and you can see that for 2023.

The market has been practicing approximately between 10% and 15% better than the previous harvest. And most of this variation is the provisions that were very positive, right? The lower cost of fertilizers such as I've already mentioned and good productivity contribute to this improvement also of the margins with cost reductions. And when we see sugarcane, we'll -- we see sugarcane, and the results -- the gross results are [ 17.3 ] and the margins are 14%. And so low sugar rates, and that's impacting the lower quantity of tons commercialized with 20,000 tons basically. And this low level of sugar also impacts the price, [ 168 to 189. ] And so the values that you can see of ethanol are very similar to what they were last year, and just the ATR is reducing the composition of the unit price. And the cost, which increased [indiscernible] [ by 5% ] due to the reduction in tons and low productivity, that impacted the treatment of the crops.

So beans are not too much volume. Cotton is also challenged due to the volatility of the production. We are still -- that we're still searching for ways to stabilize for cattle raising. Most of this has always been considered also part of the biological assets, but very firm prices and really having profitable activities for the company with a smaller size, right?

So of course, then we'll get into the company's debt level, cash of [ BRL 226 million ] and the debt is BRL 895 million, and you can see the cost of about 90.8% CDI, and that's a rate that's pretty good. The net debt of BRL 650 million. The schedules as well. As you can see, we have the amortization [indiscernible] BRL 372 million. And the working capital to plant and BRL 408 million, which are 2 to 5 years. Basically those that have CRA debentures to be able to finish the transformation of these different areas in Brazil that were already complete and part of Paraguay that we're also finishing to develop.

And for the irrigation project, which is also a project where -- the phase we were planned for this year has already been completed, and we're at this phase where we're working on the plantations. And we have another 1,000 hectares to finish implementing.

And so these are all our debts, and we're already waiting on cash flow to be able to start amortizing these debts.

So it's also important to highlight that we have BRL 6 million to receive, and the present value is BRL 651 million. The nominal value -- so we haven't had much of an impact in these variables. The basis interest rates are also pretty high, and that still generates pressure within. So then also the -- when you consider the agriculture margins, you have -- the cost of credit is really complicated, and that generates a lot of pressure as well, especially in companies that have high leverage.

As you can see here, we understand that we consider sales of farms that we still haven't received, we basically have a net debt of 0. But we can see as a company, each point of CDI represents this amount. And we can see how hard it is in agriculture to find margins -- positive margins and the size of the operational EBITDA. And so we can see that these interests are really hindering the sector.

And then we can see here that we had the approval in the parliament for the payment of -- sorry, the approval in the General Shareholders' Meeting of BRL 75 million. And that's -- we already plan to start this in the 28th of November. And so here, once again, as always, we have our commitment to continue to be a dividend-paying company. And we can see our average in the last 5 years, and we understand that for the type of sector we're in with the cycles, we continue to be a very attractive company.

And so I think here we have another page. Okay. Great. Well, thank you so much, and now we will hop into Q&A.

Thank you, Andre. Thank you, Gustavo. The first one comes from Guilherme from BTG.

Two questions here from our side, please. First, we want to understand a little bit about the sugarcane scenario. So from what was listed, you guys are waiting for -- or expecting about 10% more tons harvested by the end of this harvest year in regards to your sugarcane plantation, right? So I wanted to discuss how you consider this scenario in regards to the total scenario in the market. Because when we look at this, the rest of the market and the current estimates by the consulting firms and other entities, they say -- they talk as if you're still going to have to harvest about 20% or more from the beginning of October until the end. And so I wanted to understand if you think this is because there is -- your sugarcane plantation was more impacted from the average or maybe because the market estimates are too optimistic. And that's the first point.

Then secondly, I want to understand if you guys could give us a little update on the purchase and sales scenario of the land and how this market is doing. In the last Investor Day, you said there were a lot of opportunities. So I wanted to understand how this has been advancing.

Well, Guilherme, that's the $1 million question you just gave us. But let's try. So I'm going to start backwards and then answer the first one. So I think the first question is going to have more discussion. But first, when it comes to sales, no doubt we're advancing and working towards this. The company is not going to stop selling bonds. You guys can be sure of this. And I believe it's really in line with what we were talking about, right?

Although we have, as Gustavo mentioned, business that's really being hindered by interest rates, we see a scenario of a lot of stability, but there's still some big liquidity opportunities like such as Bahia with a lot of irrigation projects and other regions also that we discussed. We never imagined to sell preference in a year. We actually expected that we would sell it to agriculture when that was in a good condition, right? So we would expect this.

But as I was like reinforcing, we get into this cycle that more opportunities for purchases than for sale. And the last few years had major opportunities, and the company was also really efficient in obtaining this. And so as an admin management, we were able to reduce not much, but we just reduced a little. So yes, we did suffer. And this is really being important because of the BrasilAgro's operation that broke down at more than 20% than what was estimated because of the freezing and ice in the plantation.

And so when we see the sugarcane start having to review all of the balance throughout the year, and we saw what the differential is in Maranhão and the beginning of the rain period was not that intense, right? So when you look at Brazil, I actually joke about this. And in the Investor Day for BrasilAgro, I had a bet with the guys there, and I said, I don't think we're going to get to this number. I still think -- I think it was Guilherme that set the bet.

I'm not going to forget that. We have a lunch. And anyways, this number is -- I was very skeptical about it, right? And I wanted to really see how this number would close, right? Maybe it's not the [ 500 ] that I was considering, but sugarcane has really been suffering a lot.

And another point -- pain point is the sugar levels or the sugar rates. This is something that everyone has the consensus in the market. We're like 2 to 3 points below, right? But our vision is that we suffered more because -- and I believe that -- I don't know if we are taking too long to get these results or we're waiting to have sugarcane recover at the end of the harvest, but we see that stopping, right? And so a lot of these are stopping, right? So we have an accumulated result, but I think we're going to have a quick drop as well.

Now we're going to find the next question here, which -- so we have from [indiscernible] with the next question.

We have 2 questions. First, about the agreement for imports in soy in China, it was really clear how this strategy seems to be very assertive. But we wanted to approach the perspective from now on and also the timing of this negotiation, right, because this expects a volume of imports that would have to be fulfilled for this harvest, but also by the end of 2026, we would already have harvested this that should bring in more competitiveness to our country, right? So we want to understand if there's any risk of maybe displacing this origination of the soy in U.S. and China that could impact the distribution of our production next year -- was a year with such a strong harvest as I mentioned.

Then we have a second question about M&A. And that was a great overview, but also trying to give you a bit more of a long-term discussion, and we have this discussion on biofuels and crushing projects, et cetera. So we want to see how this can affect this M&A that the company has and different views also on the project.

Also, from a profitability perspective, sugarcane crushing project could make an area more feasible. Then as a consequence, we've also been in areas that are not accounting for grain that could be used for biomass production, and how this discussion could bring in more possibilities?

Well, 2 questions that are really good. Well, first, we have 2 points here. Up until December, we have the imports of about 12 million tons and 25 million tons next year. Yesterday, we were in a discussion -- commercial discussion that we have with the company every 13 days, and we were looking at China's position. And our first reading is although the first -- we believe -- we consider there's still going to be some favorable basis.

And last year, we started the harvest with plus 40, then 0. Then we ended the year with the tariff effect, and we started selling soy at almost 200 positive bps. So we don't expect this. But we do expect the month of January with a perspective of basis points that look good. And in the harvest, we expect, once again, that there is a negative base point. And it's going to, once again, be a year where we're going to really bet on this.

And everything that Gustavo mentioned, right, the efficient cost of capital, and we're going to try to carry on a bit of the soy to the second semester. We [ should ] have [ 150, 200 ] basis points. But I think we're going to recover most of this in the second semester, maybe not about this 150, but maybe something closer to 100 points.

So I think this is our vision that we're considering, looking at the coverage. And the biofuels agenda, I actually talked about this a while back. This is the agenda that's here to stay. And it's -- thank God, it's here to stay, right? If not, I would never imagine what we would be doing with so much soy. So we have BRL 50 million already to biodiesel crushing.

In Brazil, the issue is a little slower, but with corn ethanol, you're very straightforward in your statement, right? It started off generating profitability in regions where you have logistic issues to truck -- to carry a ton -- charges pretty much the same price, right? And so made us start -- and actually, there's another factor also in this story.

The [ worst ] logistics, what they did in the past made you have -- when you install corn, you place DGG there, and this rearrangement is redimensioning the logistics and spray and everything we know in Brazil is that we know as it is a continental country, right? So yes, we've been studying certain thinking.

And a lot has mentioned, this is kind of in line with everything. People ask each other about up until which point corn ethanol, right? But no one has a crystal ball, but there's a limiting factor, right? And this issue with biomass. And so I want to -- maybe I can plant biomass, but there's going to be biomass maybe 5 or 6 years from now. So we know that the cost matrix of a product versus sugarcane is pretty tight. So just as when corn is cheap, corn and ethanol is super profitable. But when corn becomes expensive, then corn ethanol is not profitable. There's a big challenge here.

But yes, we've been looking into this some units that could benefit from this. And we start having a lot of provocation in the region in Piauí and Bahia, where we assessed even some projects there and the units close by. But we have really been keeping our eyes open and watching closely. Then we'll get into a very significant volume of the corn harvest and that's important.

So with the -- if we didn't have the 30 million tons, we wouldn't have chicken or pigs to eat so much corn, right? So I think the business is here to bring greater linearity, and I see this very positively because the corn ethanol industry has crushing maybe 365 days a year, and that brings stability to prices, right?

So I think the first graph I showed you was showing you that you can see corn operated really stable, in a very stable manner with starting to plant with an expectation of [ 139, 140 ] reaching harvest of 150. And so corn is really stable. And then also that's bringing a lot of liquidity. So corn, chicken and pig operate in the future markets, right? So that's really bringing in more liquidity to BML. And in the past, if you were to see this maybe 10 years ago, BrasilAgro would sell most of the corn contracts, right? But today, we start having liquidity there. So I believe this is here to stay.

There's a limit, of course. And I don't think we're going to be a country that just produces corn ethanol. Everyone believes it could reach 40% or 50% of the total volume with these points I mentioned, right? So you have biomass issues with different regions. There's regions where you have the corn, but you don't have the cows. And this is also the case with Maranhão, for example. Maranhão is closer to Pará. You even have some cows close. But anyways, you have huge challenges there. But I do believe it's generating liquidity and improving the logistics.

Our next question is from Pedro at XP.

I wanted to get back to the sugarcane topic a little bit. And I think your view on this harvest was very clear, but I wanted to understand your view for the next period, right? And so after all of these climate situations, everyone's effort, we see better climate conditions. And what do you guys expect for TCH recoveries? And also how this should be translated if there is a possible drop in costs in the production of sugarcane for the next harvest? That's my first question.

Then my second question is, we saw the actual price of cotton that was a little worse. And it was very clear that this was due to cotton with worse quality. And so what I wanted to understand in the comment you mentioned about this cotton position with worse quality from those BRL 93 million that I have seen in the stock, we don't have this quality issue anymore, right? So I wanted to confirm this understanding.

And also understand if the cotton that had problems with quality was the cotton in the off-season harvest in Bahia. So I want to have a better understanding here on the composition of the estimates of costs for the off-season harvest. And so when I see this, there was a slight increase in the cost expected for the off-season harvest, but there's also a percentage of nitrogen-based products that were not bought. So we saw improvements in the ratio of exchange in the last weeks and the company's strategy was very certain. But what I want to look into the calculation is that maybe this increase you guys placed here of the off-season harvest could be reversed as you guys advance in the acquisition of the nitrogen-based products. Just to understand what's in frame for the revision of the off-season harvest.

[Foreign Language]

Sugarcane. What's important with sugarcane? Well, what's important with sugarcane is the beginning of the rain period and the end of the rain period. So November, let's say, 15th of November and all of December, January and February, soils, its full field capacity, and the soil really drenched. So [ 100 million ] more rain in December won't do anything. And what really makes a difference in sugarcane is going to be the rain in the inflow and the outflow. And so that's where you start having a quicker process. And then you get the lighting, which is December and January, and that's where you -- it grows a little bit more. That's the first module. And then it makes sugarcane coming quicker and grow more in the month of December, January.

In May or April, the sugarcane starts losing weight and dehydrates. And then when you have a longer summer that rains well, then you have an extension or postponing of this hydro stress. So having said that, it's important to mention what we're seeing. We saw that there was rain coming in, especially in Sao Paulo and [indiscernible]. That was a lot better this year. So we had a month of October that was a lot better for rain. And what I'm trying to say here is that the sugarcane conditions are a lot better than what it was last year. Due to the rain in October in Maranhão, that started off now and the rain was a little bit later there. October there wasn't as good as there was in Sao Paulo in the Midwest, but that's the point.

Now what's the main game here? What's going to happen and -- when the rain stop? So from now on, we have no more water blacking. Soil has already started drenching and life goes on. But the challenge here is going to be this, right? So the perspective indicate that we could have April or maybe the beginning of May with a bit of rain due to this La Nina effect with low intensity. So I want to say that we're expecting significant recovery in our sugarcane for TCH, and we can be sure that, that's going to be recovered.

In Maranhão, what we're doing also is as we had October a little less intense, we are extending our irrigation once again there. We should be operating in November almost all entirely. Although we have been stopping the plant there, but we have a supply agreement. We're going to postpone irrigation there a little bit more in November. And possibly, we could even anticipate this irrigation a little bit if we see that we have this hydric need there ahead.

But Mato Grosso and Sao Paulo, things are doing really well and Maranhão. We're going to extend this a little bit more with irrigation into November. And that's where we normally start on the [ 10, 10, ] and that we're going to extend this about 10 or 15 days more to offset this deficit in October.

And for cotton, basically, we had a cotton in Bahia. And so the company has been highlighting this. And that's where we're headed to irrigated cotton. Cotton -- irrigated cotton has been -- we've been reaping or harvesting over 380, 390, 420, 430. And so we're going to see this crop has a very high production costs. And that's really tight so we can't play around with productivity in cotton. Although we always say that for us, cotton has 2 effects: One is the product effect and the value of the harvest in Brazil. [Foreign Language]

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So that's what everyone would like to control from the millions, but let me try to clarify a bit. So the challenge are 2. I just kind -- I just stated in the call that we start the harvest in January in Mato Grosso. So we want rain. So there's not a lack of rain, but we don't want too much rain. So there is enough rain for the rest of the harvest. So historically, when we look at the first Maranhão, Piauí and Bahia, those are months where we have 180, 200 millimeters of rain. That's the history of the regions. In Maranhão and Piauí, we have a more rainy week and March, so much is that, that when we get corn in the case of corn, as I showed, the plantation of corn on the 20th is exactly that. When we get the rainy season in March with corn ready for harvest, if you get it too early, then we lose a lot of corn.

So for every one, we have the rain. So we wait for the rainy season with low humidity and then there will be less grains that are lost in the harvest. So there's no way to do it in the second harvest. So when there's so much rain, 300 millimeters, it's very difficult for you to have a monthly distribution of 300 millimeters where there's not enough room for harvest. That's what we're more concerned with is January with more than 300 millimeters.

In the past, they would say it's good when it rains at night and it's sunny during the day. That would be the ideal world. But what I'm saying is that in the predictions, when we start having a January that's over 300 to 200 millimeters, then you have problems with harvest in Mato Grosso. In the other regions where we don't have, it's our expectation that what do we do when we see the intensity of the phenomenon that's important for everyone, for anyone who has a farm or a company, that's what they do.

It's -- the intensity is similar to summer. So the last summer, what was the behavior during that summer? That's what we have to have more predictability. So we look at 15 or 17, and that's what the volumes are that I'm talking about.

Excellent. Thank you so much, Andre and Gustavo. Once again, everyone who stayed with us until the end to accompany the results of the first quarter, it's important to remember that we are just getting started our harvest years that the year of BrasilAgro starts in July and goes to the 30th of June. So there's still a lot of things to happen in this year. So until the next quarter.

[Statements in English on this transcript were spoken by an interpreter present on the live call.]

Good morning, everyone. We are here once again for the results call of BrasilAgro. I'm here with André Guillaumon and Gustavo. Today, we will be representing the complete numbers of the year. For those who are following us, our accounting number starts year -- goes from July to July. So today, we are reporting on the fourth harvest of the year '25. For those who are following us in English, we have simultaneous translation in English. Thank you so much. I'm going to pass the floor to André.

Thank you, Ana Paula. Thank you to everyone. It is a pleasure once again to be with you to talk a little bit about how our year was? It was a year with a lot of challenges, a lot of volatility in the financial aspect. I would like to make a parenthesis. I remember in the past when we were discussing the budget of the year with the company's Board, the dollar was at BRL 4.80 and we went up to BRL 5.30. -- the middle of the way, we saw the exchange rate going to BRL 6.40, and now it's at BRL 5.40. So that shows the magnitude of volatility that we worked with during the year, and we're going to be showing you some numbers on how we worked to mitigate these volatilities.

So let us begin telling you about the numbers and results of the company. And there are new things, there are things that we want to share with you. First, I think the net revenue of the company was able to reach BRL 1.2 billion this year with an adjusted EBITDA of BRL 267 million and a net income at the end of the exercise of BRL 138 million that later we'll go into the details. Gustavo will show you the comparison of EBITDA a year-over-year. The difference is not very large. But when we look at the difference of financial costs and what we will show during the presentation.

Next slide, please. Well, here, there's a parenthesis. I always like to open a parenthesis. The focus of the company is operational and for real estate. I -- sometimes you might be surprised with the news that BrasilAgro is selling farms. Of course, we are going to sell farms. That is our business. And for those who do not understand this business, shouldn't even be making this kind of comments. It's important that everyone realizes that selling farms is part of our DNA, and we will be doing it when the market is good, when it is bad, we will always be selling farms.

That is our intrinsic characteristic of how we remunerate our shareholders is how we sell our assets. And this is the top numbers of how we've been selling properties, BRL 240 million with revenue from sales of farms, BRL 120 million is something that we had done previously. You know very well. We mark transactions only when we deliver the title. We sold in Alto Taquari 1,700 hectares, which -- in which remain 140 hectares, which we delivered at the end of this exercise after we finalized all of the sugarcane area, and then that's when we finalize that transaction.

This was a year that I think we need to celebrate from the real estate point of view. Everybody has been seeing the difficulties that there has been more loss of liquidity in the sector, but there is a ponderation here when we always talk about the diversification of cultures and regions. It's not only true for mitigation of operational and commercial risks. It's also true for the mitigation of our real estate risks. And what I am bringing from the sales that we did from the [indiscernible], we saw a sector of grains with more repressed margins in other sectors with bigger margins, and we saw a recovery of cattle raising over the year.

And once it recovered, we brought liquidity for an asset of cattle raising that we had in Bahia, and it was very assertive in recovering that liquidity. It was an asset that we required in the past for BRL 10 million, and we sold it now at a nominal value of BRL 140 million. We invested in it at the present moment of the transaction. It was accounted in our audit of BRL 30 million with all of the investments that we had made and the investments that had been amortized. So what I want to highlight here is that selling the farms are part of our DNA. We will always be doing this. That is important.

And here, I just wanted to make that very clear of how efficient we are in capturing other activities that are standing out and still carrying out the sales with other activities. The square on the next slide, reinforcing once again our DNA is where we bring the challenge when we would talk to the analysts with everyone that would accompany us, how difficult it was for us to calculate the EBITDA of me and Gustavo were able to do it, but the difficulty is foreseeing the sales. So I think better than forecasting is the history. It's the history that we have is the best forecast. So productive budgeting, we will add proactivity. So we look at the history of productivity for the last 5 years, and we brought this methodology so we could share with you. We bring the history of the sale of the company in the last 4 years. We sold BRL 1.9 billion in companies, an average sale of BRL 380 million per year. That's what the company knows how to do, and we will continue to do that. And then over the years, showing below the transactions and the nominal values of each one with the tier of every the investment.

Next slide, please. So continuing in this chapter, this real estate chapter, which is fundamental to the company for all of the investors that are following us. It's one of the important things for them. We this year do not recurrently evaluate the farms. We do it with third parties, and we are bringing to you firsthand the evaluation that was made by Deloitte, which is our evaluator for many years already year-over-year. So here, in this graph, we have an evaluation that is very important. And on the square below, it shows the evaluation of the plans of the company and what is the evaluation of Deloitte reached BRL 3.5 billion in our assets. The square above, we set up these 2 squares on the right and on top to show the capacity that the company has of adding value in the transformation of areas. When we look at the evaluation of the portfolio in the past it was BRL 300 million, BRL 500 million.

So then people ask me, oh André, if it was BRL 300 million, BRL 500 million, then in the middle, we sold BRL 550 million in funds. So that is the real capacity that we have to bring returns to the shareholders. So you might ask me, but André, how does this portfolio appreciate year-over-year or every 2 years? Well, it's because of our intrinsic activity, which is to add value, mature the land, bring in new operations where the EBITDA is changed in that area. So the important point in the last few years, there was an important maturing of our areas. There were massive investments that we are accompanying irrigation, an area that we had in bay area, we saw any irrigation that was representing 150 sacks. When we add irrigation, it has an important leap in value, and we are finalizing this in Hoja ginkgo plantation.

So part of this important gain is a reflection of this investment of this added value, and most of this comes from our capacity of maturing the portfolio. So I think what this is showing, and we always like to draw attention to this. I always play around and say that we want to be drivers and not the passengers of the vector of motivation. So we are always going to bet on the value that will value more than inflation. What we like to do, we put management, we put resources to not only have the basal appreciation, the appreciation that we see that is the fruit of the work of the entire transformation team of the company.

Next slide, please. Now a little bit more about the results, and I think this cooperates with the numbers that Gustavo will present to you. I would say that it was a year of stability. We are seeing the peak of soy now in the next few months, much more connected not to Chicago, but in function of what we are seeing in terms of recovery of the internal basis. You know this much better than me, what's happening in terms of the war, the non-imports of China and this production having its origin in Brazil has strengthened a lot of the basis in the last few months. And that just cooperates with our strategy when Gustavo showed the indebtedness when we collected the harvest in the month of February, March and April. We started the harvest and accelerated it as much as possible because over the harvest, it was very negative.

It went to 20 points negative, but we made a decision once again, that was very assertive. We said we're going to hold for all of the stability, the geopolitical stability that we had. We had a good part of the harvest stuck in Chicago. Also the exchange rate was stuck. So we also had the basis. So we did it in a financial account to carry the stock to the second semester. And we had to do an account of how much the base would be to pay for the financial costs. We did that. and it was worthwhile, and I think we will have bigger upsides. And in fact, the reality of the market today showed that this strategy was assertive. The base kept on going up. We were able to sell. We didn't sell everything. It's important to highlight that, but we started to sell when we understood that it was favorable. We ended up selling base of up to 600 positive points. It used to be less 20 in February and March.

So in average, we were able to have a better basis of what we had at the moment of the harvest. We will be operating in at 80 points, 90 points in average. When in the past, we had a basis of minus 20, minus 30. So once again, the company is very agile in this commercial business of soy. For corn, it's on average. We'll show you how things are going and cotton as well. We will see how the company behaved with the recovery of livestock. There was a punctual drop when the tariff came in, when the recovery of ethanol that was very connected basically. I think there are 2 important factors here. There is a harvest of sugarcane that is lower. We see in all of the expectations, there was a harvest were everybody was talking about BRL 660 million. Today, they're talking about 680 tons. And besides that, the increase of the mixture of ethanol and gasoline leaving 26 to 30, which will generate an additional demand of 1.6, 1.5 in the market that makes ethanol heat up, and we will show you how we were positioned in that as well. Sugar is walking a little bit on the side.

And now the next slide, Ana is always mad at me when we run up because we need to talk about how much the input came in because I'm sure somebody will ask me this question soon in the sequence. But I need to show you how in this business of ours, the challenge is working with the marginal contribution, and this is what we're bringing here. So the first thing is map, that's the phosphated cost. We were monitoring this and these balls that are here within the line. I asked for these balls to be here, but they look smaller. Next time we'll have a larger ball, but the balls that were within the line is the moment where the company made the decision of making an acquisition.

So on the first graph, we can show that we're -- there was phosphated fertilizer costing a lot more, $560, and we bought about 80% to 600 and 60%. So at the end of the year, the end of the harvest, we started to take a position. The next one is chloride of potassium chloride. We also made a decision there. We even bought it a little bit before the phosphated. We thought it was almost -- we were almost at the end of the well, but no one has a crystal ball. We do have a lot of knowledge on this business, and we are company with a lot of business knowledge and the margin of contribution made a lot of sense at that time.

So the company as well was able to buy chloride potassium at $560. That was a real -- that was very assertive and nitronate of I mean, I always say to my commercial team, the best way to get hydrogen -- nitrogen right is to buy it many times of the year because otherwise, we'll never get it right. But we have been showing how these purchases have been doing. And an important part is that we bought it the nitrogenate in the past, and it was assertive. The rest we are waiting for it to accommodate. The graph on the side shows the percentage of things that we started closing. And on the bottom, I think it shows the main question that you will ask and makes sense for Gustavo, how do you wait for margins in the next harvest. This shows us the margin of exchange and how they evolve.

The relationship of exchange is basically what accelerates and what deaccelerates. When we look at the number, everybody can see that the commercialization of soy is a bit more delayed. But basically, we see in our reading that this is because of the relationship of exchange. When the relationship is in favor, it weakens the base. So cooperating with the positive base because China is not buying from the United States, but it also corroborates with the market that's a bit more delayed from the present harvest and of the future harvest.

So the farmers are looking a lot about the relationship of exchange before they decide to buy inputs or sale grains. They're really connected to the inputs of exchange. So now we're going to talk about some good things and some bad things. The good things is the increase of the total volume of commercialized. The bad part is cotton, 38% less than we had projected besides the fact that we do not plant a lot of cotton, but we do have some cotton in Chaco, Paraguay, and we had a very severe drought in cotton in Paraguay that impacted us a lot, which gave us an expressive lowering in -- that in cotton.

So what are we doing now? Basically, the company already reduced the cotton for the next exercise. And just with cotton for irrigated areas, we know that the percentage of irrigated area has gone down a lot. So for '25 and '26, a good amount of it will be over irrigated areas and the irrigated areas is a very good margin with a lot of good, stable profitability. So we are going to keep cotton culture. It's an important value for cash generation for us, but we need to mitigate the volatility with this culture that is so expensive. So we will be planting 80% of cotton, and it will be over irrigated areas which mitigates the volatility for next year. We won't be here showing such a large variation in productivity.

Next slide. And I think here for sugarcane, you know that everything that's happening, we talked about opportunities in the market, and so nothing is different. There are 2 important effects. We had a summer, I would say, in a certain way in the productive sugarcane regions, especially in Sao Paulo and Maranhão, we had a January and February that was very below average, although we had a lot of rain during the year that was favorable, but the months of June -- January and February are also the months which we have the highest possibility of [indiscernible], which is a past tense that forms for sugarcane. So it was very rainy.

And this year, we mainly had a reduction in the temperatures, which was quite expressive in the months of April and May. So even if there was humidity in the soil, this development went down a lot and part of the sugarcane, which is reflected that we saw last year, part of it came in June in our results. So sugarcane for the beginning of the harvest was affected by that. So I think that the livestock in the company will be diminished in these next few years because of the sale of the asset that we commented on initially. The company has been doing a good work with the livestock. And so we start having to deinvest in this unit of the business. Undoubtedly, we will bring favorable results or in other words, the gain for the price of meat will definitely be transformed into results. So I think all of this is very positive, showing the ability of the company, both of investment and deinvestment in its assets.

[ GMV ] is along the lines of what we budgeted was already around 2% of deviation because of what I commented January and February with rains under the average. Paraguay is doing very well. What we were missing in rain is helping our revenues in Paraguay. So next slide. And I think the last -- previous to the last slide that I wanted to comment on basically is the evolution of the planted area. This shows the capacity of the company of readequating itself and reinventing itself, as I had been showing you previously. We were selling 1.9 in farms over the last few years.

And I think it's important, as I always say, we balance the results. We can't only sell farms because that was a company of the past and not have any operational results. So this is what we've been trying to maintain here, a balance of generation of EBITDA on the operational side of the area. So more and more, you can see this graph that is more colorful with the bases that are more colorful, which is how we are mitigating operational cases. So whoever looks at this graph a few years ago in production, you would see cane and soy. Today, we see other cultures gaining a lot of relevance.

And the graph on the right is how we've been gaining -- well, we do not have a magical area, but we believe in the 50-50, and it seems like it's a capacity for us to stabilize operational capacity. So I think that's a bit of that. Let's talk about new things and the things that we are working on, undoubtedly, we see in the world, agriculture will go through moments that if we do not have any increase in production, we will be going through tighter margins in the next few years. And at this moment of tighter margins are when we have to look for the most efficiency possible, not that the company is only doing this now, the company had already been doing this. You know that for 2 years ago, we already started to announce investments in telemetry and brands in real time.

And now we are bringing to you what we are building an operational center. We rented a small office. As we always said, we like small offices, 150 square meters. We rented an office of 100 square meters in Palmas, which is where we understand we can have a hub in our area of production is there and our curve will be there. So the operation will be centralized for monitoring all of the equipment. They will start to be monitoring through Palmas, whoever would like to get to know it, we have a split on the screen, but the management that will be in Palmas so that we can more and more look for efficiencies in our agricultural assertiveness.

Yesterday, I was discussing this with our people, and we saw updates in our own operations of almost 20% in diesel oil. That's quite relevant. So that has assertiveness, less time of the machines on off time. This is just to collaborate with you and share with you that we are setting up COA in a physical's way, which was focused on the units, and this will be centralized in Palmas that will give us an important leap in monitoring the operations and help us to be more effective in monitoring all the costs. This just prepares the land for artificial intelligence. This data lake that we are developing is where we will be able to add artificial intelligence. So it can be another disruptive point in Brazilian agribusiness as it was in the past, the Norman Borlaug, which was the hybridization of the first transgenic adventures.

I think artificial intelligence and the management of things in real time undoubtedly will give us important gains in agriculture. So just finalize the final head. We ended up with Chicago 1020. And here, it's important to mention that we started the exercise with 580. In the middle of the path, we had 640, a lot of stuff sold, an increase in margin that left everybody concerned in the beginning, but we adjusted our positions, and we were able to finalize in this way. The graph of soy on the right shows how we are taking positions for the next harvest. That is because the margins of contribution, which I commented to with you. We were buying the fertilizer at that moment. So we also had to sell soy, and that was very assertive. We were able to sell soy at around 1070, and there was still some instability, some economic instability, but it was made more sense for us to do 690 with the sold graph.

So this is what we did in terms of price, [ BRL 35 to BRL 65] with the current harvest. These are the numbers we're sharing with you and an exchange of BRL 544, the graph on the right in cotton, we already have this cotton with less volatility, irrigated being sold. So we are already more sold because of decision-making of reduction in the dry area. So since we diminished the dry area, we have a better percentage of the amount sold at BRL 665. That was also very assertive and that will give us a margin of contribution in the next campaign. That's very positive. Ethanol, 50%. We started this in the past.

Now we look at the screen of November at the area of BRL 2,900. We are also being able to carry this out and a very important line that I would like to draw your attention to are the receivables for '26. Everybody knows that the company basically has BRL 880 receivables in farms. This is marking us at every moment. So we have 80% of soy already sold, very similar to the P&L of the year in co-production. And the exchange rate is also very similar, BRL 6.26, so 80% of the receivables already sold with 60%. So now I pass the floor to Gustavo, and these numbers will be reflected in what -- in the numbers that he will be presenting.

Thank you so much, Andre. Thank you so much. I would also like to thank the presence of everybody. As Ana mentioned, when we began the conference, thank you for also a highlight of the exercise, the net total profit in 2025, we are talking about BRL 180 million, as Andre started to mention in the presentation. During the same period of the same year, the net profit was BRL 288 million. The main variation as is of custom for us to put in the graph on the higher part of the screen, we see how the result of the previous year until BRL 830 million and what were the main variations when we compare the 2 periods. One highlight, as Andre also showed was the evaluation of the different commodities and especially for corn and sugarcane, which was BRL 80 million in positive, there is also a higher number volume of volumes sold in sugarcane, which was positive, BRL 800 million. The real estate had certain changes of BRL 80 million. In the past, we had not sold BRL 20 million of the farm safra.

But in this exercise, we started the sale in Taquari in the first quarter and from the sale of preference that Andre also commented on here gave us a combined result of BRL 180 million. And this price and volume also provoked when we sold the highlight of the exercise. We saw that this combination of price and volume gave us 14%, an increase of BRL 17 million in 2025 and BRL 700 million in 2024. When we observe the adjusted EBITDA for the total of the period, we're talking about BRL 167 million. So that gives us 4% less compared to the previous period, very similar because afterwards, we will see that what's impacting the final results are the financial impacts, the financial final results, I think it's important to go to the right side, the lower right side because the main effects of the increase of interest rates and also the market volatility that Andre mentioned generated an impact which the number tended to 0 in impact.

And today, we're talking about BRL 80 million in negative results. So the revenue of financial applications are mainly the revenue of the cash applications of the company, even if we could have, let's say, even if we would have been able because of the interest rates increase, we could work with a cash flow that was a bit lower. This would generate an impact when we look at one year-over-year in millions of reals. So the passive interest rate, which would give us an influence that was we would have started in '24 in 5.5%. And now we started to work with [indiscernible] of 15%, even though the interest or CDI rates or the cost of the debt of the company is very low compared to what is practiced in the market.

But even then, the impact and the pressure that it's generating in the margins of the company are very relevant. So the 2 lines that continue, which is the update of the income to receive are for the first time, all of the contracts that are for long term, we need to register them for the liabilities and the right to use. And all of that impacts a difference that transits for the results. And over this year, we had the increase in interest rates over leases in sugarcane and remeasuring or renegotiation of a few contracts. And so that generated BRL 400 million negative. So the update of the receivables, as Andre already mentioned, we have BRL 700 million in sales of companies. So this index to the soy, we have to update it, so it can be the present number.

And in the previous year, we had a very strong volatility in the kind of exchange rate to this year, even though Andre mentioned that we started with the BRL 540 or BRL 560, it didn't reach BRL 670. It went back to BRL 540, which in the past was the variation that was presented and that it was neutral. But a summary here as everything on this line was compensated. What we can see is that last year, the cost of the debt was compensated, especially by the demarcation of the market. And this year, these demarcations were practically neutral, which shows how the passive interest rates start to present a very significant material impact. Another highlight is in 2025, we had a gain in the cost of BRL 53 million that were compensated mainly by a swap that we did in terms of the long-term debt with the inflation plus BRL 625 million and other amounts that were carried out with the cash prefix of BRL 270 million.

And part of that, we had done a swap in CDI. CDI was 9% for that period. And this year, the swap generated a loss for the debt of BRL 20 million. In 2024, the result of grains was practically neutral, but the result was negative in cotton of around BRL 5 million. And then the swap had also generated negative results. Well, going back to the highlights of the exercise, we have the margins of adjusted EBITDA that were 65%. And we can see in the part that's in the middle, the operational points was much better than it had been in the same period of '24, especially with sugarcane, corn and soy. And with the sale of the farm, which we had commented, it generated BRL 68 million less than we had originally expected in the last year.

On the next page, here, we see, as we had always commented, soy and sugarcane added up to 60% of the total gross revenue. And going back to soy, the gross result in BRL 76 million, the margin of 86%. The price was 7% less than was commercialized in the year of '24, maintaining a margin of opportunity very close to the previous year, of course, better because of the cost of inputs that were around BRL 140 lower, 8% corn, which is another activity, which, in fact, we had reduced the amount of commercialized and we started producing in some tons 167 to 67,000 tonnes was the consequence of the decision that we had made of not planting in that area because the margins -- the previous margins were very negative.

So even though we had an area of recovery of BRL 772 per ton in '24, but we had to confirm the cost with the lower price of inputs compared to the previous harvest, but we had difficulties with the production that generated this higher cost per production. Going to sugarcane, the gross result of BRL 86 million, I think that had come back to margins that were more historical, closer to 30% and an increment of margin, as we said, was especially in the increase of the price of land and also in the production with a higher level of sugar, but the impact of that price generated this very positive results.

And the increase of the cost is also connected to, as I commented, the leases and tons. And when you increase the price of land, it also impacts the cost of sugarcane. For beans, I think there's small volume. It's a culture that we are trying to diversify a bit with let's say, during the small harvest of Safra in regions where we believe there is a potential to be explored. And for cotton, I think it's a point, as Andre mentioned that -- in the case of Paraguay, it's very important that part of the decision of the company previously was to reduce the super -- the surface, as Andre said, with better productivity of production. But it is still a culture that we are trying to consolidate with our technical knowledge through areas of less volatility, which is the idea, but we still believe that -- we have the potential or opportunity to bring it in as a culture that can diversify our productive areas more.

The next thing that we see here is the cash flow of the company, BRL 870 million with debt of BRL 886 million, a cost of 91.22% of CDI with a net debt of BRL 785 million. Now we have the sale of BRL 567 million in the past in the committee and the financial committee. We added this to some follow-up, especially with the debt adjusted debt. And we did consider the BRL 850, and that's how we understand that we are always working with a level of indebtedness that is very low. The net adjusted debt in its value is like in that percentage. Usually, we work with an index of 80% and now we consider that we are quite reasonable in this sense.

On the right side, we have a program of amortization of the debt, BRL 757 million of the short-term for soy, which we defined as a strategy to capture better the premiums, BRL 486 million from 2 to 5 years, BRL 45 million every 5 years. And as I commented, it's also important to highlight what we still have [ BRL 44 million ] in soy bags that we will receive in the next few years. So what we have verified in the debt that has been very high, and it's impacting our high interest rates is the high interest, which is increasing the cost of credit. We see that in our company is not leveraged enough. We had an initial BRL 500 million to BRL 870 million. And a large part of that is due to the recognition of the interest rates of BRL 100 million, which is adding a lot of pressure to the company, especially if we have that factor of leveraging. So we see that it is affecting the health of the sector. It is increasing the price of the debt and the sector.

We also saw there's a lot of judicial recovery. So just for the definition of our cost, we've been considering this a lot because it's a completely different scenario with an interest rate of 9% and the level of that that's very hard to conduct any kind of decision or forecast. So a decision that we made was to reduce the surface of cotton and diversify that because we have seen with such high interest rates, it doesn't make sense to have some cotton come back.

On the next slide, we see the results of the company, we are bringing a proposal in dividends of BRL 5 billion that will be approved by the assembly. This represents a dividend for BRL 0.65. This is the historic -- history from the last 5 years of BRL 1.3 billion of distributed dividends with a return of around 6%. We understand that we will consider some of what I considered and the cost of interest rates, we have a few commodities in this sense, and it would be a good decision to try to preserve this a bit, which is the decision of the company to pay this amount.

Next slide. Well, here, for the investors which are accompanying us, we will have a BrasilAgro Day on the 26th, so you can get in contact with us from the Relations, Investor Relations to coordinate your presence. Thank you so much. And now we can go into questions and answers.

Thank you Gustavo. Thank you, Andre. Thank you for talking about our BrasilAgro Day, all of the -- we are open now for all of the -- those who want to participate, remember that you should make your participation as soon as possible because we have limited vacancies. Well, now we have our first question.

I have 2 points, Andre, to explore. I think the first would be, well, you already talked about it in the beginning, but I could not let this pass. So you advanced well in buying a few inputs in a few commodities. And it seems like you are in a better position in relation to the market. I wanted to hear from you what your margin expectations are and which -- what you already have visibility and what you already know, which you already have directions and then try to make it relative with what you see for the industry.

You already talked about how you expect the margins to be compressed in the next few years. So how are you seeing that and your expectations? And then the second question, focusing more on the appraisal and the internal appraisal that you do plans and on the external. It seems like you are more conservative in relation to the other valuations and price per hectare. Is there any more specific discrepancy that you could highlight? Is there any region or if it's some kind of land in connection or not, which divert with your external numbers. Maybe it would be interesting for us to understand that divergence better.

Well, let's start with the second, and then we'll talk about the margins because then Gustavo will get to ping pong with the appraisal. First of all Gustavo. Thank you for your participation. As always, your questions are very intelligent. What I would say is the following. What is good to talk about. We currently sell farms over the evaluation of Deloitte. That's one point. Everybody here I mean, nobody here has any bonification or any incentive exchange for appraisal. So we are very conservative.

What I would say on that because why is there so much difference if you look at the last year, the difference was lower and this year was higher I'm going to stick to the point. The first is the good news. Deloitte is get better than us. Great. The investor is very happy. We're always going to sell higher than Deloitte. So what could be happening Gustavo? This is very clear, is the moment when there is an increase of TAC of interest rate.

So what is our methodology. It's the knowledge that we have on the market. We do not have a methodology like Deloitte has to say, "Oh, it's an ABNT that has its comparisons that gets the transactions." They have their own methodology. Now our methodology, those who are in the market all the time buying and selling firms. We have familiarity with the price. What do I see that changes a lot in these moments?

And so what do we do? In a certain way, the sales of the company have a larger deadline than the market sales, and that makes a lot of sense. If you have a cost of capital that is more efficient than your buyer, I want the deadline to be here. So I do not want to sell farms in cash and then for him to sell to be paying the interest rates to the bank.

So that's part of our strategy to sometimes have a longer-term sale because the cost of efficiency of capital is better for the majority of our buyers. So that's usually what happens. Now when you look at Deloitte against BrasilAgro, in a certain way, we have a larger duration of sale and then complementing to what I just told you, when you have a higher tax discount, you generate a larger gap of difference.

So I think that's it. In a certain way, the evaluations are very much in line. We have very specific points. This is usually recurrent. So since you have a region where you have more current transactions, let's say the case of Bahia, you have more appreciation at Deloitte than we do. When you go to Maranhão or Piauí, where you have less current transactions and larger transactions happening. You have an average price of the region that's lower.

So when you get the average price of the region that's lower and you put it on a higher asset generates a difference as well, but nothing can jump to the 40 to 30 difference from one evaluation to the next. What I said is that the methodology, the way you bring the discounts, the way we prefer to have a larger deadline. And the third point is how the methodology of -- the sample methodology of Deloitte comes from transactions, just as we have in by an average price of the average size lower than our properties, you have another price.

And then another area where you have less concurrent transactions, the price is a little bit better than Deloitte. But there are small differences. So when you look at the details, which you definitely looked at the details you see that some are worth more and some are worth less, and that's exactly what I'm trying to say to you.

The next one, margin visibility. I mean it's -- what is the concern? I'm going to take the BrasilAgro often talk more about the sector right now. What are we seeing? We've been taking positions. I think this is the year of discipline where the farmers need to be very disciplined. But just like the reason you are now. So what happened in the harvest -- in the last harvest because of a happy coincidence. We saw the dislocation of the exchange rates, right? When the farmers were looking for revenue.

The last harvest, they planted with $1.470, $1.480, then all of the stability came and he sold at the average of $1. That was a bit more expensive. That really tightened the financial situation, because we bought with a cheaper dollar and sold with a more expensive dollar. He already had some part of the production was still open. And majority, he sold it with a more expensive dollar than he had decided to when he had in his costs.

What are the concerns for the future? We are entering a time of formation of the harvest. It doesn't matter who bought earlier or later, but let's say he bought with the $1.560, not the $1 of today. Because today, farmers already have their inputs at home. They already have their applied fertilizers.

So the farmer comes in with a harvest with a higher dollar, more expensive dollar. And last year is a political year, it's the year of volatility. No one is going to -- it's not about being right or left, but we want Brazil with more stable -- fiscal stability. If there are trends or which show that we will have fiscal adjustments that are more balanced than there is a trend to once again add pressure for the reduction of the exchange rate.

And then what happens is that the opposite of what happened this year. You planted with a cheaper dollar -- and next year, the trend if that continues happening, which we expect for the country is that the trend is that we will close the year because of the exchange rate.

So that is the visibility, especially when we look at exchange. When we look at the offer, well, what regulates, it's the offer and the demand and the offer. And then we have China, which is at a lower amount. And then you have Brazil again coming with the relevance production of the United States confirming its production. So we have a stock of passage, although there are uncertainties in the market that STA seems very high.

But all that mess in my 34 years working in the farms, I was saying, oh, people are migrating more for corn. Well, in my knowledge, everything goes back and forth. So it's nothing if you look at all of the migrations in the last 30 to 40 years of American agriculture, that's what we're talking about 3 and 4.5 more or less because of the migration of corn to soy or the inverse.

In summary, we're going to reach a market that's going to have high offers, higher offerings of stock, which will be able to keep these levels, the level -- the current level. So we are talking about climate, we're talking about biology, about if in the middle of the way, there's any climatic event that will affect this relation of supply and demand, everything that I'm saying is not going to be true, but in the structural aspects of right now, we have the concern for a reduction of margin in the next few years, until these stocks regulate and how will they regulate. They always regulate.

The cost of production that is high, lower margins you remove your foot from the daily transformation. The offer and the demand, on the other hand, is something that is constant. So we also do not have a disruptive event at the side of income, but we have been yielding for years at margins very similar to they are now. It's not like it's a disaster or any of that. But it's very similar and the farmers need to be very prepared to work with these different costs of revenue and income and so.

Thank you so much Andre. A little bit about numbers. The previous year, we started with a cost per hectare for soy and now it's a different number and especially for fertilizers that Andre was showing us and the fertilizers that has happened for almost everything around 6%, 7%. When we go into corn 3,000 to 4,000 -- when we go to cotton, that was the one that when we looked at the cost, 13,000, went to 14,700. That's something that we also saw that took us back when we talk about margin, it was very similar to this year, especially when we talk about the case of soy.

And in our case, with the premise, well, it was dropping at BRL 4,000 per hectare, and now it's 500 per hectare. And what was bank confirmed that now we are going to have to work with the impacts of productivity of sugarcane, but we are also talking about BRL 4000 per margin. So we were foreseeing an EBITDA and operational EBIT very similar to 2024, '25 was in this harvest.

Next question from Thiago Duarte.

Gustavo. It's a great moment. I actually have a few points. The first one is about the proposal of dividends. So it's the lowest in the last 5 years. I imagine that, that is associated to this more careful panorama that Andre talked about when he was talking to Gustavo and his initial considerations, but also draws my attention considering the balance of the company, the company is very healthy.

As you well demonstrated -- when we look at the indebtedness of the company, and we deduce the receivables, the company has no debt. So I would like to understand better from the point of view of capital allocation if we should be careful or if the company sees other uses of capital in this scenario of low margins, maybe there will be more opportunities to grow. Andre like the cycle of growth, which we talked about in [ follow ]. I don't know if that has something to do with that. And that would be the first question.

The second question would be the transformed area. -- the last year, you transformed a little bit more than 3,000 acres when you have an average of 10,000 acres in the last previous years. I also would like to understand while this deacceleration happened, I imagine that the conditions today, let's say, thinking about the tier of daily areas the cost of developed area went up.

Maybe you could talk a little bit more about that as well. And finally, it's more like a follow-up when you mentioned the difficulties you talked about the management of a cotton in Paraguay. I remember when you entered into Paraguay, I believe that, that was an area with a lot of aptitude for soy. And then you just wanted to understand this venture that you have on top of cotton and understand.

Well, you talked a lot about learning thing, of course, that's very natural for a company that's always trying to diversify that high, where you see more colors.

But I wanted to understand if the expectation is to maintain that area of cotton in Paraguay with everything that we saw this year. Those are the three questions.

Well, Thiago, good morning. As always, this is the analyst Gustavo, these are very intelligent questions here coming up. So first of all, I'll go backwards to forwards. Cotton. In Chaco Paraguay, it's a very high cost of production. It's a very relevant factor. For Chaco, there is a lot of instability because of the climate, the radicular cotton comes, gaining body at Chaco, not only in BrasilAgro, but not only with our company, there 3 years ago, when we planted cotton in Chaco, we were planting in our first 800 hectares. And at that time, Chaco Paraguay was producing 16,000 acres of cotton us with 800 the old region, was planting 16, 17, especially with the Mennonite cooperatives and we went to 2010. Now -- and in Chaco Paraguay, in the last harvest Chaco produced 45,000 hectares of cotton. Just for you to have an idea, and I'm sure you have these numbers very fresh in your mind.

If we consider Chaco Paraguay, a Brazilian state today, it would be the third state in the level of cotton production. It would be Mato Grosso and then Bahia and then the third Brazilian state would be Chaco Paraguay with 45,000 hectares. There are a lot of other states in Brazil, producing with 35,000 and then the numbers start falling, but there was an important increase of this in Paraguay, this is what I commented.

The culture is more resistant to extract. And later, I can tell you how we saw this empirically. We had this discovery there. And undoubtedly, what happened this year was a sum of factors. So as incredible as it may sound, a great reduction of our production in Chaco Paraguay this year was not because of a lack of water in cotton. It was because of too much rain. We planted cotton in December, especially cotton suffered because of the drought that soy suffered in February and March.

But until then, cotton was very strong. We had all of the numbers as we had decided upon as we had budgeted. So everything was going right, then what happened. Very strong rain came in March and April, especially April and May when cotton had already opened, we had more than 500 millimeters of rain. So that shows that the drought well -- the drought wasn't the problem that we saw was in excess of rain in a few months.

So this makes us be very careful. I think we are going to continue to plant cotton, we're going to have a daily reduction, but I believe cotton is a vector of transformation for the real estate cost, we will just be readequating it in 2 or 3 years with lower margins there, we might have a readequation because there is a very important efficiency there. It's a paradise to come in and nobody leaves when you get in.

So -- our main concern is to balance this out. So we are working there to balance the entrance and excess of flows because of the volatility. The transformation area, which was your second question. What happened in the area of exploitation. I think you remembered you worked with us in the past on the follow-on of the company, when we issued the follow-on, we issued the [indiscernible].

We had a very important concern, which was to accelerate the development as much as possible. So we were racing at that time, basically Brazil with the exception of [ Panambi ], which was a farm that we bought a few years ago. We are finishing the transformation of Chapparal House has no more areas to open. We are finalizing a few things [indiscernible] that we are still missing -- so the reduction of the transformation was because the purpose in the past was reached, have a cross -- have the capital in the company and accelerate the transformation, because we saw this entire discussion of commercial restriction of a few tradings in '25.

So we worked very hard to have that done and we had to reach levels that were even lower and this number is very similar because in Chaco Paraguay, that was the number that we understand accommodate the need for cash flow, it accommodates the operation because it's a heavier opening area than it is in Cerrado of Brazil. So that is the number that we should expect.

There is a need for transformation in Brazil. So just to explain part of the reduction was because of this main objective that we had. Now your third question, and my third answer. Thank you. Where I would add being careful on opportunities. Those are the two things. First, care, being careful because we do not know how the interest rates will go up, no matter how much the company will run with operational numbers. We do not want to pay extra for capital cost.

The challenge here is that my current debt has interest and my receivables from the firm do not have any corrections. They are corrected by soy. But if soy walks hand-in-hand and that's our expectation, we'll have a debt and receivable walking hand-in-hand and that's where we need to be careful, which you very well mentioned, to bring this level of identities, which is very healthy. And today, our net debt is 0, and it will be positive. And that's part of our business. And so when we look at the recurrence of dividends paid in the last few years, I have no doubt that we've been one of the best dividend payers, companies and in 75 we see 3.5% of yield maintaining an average of yield at the house of 9.

So I believe that the market will manage the company. So there's a point of attention. There's a debt that I don't know when the descendant CDI curve will happen. There's a part that's not connected to a debt because it's stuck in soy, soy is more stable on the future, and there's also the generation of business opportunities because of all this that will generate opportunities. So I don't think there's one word that we can use to say bingo, but I think it's a sum of different factors.

I tried to complement as well. I believe that in the last 3 years, I think it was BRL 450 million invested in the funds, not in irrigation or area, but I think we also have for this year CapEx of around BRL 130 million. So at some moment, we thought, well, a little bit of both. One is to preserve the company for an eventual purchase or acquisition. And since we have a large volume of investments in irrigation, more than BRL 36,000 million. We want to renovate not diminish the average age of our sugarcane plantations. So there is a large CapEx in plantation with sugarcane.

So I think there are several projects that we are understanding that make a lot of sense. And with the interest rates and this level, of course, are a bit difficult even to approve them.

Next question from Pedro Fonseca from XP.

Good morning, Andre, Gustavo. Thank you for getting our questions. The first question, I wanted to explore is a change of mix with the more -- so is there any data that the COGS as a culture where we need a few years of investment with more traffic?

And then the second point Andre, you already commented that the company will focus more on content. I wanted to hear more on what's behind the strategy and changing the mix, if maybe it's more connected to optimism and related to corn or if it's more conjunctural because of the mix of the company and for the next years.

So I think these are the last questions that I would like to explore. And the second point is in relation to the strategy of acquisition of the hydrogen. When we look at the level of acquisition of the company, it's much more delayed in relation to last year. So at this time, the company would have purchase a higher amount urea. So why is there this longer delay with urea?

Does the company think that the exchange rate, which is very terrible today can improve? Or do you think we will eventually see the company using less nitrogen in the next harvest using the stock that's available and the soil that is -- those are my questions. Thank you, everyone.

Okay. Now you asked questions to the agronomer. Let's start with your last question. I'm only starting with the last question, not to make a mess, but that's how -- so nitrogenase, agronomically is the only nutrient that you cannot use stocks in the soil. You can use potassium phosphate, nitrogen and unfortunately, not nitrogen if it's available in the soy, it's nitrogen that's as available in the soy is compressed from the material and it will be made available for the system.

So the economy of nitrogen, if anybody says they're going to do that for you, take note. It's a reduction of productivity. So that's the first point. You cannot do that with nitrogenase, And then some of it comes from the discussion of certification. Basically, our nitrogenase, has 2 main motives. It has cotton and [Foreign Language], the corn of the smaller harvest and nitrogenase, which we are using today is for the fertilizer of corn. Yes, we are sugarcane. So we are a bit later, but the 2 things we're not betting on, but we have a challenge to work with more just in time, not carrying stock at a moment in which you have high cost of test, but also the other years, as we saw the price of nitrogenase was very higher within the numbers we went and started using that in the sugarcane harvest.

And now we are more prudent because of the cost of capital. Of course, we're phosphated, you said there's the cost of capital, let's just do it. So we did it. Nitrogenase, as we said, we didn't do it. And if you ask us what are you seeing for the future, I think it will accommodate the price discussions of things that may affect the price, Russia, Ukraine, all of that will affect the price of petroleum and of course, it will affect the price of nitrogen.

So it's not like we are betting our peace there. Of course, we are as citizens. But of course, that may bring the issue of the year having a higher cost of capital and to use it over the whole year. The decision of nitrogenase it was a little bit about what I mentioned. We are going to buy nitrogenase from hand to mouth when you need it, you buy it.

So could be at the end of the harvest, you'll say, well, we got the average price wrong, but the strategy of buying Nitrogenase from has always been very. Well, cotton versus corn, there is a weight in this -- and we started to see stability -- more stability of formation or a better market of corn derivatives.

So we start to have more predictability. It's important to have you know. So we have been -- we were one of the first companies to work with corn, the largest producers of corn. So we were not the largest producers, but we understood made sense that we had a large problem of liquidity. So if you ask me what change in corn from them to now, I think the liquidity of the derivatives of BMF checking -- that's when you start having more predictability.

Gustavo will also remember. Every time we're discussing the budget in H1, May -- it doesn't -- did it make sense buy corn. So if it would generate margin corn was always bad. We always think the decision to make it. What's changing in the next few years is that we start to see the market of corn derivatives that allow us to start working some, that's one point.

The second point is that we need to see with the corn is a low added value product, just not like that's times 2 worth times 2 corn. So -- it's a situation that you accompany much better. The ethanol plants are getting you to capture part of the price of corn in this premium, which I'm going to call less economy and less logistical costs transfer the corn long distance.

So that is also something that has made us be audacious. So that's a combination of growth in the cost of capital, which is more capital for cotton, corn, less -- a bit more repredictability, the market of ethanol, which is much more liquidity in your pocket because of the vehicles and also ethanol, making sure you have the logistical redistribution and the distribution of corn. So these 3 things, I mean, I'm very optimistic for the growth of corn in Brazil and BrasilAgro is going to grow because of this as well.

That was very clear. If I could just make a quick follow-up. When we talk about very strong growth of the harvest corn in the projections of the company. It would be in which states?

basically, Piauí and Maranhão, basically Piauí and Maranhão.

Thank you so much for everyone's presence, Andre and Gustavo, for your availability at this call. We went over time today. So I'd like to thank everyone who remained until the end with us, and we will be closing this call for now. Thank you. Goodbye.